공공수용 보상에 관한 유인체계 분석
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 이호준 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-27T06:43:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-11 | - |
dc.date.available | 2016-07-27T06:43:54Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011-10-28 | - |
dc.identifier.other | 2067 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/19279 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study incentive structures of public developers and land owners in the process of public expropriations using a sequential game model. In the model, we show that there is an incentive for the public developer to give more compensation than just compens | - |
dc.description.tableOfContents | Ⅰ. 서 론 Ⅱ. 관련 선행 연구 Ⅲ. 기본이론모형 Ⅳ. 피수용자의 반발과 균형보상액 Ⅴ. 정당보상 달성을 위한 권한위임(Authority Delegation)모형 Ⅵ. 결 론 부 록 | - |
dc.language | ko | - |
dc.publisher | 한국개발연구원 | - |
dc.publisher | Korea Development Institute | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | 12096 | - |
dc.rights | CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 KR | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/kr/ | - |
dc.title | 공공수용 보상에 관한 유인체계 분석 | - |
dc.title.alternative | Incentive Structures in the Compensation for Public Expropriation | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.subject.jel | Property Law | - |
dc.subject.jel | Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory | - |
dc.subject.jel | Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design | - |
dc.subject.jel | Land Use Patterns | - |
dc.relation.startpage | 121 | - |
dc.relation.lastpage | 161 | - |
dc.relation.volume | 33 | - |
dc.relation.no | 3 | - |
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