Three essays examining the political, social, and economic factors determining agricultural productivity and resource allocation

Abstract

1 While existing literature on distributive politics mainly focuses on allocation across constituencies, regions, and ethnic groups, internal distribution within administrative frameworks is susceptible to elite capture, particularly through political alignment between central and local governments. This study examines the impact of such political alignment on the redistribution of input coupons within constituencies in Malawi’s agricultural subsidy program. Using nationwide Integrated Household Survey (IHS) data and tripartite election results, we employ a difference-in-differences design. The results support the co-partisan hypothesis, showing that input coupons are disproportionately allocated to ruling party constituencies and wards. Additionally, redistribution within constituencies, particularly between politically aligned and non-aligned wards, also strongly supports the co-partisan hypothesis. Specifically, households in ruling party wards are notably more likely to receive input coupons compared to their counterparts in opposition wards, regardless of the constituency’s political affiliation. 2 This paper explores the role of customary tenure systems in redistributing farmland resources within developing countries, which often face challenges such as market imperfections. Focusing on Malawi, where the farmland market is underdeveloped and land acquisition predominantly occurs through customary tenure systems, the study utilizes data from the National Integrated Household Panel Survey. The study uses Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and binary choice models to analyze the data. The findings reveal that higher farming ability is significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood of participating in inherited farmland. In contrast, farmland allocated by chiefs is positively associated with farming ability. Thus, while inherited land is inefficient in its allocation, farmland distributed by chiefs appears to be more efficient, as it correlates with positive farming ability. The total household landholding size does not significantly affect participation in customary farmland tenure systems. These results suggest that customary tenure systems promote equitable land distribution despite the inefficiencies observed with inherited farmland. 3 This paper investigates the impact of seasonal plot-level irrigation on agricultural and labor productivity in Rwanda. Using household-plot-year fixed effects regressions and data from Rwanda’s Land and Water Husbandry (LWH) project, the study examines the effects of irrigation during rainy seasons A (September to February) and B (March to June) on crop yield and labor productivity. Results indicate that irrigation significantly enhances productivity more during season A than season B. Specifically, during season A, irrigation increases yields for all crops combined by 43.1% and 37.3% for legumes compared to non-irrigated plots, while in season B, irrigation increases the productivity of legumes by 23.4% compared to non-irrigated plots. Additionally, irrigation increases household and total labor productivity by 14.1% and 13.6%, respectively, compared to non-irrigated fields in season A, with no significant effect observed in season B. The findings highlight the differential impacts of irrigation across seasons, emphasizing the importance of optimizing irrigation practices to enhance crop yields and resource efficiency. These results underscore the need for targeted policy interventions for efficient seasonal irrigation to ultimately improving food security and economic stability in drought-prone regions