Contents

대테러전략의 게임이론적 분석

이상훈

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.author이상훈-
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-27T06:44:17Z-
dc.date.available2013-09-05-
dc.date.available2016-07-27T06:44:17Z-
dc.date.issued2013-09-05-
dc.identifier.other2396-
dc.identifier.urihttps://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/19325-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a situation where multiple targets are exposed to a potential terrorist attack. The probability of an attack is determined endogenously in a game where a terrorist chooses the target while the targets independently determine the level-
dc.description.tableOfContentsⅠ. Introduction  Ⅱ. Model  Ⅲ. Equilibrium  Ⅳ. Analysis  Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks-
dc.languageen-
dc.publisher한국개발연구원-
dc.publisherKorea Development Institute-
dc.relation.isPartOf13234-
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 2.0 KR-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/kr/-
dc.title대테러전략의 게임이론적 분석-
dc.title.alternativeDefending Multiple Terrorist Targets-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.relation.startpage93-
dc.relation.lastpage124-
dc.relation.volume35-
dc.relation.no3-
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