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Leniency Policies and Cartel Success: An Experiment

KIM, Jeong Yeol / Noussair, Charles N.

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Abstract

Cartels are often fought by granting leniency, in the form of forgiveness of penalties, to whistle-blowers. This study employs a laboratory experiment to compare leniency programs that differ with respect to fine size and whether a second whistle-blower may apply for leniency. The results show that leniency does not affect the probability that a cartel forms, but is effective in exposing cartels and thereby inhibiting cartel success. Higher fines are more effective, but allowing leniency to a second whistle-blower is no more effective than granting leniency to only one whistle-blower.

Issue Date
2023-09
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Keywords(Author)
Antitrust; Cartel; Leniency Policy; Experiment
DOI
10.1007/s11151-023-09915-z
Journal Title
Review of Industrial Organization
ISSN
0889-938X
Language
English
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