대테러전략의 게임이론적 분석

대테러전략의 게임이론적 분석

이상훈

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	이상훈	-
dc.date.accessioned	2016-07-27T06:44:17Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-09-05	-
dc.date.available	2016-07-27T06:44:17Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-09-05	-
dc.identifier.other	2396	-
dc.identifier.uri	https://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/19325	-
dc.description.abstract	This paper analyzes a situation where multiple targets are exposed to a potential terrorist attack. The probability of an attack is determined endogenously in a game where a terrorist chooses the target while the targets independently determine the level	-
dc.description.tableOfContents	Ⅰ. Introduction 　Ⅱ. Model 　Ⅲ. Equilibrium 　Ⅳ. Analysis 　Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks	-
dc.language	en	-
dc.publisher	한국개발연구원	-
dc.publisher	Korea Development Institute	-
dc.relation.isPartOf	13234	-
dc.rights	CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 KR	-
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/kr/	-
dc.title	대테러전략의 게임이론적 분석	-
dc.title.alternative	Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets	-
dc.type	Article	-
dc.relation.startpage	93	-
dc.relation.lastpage	124	-
dc.relation.volume	35	-
dc.relation.no	3	-