# AID, INVESTMENT AND GROWTH IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 

## By

Joseph Upile Matola

## THESIS

Submitted to
KDI School of Public Policy and Management in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

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#### Abstract

\section*{AID, INVESTMENT AND GROWTH IN SOUTHERN AFRICA}


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This pa per i nvestigates the role of $O$ fficial D evelopment Assistance (ODA) in e nhancing investment and facilitating e conomic growth in Southern A frica. We use a data covering a panel of 12 countries in the region from 1991 to 2012. The study finds that aid has generally been i neffective in facilitating $g$ rowth in the $r$ egion a lthough its effectiveness pos itively depends on quality of policies and institutions. The impact of these policies and institutions on aid effectiveness is found to be very limited hence making aid effective only when at very high levels. Nevertheless, a look at the aid-investment relationship shows that aid has a strong positive i mpact on i nvestment. T hese t wo f indings suggest that overall there ar e o ther exogenous ne gative effects of aid that are stronger and therefore tend to offset the positive gains from aid that comes through its impact on investment.

Dedicated to my beloved mother, Grace Matola.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the Study

Although Africa's economic growth has been somewhat satisfactory in the 2000s, poverty remains a huge challenge the in southern Africa and most other parts of the continent. Until recently, Economic growth has historically stagnated in Africa and the income gap with the world's developed countries has widened continuously ${ }^{1}$. Southern Africa has not been any exception in the African economic stagnation. According to Weil, D (2009), in the period between 1970 and 2005, countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Democratic republic of Congo have actually experienced a decline in their per capita incomes. One of the factors to which this economic stagnation is attributed to is inadequate accumulation of capital resulting from poor saving rates among other factors. In this regard, the international community has employed different measures to help these countries grow their economies. Foreign aid has largely been one of those measures.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is one of the major forms of international capital flows to countries in southern Africa. Since the beginning of aid, large amounts of foreign resources have been channeled to the region (and the rest of the continent) in order to accelerate growth through increasing investment in both physical and human capital. Despite the persisting poverty levels, foreign aid still forms a significant portion of government financing for many of countries in the region. Countries like Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are big dependents of foreign aid and ODA
${ }^{1}$ According to Weil D. (2009), as of 1820 the richest part of world - the western offshoots - had GDP per capita 3 times that of Africa. By 1998 the ratio had risen to 19 to 1.
typically contributes to more than 10 percent of their respective incomes.

Table 1. 2000-2012 average ODA receipts as a percentage of GNI

| Country | ODA/GNI |
| :---: | :---: |
| Angola | 5.27 |
| Botswana | 1.74 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 18.55 |
| Lesotho | 7.49 |
| Malawi | 23.1 |
| Mozambique | 33.2 |
| Namibia | 3.83 |
| South Africa | 0.33 |
| Swaziland | 2.36 |
| Tanzania | 15.03 |
| Zambia | 20.4 |
| Zimbabwe | 6.64 |
| Average | $\mathbf{1 1 . 5 8}$ |

Sources: World Bank Development Indicators

Table 1 above indicates ODA-income ratio for 12 countries within the region from 1991 to 2012. Foreign aid to these countries averaged 11.58 percent of the total Gross National Income (GNI) during this period. These kinds of resource transfers have taken place amidst disagreements between foreign aid analysts on the effectiveness of aid in achieving its very purpose of economic growth and welfare improvement.

Different empirical investigations have yielded diverse results regarding impact of aid on economic growth. Consequently, three main schools of thought have emerged in the aid literature. Some studies have established that aid is generally effective, other findings assert that aid has no impact on growth and others claim aid is effective only under certain policy and institutional conditions. These disagreements can be attributed to differences in data sets (countries and time frames under investigation), differences in study methodologies and many other factors. Nevertheless, there seems to be an agreement between development
partners that aid has not been as effective as it could be and different measures have been proposed aimed at making aid more effective ${ }^{2}$. It is against this background that this study attempts to establish the impact of these foreign resources that have been channeled to southern Africa on investment and growth of the region.

### 1.2 Statement of Problem

There is need to establish evidence of the impact of aid on investment and growth in southern Africa. Absence of clear evidence of the effectiveness aid in an economy tends to undermine development efforts of development partners. We know that aid policy typically has a specific purpose. For instance, some development partners focus on interventions that directly target welfare improvement of the poor. On the other hand some aim to increase economic growth and do so by channeling their aid towards investment activities. Whether any of these forms of aid delivery work is an empirical matter that needs to be investigated on a case by case basis. Thus it is in the same spirit that we need to establish evidence of effectiveness of aid for the case of southern Africa and fill this knowledge gap ${ }^{3}$.

Filling the aforementioned knowledge gap is beneficial to both donor and recipient countries within the region. Since there is persisting disagreements on the general impact of aid, establishing evidence on whether aid facilitates investment and growth will help improve development efforts in the region as development partners will be able to make well informed decisions on how best to allocate aid resources. If it is established that aid has a positive

[^0]impact on investment and economic growth, development partners will have to focus their efforts on enhancing investment. If the evidence proves otherwise they will have to rethink their aid policies.

### 1.3 Purpose of the Study

This paper investigates the impact of ODA in enhancing investment and fostering economic growth in Southern Africa. We know from a theoretical perspective that aid affects the economy in different ways, both positively and negatively. On the positive side, theories such as two-gap model postulate that foreign aid provides the much needed resources to poor countries in the form of savings and foreign exchange which facilitates capital accumulation thereby enhancing growth. On the negative side, aid can hurt the recipient economies through a phenomenon called the Dutch disease. In this regard, aid flows increases the supply of foreign exchange which leads to appreciation of the domestic currency which in turn weakens the competitiveness of domestic tradable goods thereby suppressing exports. The net effect of these opposing effects of aid on growth remains a big debate among scholars and needs to be investigated empirically on a case by case basis ${ }^{4}$. This is the essence of this study.

The study will further more investigate whether aid in the region exhibits diminishing returns and whether or not its impact depends on the quality of policies and institutions. Some theoretical arguments have been put forward that the aid-growth relationship could be nonlinear owing to absorptive capacity constraints of the recipient countries which results in diminishing marginal returns of aid as the recipient country approaches its absorptive

[^1]capacity. The Dutch disease phenomenon also provides support to the non-linearity of the aid and growth relationship since any impact of aid on the real exchange rate will only set in at higher levels of resource transfers. As for the influence of policies and institutions, there are also different views on their role in aid effectiveness.

Given the uncertainties and contradictions of the theoretical and empirical impact of aid, it is important that researchers develop models for specific countries or regions rather than generalize findings from studies done in other regions or studies covering a wide range of countries with different economic structures and challenges. Cross country studies on aid effectiveness literature may not properly capture the heterogeneous characteristics of the countries involved ${ }^{5}$. It is the same reasoning that this study focuses only on countries in southern Africa which we assume have reasonably similar economic characteristics as opposed to studying a broader sample of diverse economies. The sample contains a panel of 12 countries over a 22 year time span. Specifically, the study attempts to answer the following research questions.

1. How has foreign aid affected the investment rates of Southern African countries?
2. How has the investment rate in Southern Africa affected the region's economic growth rate?
3. What kind of direct relationship, if any, is there between foreign aid and economic growth in the region?
4. What role, if any, do political and economic institutions in this region play in determining effectiveness of aid?
5. How do we improve the performance of foreign aid in fostering growth in these

[^2]countries?

### 1.4 Study Hypothesis

To the extent that the developing countries of Southern Africa are resource constrained and aid relaxes these constraints, its impact on growth is expected to be positive and regardless of the prevailing policy distortions in the individual countries within the region. Nevertheless policy and institutional quality is expected to enhance or reduce the impact of aid. With this argument and our research questions in mind, a hypothesis is made that foreign aid to Southern Africa facilitates investment and leads to economic growth and its impact on growth is stronger in good policy and institutional conditions. Thus our hypothesis is twofold. First, foreign aid is hypothesized to have a positive impact on investment and growth. Secondly, this impact is expected to vary with prevailing policy and institutional conditions.

### 1.5 Structure of the Paper

This paper is organized as follows. Following the introduction provided above, a review of existing literature relevant to the study will be presented in chapter 2 . Chapter 3 shall discuss the methodology used in the study including data, specification of the econometric model and definitions of the variables used. The chapter will further include an econometric analysis in which the findings will be discussed and interpreted. Finally, chapter 4 will contain summaries, conclusions and policy recommendations.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

A lot of literature has been written regarding impact of aid on economic growth, poverty reduction and other social-economic indicators. It suffices to say results of the different studies could not be more different and diverse. Numerous studies have validated the principal theoretical expectations that aid facilitates economic growth unconditionally while on the contrary just as much literature has refuted the role of aid as facilitating factor of economic growth. The intermediate position that aid is effective only under certain policy and institutional conditions has also been backed by a lot of literature, most famously by Craig Burnside and David Dollar in 1997. This chapter examines aid effectiveness literature along these three lines and the various challenges that stand in the way of aid effectiveness.

### 2.1 Empirical Results: Literature Supporting Unconditional Effectiveness of Aid

 Hansen et al (2000) reexamine the aid-savings, aid-investment, and aid-growth relationships as a scrutiny of existing literature and attempt to solve the "micro-macro paradox of aid". They conclude that overall, existing literature support the view that aid contributes to economic growth regardless of policy conditions and therefore, the micro-macro paradox can be ruled non-existent. They confirm this result in Hansen et al (2001) in which they study foreign aid and per capita income growth using a non-linear specification and controlling for investment to explain the channel which aid increases growth. Their results also suggest a positive aid-growth link. This relationship becomes insignificant when investment and human capital are controlled for suggesting that aid has a positive impact on growth through capital accumulation. They also find that foreign aid exhibits diminishing returns.Bhavnani et al (2005), echo the view that studies on aid effectiveness usually make one
simple methodological error by not recognizing that aid is given for different reasons including humanitarian purposes whose motive hardly is to facilitate economic growth. They analyze three different types of aid: early impact aid such as economic infrastructure investments, late impact aid such as health and education and humanitarian aid. They find that early impact aid, which is one that is designed to directly affect growth, has a strong positive impact on growth in which a 1 percentage point of early impact aid produces a 0.31 percentage point in growth. Their results further suggest that although this relationship is stronger in countries with better institutions and policies, it also holds otherwise. For late impact and humanitarian their results are statistically insignificant but they suggest different modeling techniques may be more appropriate. They conclude that aid has a positive impact on growth regardless of policy conditions as long as its design is meant for growth.

