Contents

고정관념과 불평등: 정체성 선택에 관한 신호이론

김영철

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.author김영철-
dc.contributor.other글렌 라우리-
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-27T06:44:00Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-19-
dc.date.available2016-07-27T06:44:00Z-
dc.date.issued2012-05-31-
dc.identifier.other2182-
dc.identifier.urihttps://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/19293-
dc.description.abstractWe develop an identity choice model within the context of a stereotyping-cum-signaling framework. The model allows us to explore implications of the fact that, when individuals can choose identity, then the distribution of abilities within distinct identi-
dc.description.tableOfContentsⅠ. Introduction Ⅱ. Model with the Identity Choice Ⅲ. Stereotyping Equilibrium Ⅳ. Implications and Further Discussion Ⅴ. Conclusion References Appendix-
dc.languageen-
dc.publisher한국개발연구원-
dc.publisherKorea Development Institute-
dc.relation.isPartOf12415-
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 2.0 KR-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/kr/-
dc.title고정관념과 불평등: 정체성 선택에 관한 신호이론-
dc.title.alternativeStereotypes and Inequality: A ‘Signaling’ Theory of Identity Choice-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.relation.startpage4-
dc.relation.lastpage15-
dc.relation.volume34-
dc.relation.no2-
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