지방분권제도에 대한 정치경제학적 분석

김재훈

김재훈

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	김재훈	-
dc.date.accessioned	2016-07-27T06:43:26Z	-
dc.date.available	2009-07-17	-
dc.date.available	2016-07-27T06:43:26Z	-
dc.date.issued	2009-06-30	-
dc.identifier.other	1807	-
dc.identifier.uri	https://archives.kdischool.ac.kr/handle/11125/19229	-
dc.description.abstract	This paper studies the logic of fiscal constraints and fiscal autonomy in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The electoral process not only disciplines incumbents who may act against the public interest but also opts i	-
dc.description.tableOfContents	Ⅰ. 서 론 Ⅱ. 기존 연구 　1. 이론적 논의 　2. 실증적 분석 Ⅲ. 모 형 　1. 자치단체장 모형 　2. 중앙정치인(지역구의원) 모형 　3. 경선제도 모형 Ⅳ. 정책적 시사점 및 향후 연구과제 　1. 정책적 시사점 　2. 향후 연구과제 참고문헌 부 록	-
dc.language	ko	-
dc.publisher	한국개발연구원	-
dc.publisher	Korea Development Institute	-
dc.relation.isPartOf	11012	-
dc.rights	CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 KR	-
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/kr/	-
dc.title	지방분권제도에 대한 정치경제학적 분석	-
dc.title	재정자치 및 국회의원경선제도	-
dc.title.alternative	A Political Economic Analysis of Decentralization: Fiscal Autonomy and Primary System	-
dc.type	Article	-
dc.subject.jel	Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact	-
dc.subject.jel	Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior	-
dc.subject.jel	Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design	-
dc.subject.jel	P16	-
dc.subject.jel	Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government	-
dc.subject.jel	Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • Secession	-
dc.relation.startpage	27	-
dc.relation.lastpage	71	-
dc.relation.volume	31	-
dc.relation.no	1	-