Some studies have investigated aid effectiveness by focusing on a panel of a few developing countries similar to the approach of this paper. Hatemi-J et al (2005) uses panel cointegration approach to study the aid-growth relationship for Botswana, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, SriLanka, and Tanzania. He finds evidence that foreign aid has a positive and significant effect on real income for each and every country in his sample.

Hassan et al (2012) suggest that cross-country studies may fail to take into account heterogeneous characteristics of each country involved and as such single-country regressions maybe more appropriate. In this regard they analyze impact of aid on investment and on growth in Ethiopia in which they find a positive relationship that does not depend on policy and institutions. However they find that for the case of Ethiopia, aid was more effective in facilitating growth during their socialist military regime (1975-1990) than during the democratic regime (1991-2010).

Dalgaard, Hansen, Tarp (2004) explored another dimension of aid by analyzing aid's impact on long-run productivity. Overall their study finds that generally aid positively affects the productivity of countries and also positively affects growth. However, they find a surprising result that aid has had less impact in tropical climates than non-tropical ones suggesting that maybe foreign aid may not have been properly targeted to some "particular needs" of these tropical areas. They also find a weak relationship between aid effectiveness and policy

### 2.2 Empirical Results: Literature Refuting Effectiveness of Aid

Studies that refute the effectiveness of aid in facilitating growth of poor countries hinge on various premises such as the Dutch disease problem, the aid fungibility problem - which makes aid enter the income equation as consumption rather than investment, and sometimes weak investment-growth link different from that postulated in growth theories. Other explanations lie in exogenous factors such as that aid helps expand bureaucratic organizations, enrich the elite class, sustain the corrupt regimes, and reduce farmers' income by lowering prices of agricultural products.

In a critique of Craig Burnside and David Dollar's work (discussed below), Easterly W et al (2003) conclude that the findings of Burnside and Dollar that aid brings growth in good policy environments are not robust to additional data. Their study uses the same model specifications as the Burnside and Dollar study but only adds more countries and number of years. Their findings indicate an insignificant relationship between growth and the aid-policy interaction. Nevertheless, they concede that their findings simply reduces the confidence that such a relationship exists and is not a claim that aid is ineffective per se.

Djankov S, et al (2006) studied impact of aid by distinguishing between grant and loans and analyzing their individual effects. They also took into account other (private) foreign resource transfers in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances. Their findings indicate that aid has a negative impact on growth through decreasing investment and increasing government consumption. Private flows on the other hand induce investment and positively affect growth.

One of the more recent studies that have found no evidence of any aid growth relationship is that of former IMF economist Raghuram Rajan and his colleague Arvind Subramanian. In their 2005 study, "Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?", they analyze cross-sectional and panel data focusing on instrumenting aid in order to remove its possible endogeneity and also focusing on testing the general validity of the aid and growth relationship. They find no evidence that aid increases growth whether in a good policy environment or not. They make a recommendation that studies should focus on identifying aspects of aid that offset what should be undisputable positive impacts of resource transfers to resource constrained countries. Thus they concede that the aid apparatus need to be rethought to make aid effective.

Boone (1996) is another paper that finds no evidence of aid effectiveness regardless of political conditions. He finds no evidence to support that more liberal and democratic political regimes exhibit higher impact of aid on human development indicators than repressive ones. He however finds that democratic societies have higher human development as proxied by infant mortality rates than repressive ones. This is perhaps due to more empowerment of the poor under democratic governments than under repressive ones. Thus he concludes that short term aid to newly liberalized regimes would probably be more effective in improving welfare.

### 2.3. Empirical Results: Literature Supporting Conditional Effectiveness of Aid

 Most arguments in support of conditional effectiveness of aid have been put forward by World Bank economists. World Bank’s paper in 1998 titled "assessing aid: what works, what doesn't and why?" is seen by many as an attempt by World Bank under pressure to give evidence that aid is effective. The paper tries to assess whether aid is effective and the conditions that make it as such. They conclude that aid works better in developing countries with sound management of their economic, political and social institutions. They further argue that in countries with good economic management aid is more efficient in reducing poverty and it promotes private investment. As for countries with poor economic management, more aid is needed to take one person out of poverty and aid crowds out private investment.Arguably the most influential and yet controversial argument is the Burnside and Dollar study in 1997 -Aid, Policy and Growth. Following a growing feeling that aid has not been effective in facilitating growth and reducing poverty, Burnside et al (1997) came up with a different hypothesis in their analysis. They introduced a policy and institution effectiveness variable and hypothesized that aid effectiveness is conditioned upon good policies and institutions of the recipient governments. They concluded that aid has a positive impact on growth if the recipient country has good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies. This finding had significant policy implications by making a case for policy selectivity of aid which has since been followed by different donors.

Following several criticisms of the study such as the Easterly W et al (2003) study, Collier and Dollar (2002) made modifications to the study by including a broad measure of policy
and a larger sample set of countries. They acknowledge that the policy indicator used in the Burnside and Dollar study may not capture all policies that affect growth as it only focused on three macroeconomic indicators. In this study, Collier and Dollar uses the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment which has 20 different components covering macroeconomic issues, structural policies, public sector management, and policies for social inclusion Collier et al (2002). Their findings confirm the findings of Burnside and Dollar (1997) that aid works only in good policy environments. Burnside and Dollar (2004) is another attempt to confirm their argument and they reassert that aid's impact is not the same everywhere but rather is conditioned upon policy and institutional environment.

Kosack (2003) analyses aid effectiveness using a slight deviation from the common aid effectiveness measure given by improvements in GDP or GDP per capita. He analyses aid's impact on the quality of life of the poor. He finds no evidence of aid alone affecting the quality of life on the aggregate level. He however finds evidence that aid improves quality of life in democratic regimes but is ineffective and may even be harmful in autocratic ones.

### 2.4. Empirical Results: Challenges of Aid and Other Issues

A lot other literature has been written to highlight other aspects of aid that poses different challenges. Djankov (2008) analyzes the phenomenon called "the curse of aid" which likens the impact of aid on political institutions to the impact that discovery of natural resource deposits such as oil has. The logic behind is that foreign aid, just like the discovery of oil, are sudden windfalls of resource transfers developing countries. Their impact on political institutions could therefore be similar. He uses a panel regression analysis with political institution as the regressand and aid per GDP and oil rents as two of the regressors. The findings indicate that aid worsens political institutions much more than oil rents do.

A closely related argument was made by Busse and Groning (2009) in their study of the impact of aid on governance which found that aid has a negative rather than a positive impact on governance. These results were robust to a range of different model specifications. These two findings are particularly disturbing given that some studies have found that aid is more effective in countries with good political and economic governance. Combining these two findings implies that aid is self-defeating given that it deteriorates the very conditions that it is supposed to be more effective in.

However, other studies have indicated no relationship between aid and policies or institutions. Burnside and Dollar (2000) considered the possibility of treating policy as an endogenous variable in the aid-policy-growth relationship. They estimated a policy equation and found that exogenous changes in aid had no impact on the policy index.

Aid fungibility poses another challenge in the delivery of aid. One of the explanations often offered for lack of aid effectiveness is that aid simply substitutes government investment. Chattergee et al (2007) studied aid effectiveness and fungibility. They analyzed the effect that aid has on government expenditure of its own resources. They found that overall aid is fungible with about 70 percent of aid simply substituting rather than complementing government expenditure. Aid meant for investment activities tend to be the most fungible at almost 90 percent while fungibility of aid for social infrastructure was at 78 percent. There was no evidence of fungibility with aid meant for non-investment activities. Other evidence of aid fungibility is also provided by Burnside et al (2000) where they find that aid tends to increase government consumption. This relationship was found to be especially stronger with bilateral aid when compared to multilateral aid.

Researchers have also investigated the Dutch disease as one of the challenges of aid. In a cross-country study, Rajan et al (2009) find that aid has adverse effects on the growth of the manufacturing sector. Their study further indicates that the channel through which aid hurts the manufacturing sector is by appreciating the domestic currency which in turn lowers competitiveness of the sector. Fielding, D. (2009) also finds evidence of Dutch disease in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, he finds significant country variations with regard to the size of the effect with one country actually experiencing exchange rate depreciation.

The diversity of the findings in the aid effectiveness literature gives more reason to focus aid effectiveness studies to specific economies. Moreover, different countries face different challenges of aid such as governance, different levels of fungibility and varying degrees of Dutch disease which influences respective impacts of aid. Therefore as argued by Hussein and Lee (2012), single country studies for a specific period could be more appropriate than generalized cross-country studies. In the same spirit, a panel of a few economies with similar regional characteristics should offer a more specific rather than generalized result.

Therefore, this study builds on the strengths of the studies like those of Hussein and Lee and Hatemi-J et al (2005) who focused on one country and a panel of a few developing countries respectively. We attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the other studies discussed in the literature review which make general conclusions based on samples that are too broad. We believe the Southern African countries included in the sample are reasonably homogeneous to be studied together over some time span and make generalized conclusions. We further recognize the need to address the endogeneity of aid and other explanatory variables in the growth model as done by Rajan et al and Burnside et al among others.

## 3. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Given that our hypothesis has two components namely the aid-investment link and the aidgrowth link, we approach our investigation by estimating two regression equations, one for each relationship. This approach is also used by Hussein and Lee (2012). We also use the same specifications used by Hussein and Lee which are adopted from Hansen et al (2001) and Burnside et al (1997) for the aid-investment equation and the aid-growth equation respectively. However for this paper we make some modifications to these specifications as per our hypothesis and other circumstances necessitating such changes.

