Contents
A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Hwang, SunJoo | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-02-13T08:38:44Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-02-13T08:38:44Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-05 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/21709 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | A person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns. | en_US |
| dc.title | A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns | en_US |
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