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A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns

Title
A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns
Authors
Hwang, SunJoo
Issue Date
2016-05
Abstract
A person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns.
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11125/21709
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2016


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