### 3.1. The Aid-Investment Regression

We begin our analysis by examining the aid and investment relationship before moving to the aid growth relationship. Our aid-investment regression is derived from the one used by Hansen and Tarp (2002) and later by Hussein and Lee (2012). We make slight modifications to the models used by the Hansen et al and Hussein et al and proceed to regress investment on aid, savings, and interest rates in the model given by equation (1) below.
$\operatorname{inv}_{\mathrm{it}}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} \operatorname{aid}_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{2} \operatorname{sav}_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{3} \operatorname{rint}_{\mathrm{it}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{it}}$.
where inv is the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP aid is ratio of official development assistance to GDP sav is ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP rint is real interest (lending) rate

Our main interest in this regression is on the aid variable. As indicated in the hypothesis, we expect aid to have a positive impact on investment which in turn is expected to lead to
growth. The theoretical basis is that aid provides the much needed resources for investment in resource constrained countries. For our aid variable we use the ratio of ODA to GDP provided in the World Bank development indicators databank.

The inclusion of savings as an explanatory variable is based on macroeconomic theory that identifies savings a major determinant of investment. In macroeconomics, the savingsinvestment identity indicates that when some assumptions are made, saving should equal to investment in an economy ${ }^{6}$. Since savings represent income or resources that remain after consumption, they provide funds for investment activities. In reality the savings-investment identity does not hold because all economies have some degree of openness which allows for international capital mobility. As for the case of the countries being investigated in this study, they are fairly open and we do not expect a one to one relationship between savings and investment but the relationship is expected to be strong nevertheless.

One modification we make to the models used by Hansen et al and Hussein et al is the inclusion of interest rates. Macroeconomic theory also identifies interest rate as another important factor in investment decisions. Although empirically interest rates tend to have little impact on investment, in this study we observe that they may be an important variable in the case of countries in southern Africa. This is because interest rates in the region tend to be significantly high which is likely to make them an important factor in private investment decisions given the high borrowing costs ${ }^{7}$. We use real interest rates in our model in order to
${ }^{6}$ For this identity to hold we assume an economy without the external sector.
${ }^{7}$ Folawewo, A.O and Tennant, D (2008) observe that interest rate spreads in southern African countries are the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa averaging 10.8 per cent while Africa in general has one of the highest interest rate spreads in the world. This indicates that Southern Africa has very
factor in inflation

### 3.1.1. Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for Random Effects

We recognize here that cross-country analyses bring with them a number of methodological concerns one of which is unobservable heterogeneity of countries. Given that different countries have some unique characteristics, economic or otherwise, one cannot be sure if all the respective influences of these variables can be taken into account in our model let alone if they can be observed. Although the countries under investigation in this study are fairly similar in terms of their income levels and economic structures, the issue of heterogeneity is one that still needs to be looked into in order to determine the most suitable estimation technique. For this reason we conduct the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects in order to determine whether we have random effects which would make the panel estimation a more appropriate method than a pooled OLS. In this section we conduct the test for the aid-investment regression and the results of the test are shown in tables 2.

Table 2: Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for Random Effects for the aid-investment model


Results from the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects for our aid-
high lending rates.
investment regression indicate that indeed there is a panel effect across the countries under investigation. This test tests the null hypothesis that the variances of the country specific error terms are equal to zero $-\operatorname{Var}\left(\varepsilon_{\mathrm{i}}\right)=0$ in our case. As table 2 shows, the Chi-square test statistic is very large at 186.55 and the p -value is 0.0000 . We therefore reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there are significant country specific effects that need to be taken into account. We therefore conduct a panel estimation for investment model.

### 3.1.2 Modeling Investment with Random Effects: Hausman Test

Having decided to conduct a panel estimation we face another decision of whether to estimate our model with random effects or fixed effects. The general approach to deciding a more appropriate model between a random effects model and a fixed effects model is to conduct the Hausman Test. We therefore conduct the Hausman test for the investment model as shown in table 3 below. The test generates a small Chi-square test statistic at 1.75 and a large p-value at 0.6261 . We therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis that the difference in the coefficients generated by our model is not systematic. We therefore proceed to estimate a random effects model for the aid-investment regression.

Table 3: Results of the Hausman test for the aid-investment regression

|  | - Coeff <br> (b) <br> fe | ts <br> (B) re | (b-B) <br> Difference | sqrt (diag(V_b-V_B) ) S. E. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| aid sav rint | 4435527 3601961 0040832 | $\begin{array}{r} 4512273 \\ .3623825 \\ .0030311 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -.0076746 \\ -.0021864 \\ .0010521 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1022344 \\ .0321651 \\ .001094 \end{array}$ |
| b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtai ned fromxtreg <br>  <br> Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic $\begin{aligned} \text { chi } 2(3) & =(b-B)^{\prime}[(\mathrm{V}, \mathrm{~b}-\mathrm{V}-\mathrm{B}) \uparrow(-1)](\mathrm{b}-\mathrm{B}) \\ & = \\ \text { Prob }>\text { chi } 2 & =0.6261 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |

### 3.1.3. Expected results

For our investment regression we expect the parameters of aid and savings to have positive signs since we expect positive relationships between the two variables and the dependent variable. The coefficient of real interest rate is expected to be negative.

### 3.1.4. Results of the Aid and Investment regression

As stated in our hypothesis, we expect foreign aid to affect the growth of the economy by increasing investment. Therefore we expect a positive relationship between aid and investment. The results of our aid and investment regression are shown in Table 4 below. As expected, our findings indicate a positive impact of aid on investment in southern Africa. The aid variable has a statistically significant and positive coefficient. The magnitude of the coefficient also indicates a significantly high aid semi-elasticity of investment where an increase in the aid to GDP ratio by one percentage point on average leads to approximately a 0.5 percentage points increase in share of GDP invested in capital formation. We can therefore conclude that indeed aid has helped in increasing investment in these eleven countries and to this effect aid has been very effective. Studies that found a similar result include Hansen et al (2000) and Hussein et al 2012.

Table 4: Results for the aid and investment regression


The findings also indicate a strong and positive relationship between savings and the rate of investment. This is also well expected and in line with theory. An increase in the domestic saving ratio by 1 percentage point tends to increase the share of investment by around 0.4 percentage points. As for real interest rate, the results are neither statistically nor economically significant indicating that in practice interest rates have no significant impact on investment decisions.

### 3.2. The Aid-Growth Regression

The model used for our growth regressions was initially used by Burnside and Dollar (1997) and later modified by Hussein and Lee (2012) to include investment as one of the regressors. The model allows for the examination of the impact of aid in relation to the quality of policies and institutions in the economy. The growth regression is specified as Equation (1) below.
$\operatorname{lgdppc}_{\mathrm{it}}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} \operatorname{aid}_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{2}$ policy $_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{3}$ aidpol $_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{4}$ aidsqr $_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{5}$ inv $_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{6}$ lhdvt $_{\mathrm{it}}+$

$$
\beta_{7} \text { export }_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{8} \text { lpop }_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{9} \text { linpcy }_{\mathrm{it}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{it}} \ldots \ldots \ldots . . . \text { (2) }
$$

Where: gdppc is per capita GDP in 2005 US dollar prices, aid is ratio of official development assistance to GDP, policy is policy and institution index proxied by the World Bank's government effectiveness index, aidpol is policy index interacted with aid, aidsqr is the square root of aid, inv is the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP, lhdvt is human development which is proxied by infant mortality, export is share of exports in gdp, pop is total population, inpcy is initial per capita income in 2005 U.S. dollar prices, 1 denotes use of natural logarithm for that specific variable.

As indicated earlier, our main variable of interest is aid and here it enters the model in three forms. First we regress aid on growth using aid in its pure form to see its marginal impact on growth independent of the other variables. Secondly, aid is interacted with the policy variable to determine whether indeed the effectiveness of aid depends on the quality of policies and institutions as claimed by studies such as the Burnside and Dollar studies. Finally, the variable aid squared is also included in the model. Inclusion of this variable is based on the view that aid may exhibit diminishing returns and countries may have limits to their absorptive capacity of aid which would entail that aid and growth have a nonlinear relationship.

As for the investment variable, its inclusion in the growth equation is based on growth
theories such as the Harold-Domar and Solow model in which investment is regarded as the major determinant of growth. Furthermore, the aid-growth literature is based on the theoretical basis that aid affects growth through enhancement of investment which in turn leads to growth. Thus inclusion of investment also allows us to also determine the channel through which aid affects growth. It is also for the same reasons that the model also includes human capital development which measures level of human capital. WDI data on fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP is used for investment and the infant mortality rate is used for as a proxy for human capital development.

The other variable examined is the policy and institutional quality index which is also examined separate from aid apart from being interacted with it. The policy variable has been studied as one of the determinants of growth recent growth literature. As Feenstra and Taylor (2008) observes, from a macroeconomic perspective quality of institutions and policies tend to be positively correlated with higher per capita incomes and negatively correlated with volatility of the same. As for the empirical aid literature, the role of policies and institutions is still an area of disagreement. In this paper we use the government effectiveness index from the world governance indicators (WGI) as a proxy for policy and institutional index.

In our model we also include exports in order to capture the contribution of trade in growth. We also include initial income following growth literature which helps us capture conversion of growth to its steady state level. And lastly we also include population which is another important variable in growth theory.

### 3.2.1. Incorporating Endogeneity of Aid: The Hausman-Taylor Analysis

For the growth regression, we also have to make a decision on the most appropriate
estimation technique for in our analysis. Here we can conduct a Hausman test as in our investment regression to choose between a random effects or fixed effects estimation. However, both these estimation techniques may not be appropriate for our aid growth regression due to potential endogeneity of aid and some other explanatory variables in the regression. We note that aid allocation is more often based on economic performance of the recipient country. Therefore more aid may be allocated to poorer countries in order to facilitate poverty reduction or it may be allocated to high performing countries in order to enhance their growth. Either way the direction of causality between aid and growth may be a two-way relationship implying potential endogeneity that needs to be incorporated in our analysis.

