Contents

은행 임원의 주식기준 보상과 위험추구

여은정

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.author여은정-
dc.contributor.other윤경수-
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-27T06:43:51Z-
dc.date.available2011-08-12-
dc.date.available2016-07-27T06:43:51Z-
dc.date.issued2011-06-30-
dc.identifier.other2043-
dc.identifier.urihttps://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/19271-
dc.description.abstractThis study examines the compensation scheme for the executives and risk-taking behavior in the Korean banks. Theoretically, shareholders prefer risky asset choice to the optimal one due to the limited liability feature of reward, and stock-based executive-
dc.description.tableOfContentsⅠ. 서 론  Ⅱ. 보상체계와 위험추구에관한 이론적 검토  Ⅲ. 실증분석  Ⅳ. 결 론  참 고 문 헌  부 록-
dc.languageko-
dc.publisher한국개발연구원-
dc.publisherKorea Development Institute-
dc.relation.isPartOf12006-
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 2.0 KR-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/kr/-
dc.title은행 임원의 주식기준 보상과 위험추구-
dc.title.alternativeStock-based Managerial Compensation and Risk-taking in Bank-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.subject.jelBanks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages-
dc.relation.startpage41-
dc.relation.lastpage79-
dc.relation.volume33-
dc.relation.no2-
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