Contents

Antidumping Echoing

Tabakis, Chrysostomos / Zanardi, Maurizio

Abstract

This article documents that antidumping (AD) "echoing" (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD. We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import-competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political-economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political-economy-driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.

Issue Date
2017-04
Publisher
WILEY
Citation
ECONOMIC INQUIRY, v.55, no.2, pp.655 - 681, 2017
DOI
10.1111/ecin.12369
Journal Title
ECONOMIC INQUIRY
Start Page
655
End Page
681
ISSN
0095-2583
Language
English
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