For this reason we choose to conduct a Hausman-Taylor estimation for the aid-growth regression. This estimation technique has two main advantages for our analysis. Firstly, this technique factors in time invariant variables and estimates the coefficients of such variables efficiently. Secondly, this technique allows treatment of some variables as endogenous variables thereby controlling for the endogeneity of such variables. Therefore with this technique we are able to control for the endogeneity of the aid variable (including aid squared and the aid and policy interaction term) and other potentially endogenous control variables such as population. We further conduct the over-identification Chi-square test in order to test whether we included valid instruments for the excluded variables.

We first estimate our full model as specified in equation 2 to enable us to test our overall theory. Then we estimate another model that excludes all insignificant explanatory variables from our model having established that they are not important determinants of growth in our case. We also analyze the exclusion of investment and human capital as regressors. This is
done since theoretically aid is supposed to affect growth through investment in physical and human capital which could make the inclusion of aid, investment and human capital in one model rather inappropriate.

### 3.2.2. Expected results

We expect growth to have a positive relationship with aid and its interaction with policy. Aid squared is expected to have a negative sign indicating diminishing returns. Investment, human development, exports and policy are all expected to also have a positive relationship with aid. Initial income is expected to have a negative sign reflecting convergence to steady state income level. The coefficient of population may take either sign.

### 3.2.3. Results of the aid and growth regression

The results of the aid-growth hausman-taylor analysis are presented in table 7 below together with the overall specification test and the over-identification test. For our instrumental variable estimation, we treat aid, aid squared, aid and policy interaction and population as endogenous variables.

Table 5: Results of the aid-growth hausman-taylor analysis

| $\begin{array}{c}\text { Dependent variable: } \\ \text { log of per capita GDP }\end{array}$ | Hausman-Taylor Estimated coefficients |  | $\begin{array}{c}\text { Expected sign of } \\ \text { coefficient }\end{array}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Independent variables | Model 1 | Model2 | All models |
| Aid/GDP | -0.023 | -0.023 | $(+)$ |
| (Aid/GDP) ${ }^{2}$ | $(-5.36)^{* * *}$ | $(-5.59)^{* * *}$ |  |
| Aid*Policy | $(4.0001$ | 0.0001 | $(-)$ |
| Policy | 0.006 | $(4.98)^{* * * *}$ | $(2.70)^{* * *}$ |$\left.)(2.007)^{* * *}\right)$

$\left.\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}\hline \text { Population } & \begin{array}{c}1.31 \\ (9.09)^{* * *}\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}1.314 \\ (15.03)^{* * *}\end{array} & \\ \hline \text { Exports/GDP } & 0.0002 \\ (0.22)\end{array}\right]$

Note 1) Numbers in parentheses are z-values
2) ${ }^{*},{ }^{* *}$ and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent statistical significance at $10 \%, 5 \%$ and $1 \%$ respectively

Both our models have large Wald Chi-square test statistics indicating that overall the models have been well specified. However we fail to conduct the over-identification test for model 1 due to the problem of internal re-estimation of the instruments. Nevertheless Model 2 generates a large $p$-value for our over-identification test leading to failure in rejecting the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments. Therefore, model 2 which excludes investment and all insignificant variables from our full model passes both the overall specification test and over-identification test.

Given our model specification, the coefficients of the aid variable have to be interpreted with great caution. As Woodridge (2013) notes, the parameters on the original variables can be tricky to interpret when we include an interaction term. The inclusion of the interaction term changes the meaning of the aid coefficient by making its predicted impact on our dependent variable to vary with values taken by policy variable. Thus the positive coefficient of the interaction variable indicates that the impact of aid on growth is a positive function of the policy variable in our model. This result provides evidence of a relationship between aid and growth that is conditioned on the prevailing quality of policies and institutions. We examine
this relationship further in section 3.3 on the discussion of the results.

Furthermore, the inclusion of the square of aid means that the impact of aid on growth also depends on the levels of aid. The positive coefficient of this variable is an interesting result as it indicates increasing returns to aid as opposed to diminishing returns that we expected. However, the coefficient is economically insignificant and therefore not a very significant finding.

From table 7 we can see that our aid parameters are negative. This is an indication that at lower levels of policies, aid is ineffective to the extent of actually having a negative impact on growth. As the level of policies increases, the positive impact of aid increases thereby making the net effect of aid less negative. Given the fact that the quality of policies and institutions in the region is on the lower side, it is therefore fair at this point to conclude that overall aid alone is not effective in fostering growth in the region but its impact improves with improved policies and institutions, a finding shared by Burnside and Dollar. Thus we reject our hypothesis that aid in southern Africa is effective in facilitating economic growth regardless of prevailing policy conditions. Furthermore, the policy variable (pol) has a positive coefficient that is both statistically and economically significant which further highlights the importance of policies and institutions in economic growth.

In terms of capital accumulation, both human development and fixed capital formation have insignificant parameters suggesting absence of their impact on growth. Thus the link between investment and growth seems to be missing from our model. Our theoretical expectation was that of a strong positive relationship between growth and capital accumulation (both physical and human) which happen to be the theoretical premise on which most aid is delivered. We
attribute this result to model specification. As noted by Hussein and Lee (2012), empirical studies using a methodology like ours do not capture the relationship between investment and growth properly. Therefore a refined methodology specifically for investigating the impact of investment on growth may be more appropriate.

The analysis further indicates that population growth has a positive impact on economic growth while the impact of exports is insignificant. Another interesting result is the positive coefficient of initial income which we expected would be negative. The results that we get suggests that the higher the initial income, the higher the economic growth rate. This could be because the initial incomes of these economies are very low to begin with, with the steady state income levels still far from being reached.

### 3.3 Discussion of the Findings and Policy Implications

The results of our empirical analysis point to two important findings. Firstly, we have established that aid has a strong and positive impact on investment in the region. This should be an important result for development partners in the region given that most aid is given based on the premise that it will enhance investment in the recipient countries. In other words, the goal of aid is mostly economic growth, but the intended immediate outcome is increased investment. Thus to the extent that foreign aid targets boosting investment, aid can be seen as effective.

The second major finding is that, the impact of aid on the overall economy depends on the quality of policies and institutions. In this regard aid's impact on economic growth improves with improved policies and institutions. Now the question becomes to what extent can policies and institutions influence the effectiveness of aid. To have a more clear idea on the importance of policies and institutions on the effectiveness of aid given our model, we
estimate the impact of aid given three policy conditions. Firstly we analyze the impact of aid on growth at the average policy environment in the region (at policy index $=1.91$ ) during the sample period. Secondly we analyze the impact of aid on growth given the best possible policy environment (at policy index $=5$ ). Lastly we examine aid effectiveness at the worst possible policy environment (at policy index $=0$ ). These scenarios are examined at the average level of aid in our sample equal to 11.58 percent of GDP. The results are summarized in table 9 below.

Table 6: Impact of the average level of aid on growth for given policy environments

| Policy environment | Policy $=1.91$ | Policy $=0$ | Policy = 5 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Olgdppc/ <br> aid $=12.5$ | -0.009 | -0.02 | 0.01 |

As shown in table 9 above, at the average quality of policies and institutions for the sample countries during the sample period, the average level of aid tended to lower income by 0.009 percent. This means that given the current levels of policies and institutional quality (1.91 by our index), aid has been generally ineffective and its impact has been somewhat negative although economically not very significant. Going a step further and analyzing aid effectiveness at lower levels of policies and institutional quality (e.g. at the lowest possible policy level of 0 ), the impact of aid becomes more negative. On the other hand, if the region was to achieve the highest possible level of policy and institutions (policy index=5), we could expect the current levels of aid to increase incomes by 0.01 percent which is still economically not so significant.

The exercise in table 5 indicates that indeed for the past 2 decades foreign aid to southern Africa has been quite ineffective in facilitating economic growth in the region, a conclusion
shared by Rajan, Easterly, Djankov, Boone and other researchers. It also confirms that poor quality of policies and institutions has contributed further to the ineffectiveness of aid as Burnside and Dollar's concluded.

## Policy Implications

The findings of this study have some important policy implications on the way forward for aid in southern Africa. But in a nutshell we make conclusions similar to the recommendations made by Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian that the whole aid apparatus need to be rethought to make aid more effective. Thus we see policies such as the Paris Declaration as an important step in this direction. Such policies need to be fully implemented and improved where possible ${ }^{8}$. Development partners need to make new efforts on identifying aspects of aid delivery that offset what should be an undisputable positive impact of aid to resource constrained countries on their economic growth. Thus more efforts are needed on the aid effectiveness agenda.

Meanwhile, two actions can be taken that can bring some improvement on the effectiveness of aid. First of all, delivery of foreign aid need to be more focused on investment activities. Given the strong relationship between aid and investment, if development partners in the region focus their foreign aid efforts on targeting investment, their aid efforts will be more likely to positively affect the economies in the region. If the link between aid and investment is strong enough, then the more foreign aid targets investment, the more likely it is to enhance economic growth.

[^3]The second action that can be taken in order to improve on the effectiveness of aid is to adopt strategies aimed at improving the policy environment in recipient countries. Aid should not be policy selective but in those countries where policies and institutions are of poor quality, parallel efforts should be made to improve the policy environment in order to improve on the effectiveness of aid. Thus extra efforts could be focused on areas such as promoting good governance, and capacity building and technical support on policies and institutions among other issues. However it has to be noted that there is a limit on the effectiveness of this recommendation and it alone cannot improve the impact of aid on growth to satisfactory levels.

