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International Conflict, Military Rule, and Violent Authoritarian Breakdown

Bae, Joonbum

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Abstract

Why do some transitions of power from military rule occur violently while others do not? What effect, if any, does the international security environment have on how violent breakdowns of authoritarian rule are? I argue a conflict-prone security environment ameliorates the commitment problem by ensuring an influential role for the military out of power. Therefore, when facing a domestic crisis in a threatening security environment, military leaders are more likely to peacefully cede power rather than wield violent measures to stay in office. Perhaps counter-intuitively, international conflicts thus lead to transitions of power from military rule that minimize violence and human costs. International conflicts do not have this moderating effect on other types of authoritarian rule.

Issue Date
2019-09
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
DOI
10.1080/03050629.2019.1647837
Journal Title
International Interactions
Start Page
804
End Page
837
ISSN
0305-0629
Language
English
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