Contents

불완전한 금융계약하에서의 자본투자의 외부성에 관한 연구

이준상

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.author이준상-
dc.contributor.other일리 첸-
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-27T06:44:01Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-19-
dc.date.available2016-07-27T06:44:01Z-
dc.date.issued2012-05-31-
dc.identifier.other2183-
dc.identifier.urihttps://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/19294-
dc.description.abstractWe study externality costs of capital investment under limited commitment. We solve for the constrained efficient allocation with a limited commitment environment and find positive externality costs of capital investment provided that full-risk-sharing is-
dc.description.tableOfContentsⅠ. Introduction  Ⅱ. Model  Ⅲ. Characterization of Steady State Allocation  Ⅳ. Decentralization with Solvency Constraints andCapital Income Taxes  Ⅴ. Concluding Remark  References  Appendix-
dc.languageen-
dc.publisher한국개발연구원-
dc.publisherKorea Development Institute-
dc.relation.isPartOf12415-
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 2.0 KR-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/kr/-
dc.title불완전한 금융계약하에서의 자본투자의 외부성에 관한 연구-
dc.title.alternativeExternality Cost of Capital Investment in Limited Commitment-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.relation.startpage19-
dc.relation.lastpage40-
dc.relation.volume34-
dc.relation.no2-
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