## 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have investigated the relationships between aid, investment and economic growth in southern Africa. We have built on the strengths of the studies like those of Hussein and Lee by narrowing our sample to southern Africa and we have attempted to overcome the shortcomings of studies that make generalized conclusions for very broad sample of countries. We have found that in the region, aid has a strong positive impact on investment. However we have established that with respect to facilitating economic growth in the region, aid has generally been ineffective. Furthermore, consistent with other literature we have found that aid becomes less ineffectiveness (more effective) with better policies and institutions although the influence of policies and institutions on aid effectiveness is very limited.

We take some caution of the results and note some limitations of the study. First of all we take note that the methodology used in this study may not be appropriate for analyzing the link between investment and growth and by extension the channel through which aid affects growth. In this regard we recommend that evidence on this relationship should be gathered from other studies focusing on the impact of investment on growth using more appropriate models. With this evidence we can make a more confident conclusion on whether aid can positively affect growth through the investment channel.

For the purpose of future studies, attention should be given on the negative effects of foreign aid that seem to counter the positive gains from aid's ability to improve investment. Such studies could focus on the impact of aid on governance, issues of aid fungibility, issues of aid and the Dutch disease and on other aspects that could undermine effectiveness of aid. Other
studies could narrow down our sample even further to one country to produce an even more specific result.

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ANNEX 1: RESEARCH DATA

| COUNTRY | YEAR | gdppc | aid | inv | hdvt | intrate | sav | Aidsqr | rint | policy | export | pop |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Angola | 1991 | 1513.49 | 2.81168 | 12.9475 | 125.7 |  | -3.45754 | 7.905545 |  |  | 30.2633 | 10652765 |
| Angola | 1992 | 1364.23 | 9.7873 | 3.61769 | 125.3 |  | -58.9511 | 95.79124 |  |  | 68.7913 | 11002796 |
| Angola | 1993 | 993.898 | 8.93333 | 26.4411 | 124.9 |  | -41.83 | 79.80437 |  |  | 53.9014 | 11372174 |
| Angola | 1994 | 996.162 | 23.0095 | 30.5211 | 124.7 |  | -41.7833 | 529.4371 |  |  | 85.3577 | 11743377 |
| Angola | 1995 | 1066.92 | 11.2926 |  | 124.3 | 206.25 |  | 127.5228 | -2465.54 |  |  | 12105010 |
| Angola | 1996 | 1153.35 | 7.80838 | 34.822 | 123.9 | 217.875 | 98.9604 | 60.9708 | -3927.24 | 1.66 | 82.7223 | 12451978 |
| Angola | 1997 | 1211.44 | 5.54975 | 25.5598 | 123.2 | 37.75 | 12.6209 | 30.79972 | -181.427 |  | 68.4919 | 12791354 |
| Angola | 1998 | 1259.79 | 6.41023 | 35.6609 | 122.6 | 45 | 21.0586 | 41.09105 | -62.285 | 1.14 | 56.7231 | 13137483 |
| Angola | 1999 | 1264.69 | 8.21711 | 28.8996 | 121.8 | 80.2967 | 3.14333 | 67.52089 | -167.899 |  | 86.2965 | 13510666 |
| Angola | 2000 | 1264.02 | 4.05719 | 12.755 | 120.9 | 103.16 | -0.38826 | 16.46079 | -221.837 | 1.04 | 89.6262 | 13924912 |
| Angola | 2001 | 1262.01 | 3.83359 | 13.4509 | 119.8 | 95.9666 | -28.3587 | 14.69641 | -56.5944 |  | 75.3865 | 14385337 |
| Angola | 2002 | 1396.23 | 4.22605 | 12.6148 | 118.9 | 97.3358 | 1.77778 | 17.8595 | -11.5612 | 1.25 | 74.9538 | 14886570 |
| Angola | 2003 | 1392.43 | 4.03711 | 12.7096 | 117.8 | 96.115 | 7.14812 | 16.29826 | -2.1087 | 1.36 | 69.57 | 15420988 |
| Angola | 2004 | 1494.3 | 6.61859 | 9.14573 | 117.1 | 82.3342 | 13.8703 | 43.80573 | 38.7923 | 1.22 | 69.6867 | 15976669 |
| Angola | 2005 | 1706.54 | 1.7129 | 8.79039 | 115.9 | 67.7181 | 32.3503 | 2.934026 | 44.7544 | 1.33 | 86.0175 | 16544429 |
| Angola | 2006 | 1990.84 | 0.459176 | 15.3692 | 114.3 | 19.5108 | 48.5369 | 0.210843 | 6.2075 | 1.13 | 79.8373 | 17122433 |
| Angola | 2007 | 2359.28 | 0.468629 | 13.5119 | 112.1 | 17.6988 | 38.4681 | 0.219613 | 5.450099 | 1.26 | 76.3975 | 17712834 |
| Angola | 2008 | 2597.05 | 0.523442 | 16.2259 | 109.7 | 12.5336 | 30.935 | 0.273992 | 0.0599 | 1.43 | 78.0985 | 18314433 |
| Angola | 2009 | 2573.69 | 0.347623 | 15.2379 | 107.1 | 15.6821 | 4.30793 | 0.120842 | 1.950601 | 1.53 | 55.0553 | 18926621 |
| Angola | 2010 | 2576.65 | 0.320636 | 12.6682 | 104.6 | 22.5436 | 23.8989 | 0.102807 | 8.0731 | 1.37 | 62.4131 | 19549104 |
| Angola | 2011 | 2593.84 | 0.217245 | 11.4105 | 102.2 | 18.7572 | 22.8232 | 0.047195 | 5.2902 | 1.35 | 64.977 | 20180554 |
| Angola | 2012 | 2685.83 |  |  | 99.5 | 16.9303 |  |  | 6.6368 | 1.48 |  | 20820529 |


| Botswana | 1991 | 3432.27 | 3.27205 | 31.2712 | 38.1 | 11.8333 | 44.2901 | 10.70631 | 0.068299 |  | 53.0295 | 1424512 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Botswana | 1992 | 3434.6 | 2.61244 | 29.5505 | 39 | 14 | 40.3061 | 6.824843 | -2.1676 |  | 48.1796 | 1465079 |
| Botswana | 1993 | 3406.86 | 2.91661 | 26.9464 | 40.6 | 14.9167 | 40.9506 | 8.506614 | 0.5859 |  | 47.0954 | 1505296 |
| Botswana | 1994 | 3440.05 | 2.06962 | 25.5287 | 42.6 | 13.9167 | 35.0455 | 4.283327 | 3.3738 |  | 49.2782 | 1544870 |
| Botswana | 1995 | 3504.02 | 1.88865 | 25.5713 | 44.9 | 14.4167 | 36.2751 | 3.566998 | 3.904201 |  | 50.9453 | 1583455 |
| Botswana | 1996 | 3612.92 | 1.63743 | 24.782 | 47.1 | 14.5 | 42.0245 | 2.681177 | 4.4171 | 2.97 | 54.1914 | 1620994 |
| Botswana | 1997 | 3893.02 | 2.413 | 24.9749 | 49.3 | 13.9467 | 45.4269 | 5.822569 | 5.22677 |  | 56.2486 | 1657349 |
| Botswana | 1998 | 4216.12 | 2.00084 | 26.0617 | 51.1 | 13.6508 | 44.4567 | 4.00336 | 6.9894 | 3 | 48.8811 | 1692149 |
| Botswana | 1999 | 4345.52 | 1.0865 | 24.9418 | 53.1 | 14.7758 | 36.1113 | 1.180482 | 7.0265 |  | 51.6013 | 1724918 |
| Botswana | 2000 | 4521.46 | 0.579877 | 25.8374 | 54.6 | 15.4792 | 44.1884 | 0.336257 | 6.87771 | 3.01 | 53.2649 | 1755370 |
| Botswana | 2001 | 4608.26 | 0.494692 | 23.5812 | 54.5 | 15.75 | 36.5117 | 0.24472 | 9.19096 |  | 44.2698 | 1783343 |
| Botswana | 2002 | 4952.27 | 0.689558 | 24.529 | 54.3 | 16.2083 | 34.095 | 0.47549 | 8.1755 | 3.09 | 46.5693 | 1808973 |
| Botswana | 2003 | 5195.18 | 0.377829 | 26.0228 | 52.3 | 16.4 | 39.1799 | 0.142755 | 7.210099 | 3.23 | 45.3534 | 1832607 |
| Botswana | 2004 | 5440.03 | 0.552087 | 24.8184 | 47.7 | 15.75 | 39.9926 | 0.3048 | 8.8043 | 3.14 | 44.2262 | 1854731 |
| Botswana | 2005 | 5467.27 | 0.509344 | 24.5385 | 45.7 | 15.7375 | 45.1752 | 0.259431 | 7.12727 | 3.16 | 51.2499 | 1875808 |
| Botswana | 2006 | 5687 | 0.735618 | 24.0015 | 45.5 | 16.4583 | 43.8921 | 0.541134 | 4.9031 | 3.02 | 52.2544 | 1895949 |
| Botswana | 2007 | 6130.01 | 1.05549 | 27.0449 | 45.9 | 16.215 | 45.9958 | 1.114059 | 9.134001 | 3.09 | 54.5201 | 1915195 |
| Botswana | 2008 | 6295.88 | 6.87205 | 27.5729 | 46.1 | 16.5417 | 36.7216 | 47.22507 | 3.8395 | 3.06 | 50.9531 | 1933727 |
| Botswana | 2009 | 5727.78 | 2.7704 | 35.4632 | 44.8 | 13.7556 | 26.5253 | 7.675117 | 5.7283 | 2.98 | 37.0575 | 1951717 |
| Botswana | 2010 | 6164.37 | 1.14056 | 31.2683 | 43.6 | 11.4583 | 28.0796 | 1.300877 | 4.509419 | 2.96 | 35.7661 | 1969342 |
| Botswana | 2011 | 6481.69 | 0.762657 | 32.1694 | 42.9 | 11 |  | 0.581646 | 2.54183 | 2.98 | 44.3517 | 1986709 |
| Botswana | 2012 | 6663.61 |  | 36.1221 | 41 | 11 |  |  | 3.45972 | 2.94 | 44.7844 | 2003908 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1991 | 262.339 | 5.70436 | 6.09564 | 112.3 |  |  | 32.53972 |  |  | 20.3801 | 36252903 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1992 | 225.596 | 3.57935 | 7.10772 | 112.3 |  |  | 12.81175 |  |  | 16.6781 | 37730902 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1993 | 187.621 | 1.76602 | 2.25071 | 112.3 |  |  | 3.118827 |  |  | 11.328 | 39257380 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1994 | 173.862 | 4.77158 | 7.54462 | 112.3 |  |  | 22.76798 |  |  | 22.6253 | 40711860 |


| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1995 | 169.658 | 3.99271 | 9.65361 | 112.3 |  |  | 15.94173 |  |  | 28.4823 | 42012595 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1996 | 163.6 | 3.07699 | 27.0957 | 112.3 |  |  | 9.467867 |  | 0.81 | 30.0028 | 43122696 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1997 | 151.062 | 2.77246 | 2.5 | 112.3 |  |  | 7.686534 |  |  | 18.75 | 44078382 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1998 | 145.691 | 2.15392 | 2.1 | 112.3 |  |  | 4.639371 |  | 0.53 | 29.7901 | 44961180 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 1999 | 136.649 | 3.12906 | 3.06901 | 112.3 |  |  | 9.791017 |  |  | 23.6357 | 45889184 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2000 | 124.333 | 4.52178 | 3.35756 | 112.3 |  |  | 20.4465 |  | 0.54 | 22.3919 | 46949354 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2001 | 118.645 | 5.68586 | 5.21835 | 112.3 |  |  | 32.32901 |  |  | 18.6346 | 48167256 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2002 | 119.413 | 22.3944 | 8.54026 | 112.3 |  |  | 501.5091 |  | 0.76 | 21.1033 | 49516674 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2003 | 122.722 | 99.5132 | 12.2316 | 112.3 |  |  | 9902.877 |  | 0.89 | 26.642 | 50972152 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2004 | 127.093 | 30.9374 | 12.7704 | 112.3 |  |  | 957.1227 |  | 1.05 | 30.6751 | 52487206 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2005 | 133.1 | 28.1537 | 13.8415 | 112.3 |  |  | 792.6308 |  | 0.91 | 33.6175 | 54027839 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2006 | 136.578 | 26.3018 | 13.2442 | 111.9 | 46.4358 |  | 691.7847 | 33.3831 | 0.85 | 34.2051 | 55590896 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2007 | 141.072 | 14.4644 | 18.24 | 110.7 | 47.001 |  | 209.2189 | 30.0559 | 0.73 | 65.1644 | 57187735 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2008 | 145.602 | 17.07 | 22.393 | 108.9 | 43.1542 |  | 291.3849 | 25.8528 | 0.83 | 61.3007 | 58819266 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2009 | 145.602 | 42.0539 | 18.0274 | 106.7 | 65.4175 |  | 1768.531 | -663.249 | 0.79 | 45.2053 | 60486455 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2010 | 151.77 | 29.0475 | 23.5542 | 104.5 | 56.5183 |  | 843.7573 | -28.5515 | 0.77 | 68.3361 | 62190948 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2011 | 157.796 | 38.4756 | 20.5261 | 102.2 | 43.7534 |  | 1480.372 |  | 0.83 | 68.2766 | 63931324 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 2012 | 164.515 |  |  | 99.9 | 28.4467 |  |  |  |  |  | 65705291 |
| Lesotho | 1991 | 520.732 | 12.5305 | 72.2969 | 67.8 | 20 | 44.9458 | 157.0134 | 2.321899 |  | 18.7128 | 1627898 |
| Lesotho | 1992 | 547.594 | 12.9993 | 70.3824 | 67.8 | 18.25 | 46.4803 | 168.9818 | 1.0415 |  | 20.2445 | 1660368 |
| Lesotho | 1993 | 554.773 | 13.5778 | 63.6172 | 68.5 | 15.8333 | 40.7421 | 184.3566 | 2.697599 |  | 23.6187 | 1693453 |
| Lesotho | 1994 | 573.704 | 10.6632 | 66.7344 | 69.7 | 14.25 | 51.2923 | 113.7038 | 6.03526 |  | 24.4777 | 1725125 |
| Lesotho | 1995 | 575.586 | 9.4162 | 70.1348 | 71.4 | 16.375 | 26.7865 | 88.66482 | 7.10417 |  | 22.452 | 1753826 |
| Lesotho | 1996 | 596.959 | 9.08138 | 74.8206 | 73.3 | 17.7083 | 27.3065 | 82.47146 | 8.37799 | 1.99 | 29.8919 | 1779192 |
| Lesotho | 1997 | 613.594 | 7.71793 | 61.9663 | 75.3 | 18.0333 | 18.7987 | 59.56644 |  |  | 28.9523 | 1801680 |
| Lesotho | 1998 | 617.465 | 5.64803 | 47.865 | 77 | 20.0625 | -14.4818 | 31.90024 |  | 2.19 | 32.2075 | 1821608 |


| 1999 | 613.88 | 2.86192 | 54.1352 | 78.5 | 19.0625 | -0.34527 | 8.190587 |  |  | 28.3643 | 1839621 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2000 | 639.659 | 3.61482 | 41.0636 | 79.9 | 17.1117 | 2.81679 | 13.06692 | 10.97972 | 2.12 | 34.8468 | 1856234 |
| 2001 | 661.27 | 5.12693 | 36.7816 | 81 | 16.5542 | 29.0501 | 26.28541 | 26.17035 |  | 53.8493 | 1871499 |
| 2002 | 659.859 | 7.64703 | 33.3568 | 82 | 17.11 | 27.855 | 58.47707 | -16.7026 | 1.75 | 66.1689 | 1885493 |
| 2003 | 685.986 | 5.37912 | 33.1851 | 82.9 | 16.015 | 23.9967 | 28.93493 | 9.385839 | 1.81 | 60.0686 | 1898757 |
| 2004 | 696.839 | 5.4593 | 26.4455 | 83.6 | 12.375 | 23.6584 | 29.80396 | 7.35158 | 1.78 | 56.3685 | 1912018 |
| 2005 | 710.548 | 3.60994 | 21.1163 | 84.2 | 11.7167 | 15.5489 | 13.03167 | 8.27882 | 1.7 | 48.873 | 1925835 |
| 2006 | 735.59 | 3.77499 | 21.5326 | 83.9 | 12.1608 | 20.198 | 14.25055 | 6.08808 | 1.69 | 53.5461 | 1940410 |
| 2007 | 764.354 | 6.37432 | 21.9591 | 81.9 | 14.1317 | 22.5605 | 40.63195 | 6.11926 | 1.94 | 52.1004 | 1955781 |
| 2008 | 801.452 | 7.08293 | 27.8824 | 82.1 | 16.1869 | 28.9227 | 50.1679 | 5.471199 | 1.95 | 56.0226 | 1972200 |
| 2009 | 822.888 | 5.78351 | 26.9487 | 79.3 | 13 | 24.687 | 33.44899 | 5.62056 | 2.03 | 45.5884 | 1989870 |
| 2010 | 879.224 | 9.77152 | 27.201 | 76.8 | 11.2225 | 10.3895 | 95.4826 | 7.62469 | 2.08 | 44.0446 | 2008924 |
| 2011 | 902.828 | 9.0755 | 26.5332 | 72.7 | 10.4292 | 12.491 | 82.36469 | 5.40438 | 2.06 | 46.7803 | 2029520 |
| 2012 | 928.537 |  | 31.8047 | 74.2 | 10.1192 |  |  | 4.01561 | 2 | 46.5227 | 2051537 |
| 1991 | 201.147 | 25.4782 | 16.998 | 138.9 | 20 | 17.7327 | 649.1387 | 7.3847 |  | 23.2716 | 9657545 |
| 1992 | 184.45 | 32.7764 | 17.1586 | 135.3 | 22 | 5.16289 | 1074.292 | -1.7514 |  | 23.2062 | 9759386 |
| 1993 | 201.476 | 24.464 | 12.9774 | 131.6 | 29.5 | 4.69055 | 598.4873 | 6.727301 |  | 16.1303 | 9800657 |
| 1994 | 179.906 | 41.2912 | 26.7737 | 127.9 | 31 | 5.67033 | 1704.963 | -3.6496 |  | 29.6328 | 9851753 |
| 1995 | 207.635 | 32.157 | 14.817 | 124.4 | 47.3333 | 7.76837 | 1034.073 | -35.9925 |  | 30.3685 | 9964108 |
| 1996 | 218.674 | 21.9238 | 9.74971 | 121 | 45.3333 | 6.71896 | 480.653 | 7.7313 | 2.36 | 22.8258 | 10153307 |
| 1997 | 221.493 | 13.1174 | 9.31543 | 117.3 | 28.25 | 1.27221 | 172.0662 | 19.11265 |  | 21.3565 | 10404303 |
| 1998 | 223.756 | 25.4234 | 11.0961 | 113.2 | 37.6667 | 13.1162 | 646.3493 | 7.917999 | 2.37 | 32.7702 | 10700168 |
| 1999 | 224.02 | 25.7539 | 12.6065 | 108.4 | 53.5833 | 4.42471 | 663.2634 | 8.779102 |  | 28.0223 | 11012703 |
| 2000 | 221.345 | 26.1317 | 12.3221 | 102.8 | 53.125 | 9.72049 | 682.8658 | 23.5435 | 2.33 | 25.6037 | 11321453 |
| 2001 | 204.874 | 24.3222 | 13.7991 | 96.5 | 56.1667 | 10.3322 | 591.5695 | 33.4667 |  | 27.9912 | 11623158 |
| 2002 | 203.053 | 14.4258 |  | 90.1 | 50.5417 | 7.30314 | 208.1037 | 35.7971 | 2.39 | 20.8027 | 11926818 |


