A game-theoretic analysis of Inter-Korean transboundary rivers

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to establish a management strategy for the reasonable and equitable utilization of the inter-Korean transboundary rivers through the case of the Imnam Dam on the Bukhan River and the Hwanggang Dam on the Imjin River. As a methodology, game theoretic approach was deployed to explore a solution to the problems of the transboundary rivers between North Korea and South Korea. The existing studies dealing with the inter-Korean negotiations on the transboundary rivers have focused primarily on establishing counter-strategies under non-cooperative circumstances. However, in this research, the possibility of collaboration between the two Koreas was set up by analyzing the scenarios as cooperative games that link rewards. Besides, a methodology is presented that can quantify and evaluate the conditions of cooperation and reward for the best benefits of the two Koreas. The most favorable way for the two Koreas to enjoy the best benefits is that North Korea allocates river flow to South Korea and South Korea actively invests in joint development projects as a reward for it, such as the modernization of North Korea''s deteriorating hydroelectric power facilities, etc.