The Political Economy of the Linear Earnings Profile for Teachers in Korea

Lee, Ju Ho / Yoo, Gyeongjoon

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dc.contributor.authorLee, Ju Ho-
dc.contributor.authorYoo, Gyeongjoon-
dc.description.abstractIn Korea, teachers salaries continuously grow with seniority until they reach the retiring point. We argue that not only the theory of human capital but also the theories of delayed payment contracts fail to explain for this pattern. We then explore an alternative explanation based on the political economic interpretation. We argue that the previous regimes of Korea have utilized the linear earnings profile by casting parts of their financial cost for hiring qualified teachers onto the next regime, or the next generations, in the process of rapid expansion of the educational system.-
dc.description.tableOfContentsI. Introduction II. Earnings Profile III. Earnings Function IV. Seniority Pay and Productivity V. The Political Economy VI. Conclusions Bibliography-
dc.publisherKorea Development Institute-
dc.relation.isPartOfSeriesKDI Working Paper 2000-05-
dc.titleThe Political Economy of the Linear Earnings Profile for Teachers in Korea-
dc.typeWorking Paper-
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthorLee, Ju Ho-
dc.type.docTypeWorking Paper-
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