| Malawi | 2003 | 208.76 | 21.7289 | 14.1392 | 83.8 | 48.9167 | 7.11066 | 472.1451 | 39.3399 | 2.32 | 26.6967 | 12238778 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Malawi | 2004 | 213.136 | 19.5823 | 16.2226 | 77.9 | 36.8333 | 6.27098 | 383.4665 | 25.4035 | 2.11 | 24.9599 | 12569075 |
| Malawi | 2005 | 213.157 | 21.1312 | 20.181 | 72.6 | 33.0833 | 3.02094 | 446.5276 | 17.673 | 2.33 | 24.0469 | 12924690 |
| Malawi | 2006 | 211.294 | 23.4813 | 22.7291 | 67.8 | 32.25 | 9.71806 | 551.3715 | 18.2757 | 2.14 | 22.6196 | 13307522 |
| Malawi | 2007 | 224.496 | 20.5163 | 23.9418 | 63.4 | 27.7153 | 22.8995 | 420.9186 | 19.76309 | 2.1 | 28.3288 | 13713756 |
| Malawi | 2008 | 235.915 | 21.7133 | 23.9474 | 58.8 | 25.2778 | 14.7147 | 471.4674 | 16.5652 | 2.11 | 28.1888 | 14138187 |
| Malawi | 2009 | 249.551 | 15.5555 | 23.8531 | 55.4 | 25.25 | 19.433 | 241.9736 | 16.82796 | 2.21 | 24.6489 | 14573422 |
| Malawi | 2010 | 258.058 | 19.4007 | 24.1619 | 52.6 | 24.625 | 18.984 | 376.3871 | 17.21341 | 2.18 | 29.376 | 15013645 |
| Malawi | 2011 | 261.545 | 14.6427 | 13.5077 | 49.2 | 23.75 | 13.8529 | 214.4087 | 16.12718 | 2.19 | 29.5856 | 15457579 |
| Malawi | 2012 | 258.956 |  |  | 46 | 32.3299 |  |  | 11.0586 | 2.12 |  | 15906526 |
| Mozambique | 1991 | 191.445 | 41.078 | 16.1794 | 152.8 |  | 4.2538 | 1687.402 |  |  | 10.1556 | 13893616 |
| Mozambique | 1992 | 175.888 | 81.2903 | 19.7698 | 150.2 |  | 5.9703 | 6608.113 |  |  | 13.0546 | 14350423 |
| Mozambique | 1993 | 184.146 | 63.2279 | 20.4332 | 147.2 |  | 2.86483 | 3997.768 |  |  | 12.9344 | 14893270 |
| Mozambique | 1994 | 189.477 | 60.8975 | 22.3436 | 143.7 |  | 6.09703 | 3708.505 |  |  | 14.0726 | 15453406 |
| Mozambique | 1995 | 188.164 | 51.3578 | 26.9754 | 139.4 |  | 9.44808 | 2637.624 |  |  | 15.6011 | 15981622 |
| Mozambique | 1996 | 196.173 | 28.8461 | 20.2233 | 134.5 |  | 7.61196 | 832.0975 |  | 2.36 | 14.7865 | 16463395 |
| Mozambique | 1997 | 210.489 | 26.1055 | 20.586 | 129 |  | 13.408 | 681.4971 |  |  | 13.3539 | 16914639 |
| Mozambique | 1998 | 227.324 | 25.3039 | 18.3364 | 123.2 | 24.3525 | 8.72947 | 640.2874 | 22.87214 | 2.11 | 12.2492 | 17350815 |
| Mozambique | 1999 | 239.6 | 18.929 | 19.9909 | 117.5 | 19.63 | -1.7528 | 358.3071 | 16.77049 |  | 13.1665 | 17798060 |
| Mozambique | 2000 | 235.885 | 22.2359 | 30.9506 | 112.1 | 19.0392 | 10.9611 | 494.4353 | 6.315599 | 2.07 | 16.4802 | 18275648 |
| Mozambique | 2001 | 256.785 | 25.479 | 19.9718 | 106.9 | 22.7292 | 2.95998 | 649.1794 | 13.67923 |  | 23.3853 | 18785766 |
| Mozambique | 2002 | 271.7 | 55.0921 | 29.9583 | 102 | 26.7083 | 20.3583 | 3035.139 | 9.926899 | 2.14 | 27.3387 | 19319973 |
| Mozambique | 2003 | 280.043 | 23.4521 | 22.2764 | 97.4 | 24.69 | 4.269 | 550.001 | 11.2637 | 2.04 | 28.8855 | 19873545 |
| Mozambique | 2004 | 296.177 | 23.0224 | 18.6499 | 93.2 | 22.075 | 8.43427 | 530.0309 | 9.411501 | 1.99 | 30.8778 | 20438890 |
| Mozambique | 2005 | 313.108 | 20.859 | 18.6944 | 89.3 | 19.4672 | 7.54533 | 435.0978 | 12.29943 | 1.98 | 31.7279 | 21010440 |
| Mozambique | 2006 | 324.003 | 25.3294 | 17.6533 | 85.5 | 18.5613 | 7.73238 | 641.5784 | 5.3226 | 1.94 | 38.3579 | 21587392 |


| Mozambique | 2007 | 338.44 | 23.8456 | 16.1355 | 80.5 | 19.5173 | 7.05912 | 568.6127 | 11.35473 | 2.02 | 35.3504 | 22171318 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mozambique | 2008 | 352.165 | 21.5523 | 16.4812 | 77.1 | 18.31 | 5.07801 | 464.5016 | 7.9822 | 2 | 32.267 | 22762614 |
| Mozambique | 2009 | 364.882 | 21.3395 | 14.9489 | 73.5 | 15.6757 | 1.84706 | 455.3743 | 12.42401 | 1.96 | 24.7888 | 23361035 |
| Mozambique | 2010 | 380.849 | 21.23 | 21.8456 | 71.1 | 16.2627 | 9.4004 | 450.7129 | 3.5615 | 1.93 | 26.1 | 23967277 |
| Mozambique | 2011 | 398.523 | 16.7289 | 24.6764 | 67.2 | 19.0996 | 12.5619 | 279.8561 | 8.9256 | 1.88 | 29.429 | 24581385 |
| Mozambique | 2012 | 417.451 |  |  | 63.1 | 16.8135 |  |  | 15.66748 | 1.86 |  | 25203414 |
| Namibia | 1991 | 2791.27 | 6.96992 | 16.0854 | 48.2 | 23.3633 | 22.1052 | 48.57979 |  |  | 53.1241 | 1466149 |
| Namibia | 1992 | 2898.01 | 4.98656 | 20.8699 | 47.5 | 20.2125 | 23.4922 | 24.86578 |  |  | 52.1933 | 1513689 |
| Namibia | 1993 | 2756.42 | 5.2556 | 21.146 | 47 | 18.0208 | 25.4591 | 27.62133 |  |  | 51.9028 | 1559475 |
| Namibia | 1994 | 2872.71 | 4.15052 | 19.5289 | 46.7 | 17.0533 | 30.0213 | 17.22681 |  |  | 48.4888 | 1605828 |
| Namibia | 1995 | 2903.39 | 5.20142 | 22.1706 | 46.7 | 18.5083 | 30.1522 | 27.05477 |  |  | 49.4884 | 1654220 |
| Namibia | 1996 | 2906.39 | 5.21725 | 23.5494 | 46.8 | 19.16 | 28.4955 | 27.2197 |  | 3.01 | 50.5829 | 1705314 |
| Namibia | 1997 | 2938.23 | 4.46181 | 19.6287 | 47.1 | 20.1792 | 23.7838 | 19.90775 |  |  | 47.5255 | 1757970 |
| Namibia | 1998 | 2948.21 | 5.18694 | 22.9975 | 47.4 | 20.7192 | 27.456 | 26.90435 |  | 2.71 | 45.9684 | 1809715 |
| Namibia | 1999 | 2969.79 | 5.30104 | 23.013 | 47.8 | 18.4842 | 23.9366 | 28.10103 |  |  | 46.1613 | 1857143 |
| Namibia | 2000 | 3007.32 | 3.86454 | 16.5825 | 48 | 15.2783 | 25.221 | 14.93467 |  | 2.67 | 40.8774 | 1897960 |
| Namibia | 2001 | 2990.31 | 3.16248 | 20.9301 | 47.9 | 14.5317 | 25.7266 | 10.00128 |  |  | 41.1724 | 1931273 |
| Namibia | 2002 | 3090.22 | 4.19497 | 19.9436 | 47.5 | 13.8375 | 25.3734 | 17.59777 |  | 2.63 | 46.0034 | 1958305 |
| Namibia | 2003 | 3183.93 | 2.83261 | 19.0891 | 46.8 | 14.7008 | 23.1884 | 8.023679 | 7.54854 | 2.74 | 43.3868 | 1981233 |
| Namibia | 2004 | 3535.26 | 2.58743 | 18.5618 | 45.6 | 11.3892 | 27.8403 | 6.694794 | 7.2427 | 2.6 | 39.8111 | 2003327 |
| Namibia | 2005 | 3582.24 | 1.75035 | 18.611 | 42.4 | 10.61 | 27.9832 | 3.063725 | 8.34878 | 2.54 | 40.4509 | 2027026 |
| Namibia | 2006 | 3787.22 | 1.91413 | 21.6295 | 39.8 | 11.1808 | 31.9702 | 3.663893 | 6.127551 | 2.62 | 39.8516 | 2052933 |
| Namibia | 2007 | 3937.49 | 2.51788 | 23.6723 | 37.9 | 12.8842 | 32.4109 | 6.339719 | 6.15641 | 2.63 | 50.7337 | 2080690 |
| Namibia | 2008 | 4012.41 | 2.44017 | 24.4537 | 35.8 | 13.7367 | 35.0905 | 5.95443 | 3.3858 | 2.7 | 53.1585 | 2110784 |
| Namibia | 2009 | 3908.14 | 3.76604 | 22.1247 | 33.3 | 11.1183 | 26.073 | 14.18306 | 2.335891 | 2.63 | 47.3038 | 2143499 |
| Namibia | 2010 | 4085.71 | 2.39673 | 22.6844 | 31.1 | 9.72 | 21.4397 | 5.744315 | 5.24991 | 2.61 | 47.4919 | 2178964 |


| Namibia | 2011 | 4242.36 | 2.17826 | 20.8143 | 29.2 | 8.73 | 19.3618 | 4.744817 | 3.68417 | 2.59 | 41.0013 | 2217609 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Namibia | 2012 | 4372.8 |  | 21.8965 | 28.3 | 8.65187 |  |  | 2.11256 | 2.62 | 42.5939 | 2259400 |
| South Africa | 1991 | 4708.03 |  | 17.1559 | 45.9 | 20.3125 | 19.0828 |  | 4.9777 |  | 21.7504 | 35933121 |
| South Africa | 1992 | 4512.27 |  | 15.6505 | 45.2 | 18.9058 | 16.6257 |  | 5.0311 |  | 21.3433 | 36690925 |
| South Africa | 1993 | 4472.49 | 0.211713 | 14.6905 | 45 | 16.1583 | 16.7845 | 0.044822 | 6.44085 |  | 22.4782 | 37473704 |
| South Africa | 1994 | 4519.51 | 0.219772 | 15.1508 | 45.1 | 15.5833 | 17.1886 | 0.0483 | 6.64475 |  | 22.1028 | 38283135 |
| South Africa | 1995 | 4560.64 | 0.260506 | 15.8807 | 45.7 | 17.8958 | 16.8444 | 0.067863 | 9.215369 |  | 22.7725 | 39120219 |
| South Africa | 1996 | 4652.37 | 0.257673 | 16.2847 | 46.6 | 19.5208 | 16.4959 | 0.066395 | 12.16667 | 3.38 | 24.7293 | 40000400 |
| South Africa | 1997 | 4667.48 | 0.340395 | 16.511 | 47.8 | 20 | 15.4805 | 0.115869 | 11.40223 |  | 24.5955 | 40926159 |
| South Africa | 1998 | 4582.61 | 0.391193 | 17.0944 | 49 | 21.7917 | 15.6025 | 0.153032 | 14.91115 | 3.1 | 25.6529 | 41899733 |
| South Africa | 1999 | 4578.79 | 0.415802 | 15.4549 | 50.3 | 18 | 16.262 | 0.172891 | 12.81851 |  | 25.3347 | 42923500 |
| South Africa | 2000 | 4652.34 | 0.374984 | 15.1437 | 51.4 | 14.5 | 16.1692 | 0.140613 | 9.16105 | 3.19 | 27.8709 | 43999992 |
| South Africa | 2001 | 4682.78 | 0.370703 | 15.0514 | 52.3 | 13.7708 | 16.0704 | 0.137421 | 8.068899 |  | 30.1275 | 44909504 |
| South Africa | 2002 | 4788.06 | 0.472008 | 14.7001 | 52.9 | 15.75 | 17.1269 | 0.222792 | 6.58596 | 3.14 | 32.9233 | 45533552 |
| South Africa | 2003 | 4866.92 | 0.400759 | 15.4808 | 52.8 | 14.9583 | 16.099 | 0.160608 | 9.099319 | 3.18 | 27.8801 | 46116438 |
| South Africa | 2004 | 5028.8 | 0.292898 | 15.9814 | 52.1 | 11.2917 | 15.3407 | 0.085789 | 9.906321 | 3.16 | 26.4225 | 46664768 |
| South Africa | 2005 | 5234.31 | 0.285077 | 16.788 | 51 | 10.625 | 14.79 | 0.081269 | 7.2257 | 3.14 | 27.3804 | 47198374 |
| South Africa | 2006 | 5465.96 | 0.279433 | 18.3365 | 49.5 | 11.1667 | 14.6578 | 0.078083 | 6.52508 | 3 | 30.006 | 47730922 |
| South Africa | 2007 | 5706.28 | 0.292141 | 20.1498 | 46.7 | 13.1667 | 14.6018 | 0.085346 | 6.06828 | 2.99 | 31.4766 | 48257413 |
| South Africa | 2008 | 5848.04 | 0.425883 | 23.0767 | 45.3 | 15.125 | 15.511 | 0.181376 | 3.5885 | 3.02 | 35.8808 | 48793126 |
| South Africa | 2009 | 5697.23 | 0.386985 | 21.5585 | 39.8 | 11.7083 | 15.8228 | 0.149757 | 4.5783 | 2.98 | 27.3102 | 49319989 |
| South Africa | 2010 | 5794.24 | 0.289468 | 19.3281 | 35 | 9.83333 | 16.798 | 0.083792 | 5.57099 | 2.89 | 27.3645 | 49991323 |
| South Africa | 2011 | 5923.99 | 0.355934 | 18.9651 | 34.2 | 9 | 16.7737 | 0.126689 | 3.71998 | 2.91 | 29.283 | 50586738 |
| South Africa | 2012 | 6003.46 |  | 19.1554 | 33.3 | 8.75 |  |  | 3.33615 | 2.83 | 28.257 | 51189245 |
| Swaziland | 1991 | 1995.8 | 4.31688 | 14.9446 | 53.7 | 16.0167 | 18.6048 | 18.63545 | 7.082391 |  | 59.2592 | 887248.2 |
| Swaziland | 1992 | 2013.22 | 4.0942 | 19.0385 | 54.8 | 15.9208 | 16.3136 | 16.76247 | 8.3625 |  | 57.3492 | 907945.8 |


| Swaziland | 1993 | 2034.79 | 3.85806 | 17.4027 | 57.1 | 14.3458 | 13.5034 | 14.88463 | 2.3224 |  | 57.2856 | 926222.7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Swaziland | 1994 | 2043.92 | 4.11899 | 16.6818 | 60.2 | 14.25 | 18.3139 | 16.96608 | 0.4807 |  | 63.6787 | 944225.2 |
| Swaziland | 1995 | 2099.84 | 3.24523 | 15.4161 | 63.9 | 17.0542 | 14.8031 | 10.53152 | 4.765599 |  | 60.0157 | 963425.1 |
| Swaziland | 1996 | 2133.84 | 1.9051 | 16.332 | 67.6 | 18.6667 | 12.903 | 3.629406 | 12.24149 | 1.83 | 59.3548 | 984510.7 |
| Swaziland | 1997 | 2151.41 | 1.52467 | 16.5361 | 71.3 | 19.5 | 15.9528 | 2.324619 | 12.37467 |  | 61.3508 | 1006762 |
| Swaziland | 1998 | 2160.37 | 2.13 | 19.1039 | 74.5 | 19.5 | 13.0393 | 4.536901 | 11.39003 | 1.85 | 67.1738 | 1028693 |
| Swaziland | 1999 | 2182.83 | 1.77243 | 16.6769 | 77.4 | 17.4167 | 12.3145 | 3.141508 | 11.32784 |  | 64.9999 | 1048153 |
| Swaziland | 2000 | 2188.75 | 0.842373 | 18.1168 | 79.5 | 14 | 12.9805 | 0.709592 | 1.7915 | 1.79 | 74.3267 | 1063717 |
| Swaziland | 2001 | 2191.34 | 2.00805 | 22.9663 | 80.7 | 13.25 | 22.6141 | 4.032265 | 7.30789 |  | 85.4407 | 1074762 |
| Swaziland | 2002 | 2214.99 | 1.81672 | 19.3022 | 81.5 | 15.25 | 22.0269 | 3.300472 | 3.2303 | 1.92 | 95.7115 | 1082182 |
| Swaziland | 2003 | 2252.65 | 2.21239 | 20.6029 | 81.7 | 14.625 | 26.0812 | 4.894669 | 7.335 | 1.68 | 100.949 | 1087933 |
| Swaziland | 2004 | 2303.66 | 1.02715 | 15.2708 | 81.1 | 11.2917 | 17.1904 | 1.055037 | 7.84636 | 1.45 | 84.9294 | 1094754 |
| Swaziland | 2005 | 2339.29 | 1.68877 | 15.0393 | 80.1 | 10.625 | 20.1932 | 2.851944 | 5.851 | 1.41 | 87.0669 | 1104640 |
| Swaziland | 2006 | 2387.13 | 1.17424 | 12.8138 | 75.6 | 11.1667 | 15.2828 | 1.37884 | 5.862061 | 1.66 | 76.6161 | 1118255 |
| Swaziland | 2007 | 2434.36 | 1.6372 | 12.2908 | 74.4 | 13.1667 | 18.4495 | 2.680424 | 5.090611 | 1.65 | 75.6694 | 1134974 |
| Swaziland | 2008 | 2450.83 | 2.31841 | 11.0478 | 73.2 | 14.8333 | 8.52087 | 5.375024 | 2.175799 | 1.76 | 59.361 | 1153925 |
| Swaziland | 2009 | 2440.1 | 1.81596 | 10.2923 | 67.2 | 11.375 | -2.67187 | 3.297711 | 3.92677 | 1.75 | 58.839 | 1173675 |
| Swaziland | 2010 | 2445.08 | 2.63929 | 10.2102 | 61.2 | 9.75 | -0.53707 | 6.965852 | 5.24076 | 1.98 | 55.8861 | 1193153 |
| Swaziland | 2011 | 2413.95 | 3.35854 | 9.57356 | 57 | 9 |  | 11.27979 | 2.8948 | 1.81 | 66.575 | 1212155 |
| Swaziland | 2012 | 2341.38 |  |  | 55.7 | 8.75 |  |  | -0.65199 | 1.93 |  | 1230979 |
| Tanzania | 1991 | 297.142 | 22.4894 | 25.9997 | 100.1 |  | 9.07475 | 505.7732 |  |  | 10.2621 | 26337386 |
| Tanzania | 1992 | 289.035 | 30.2217 | 26.9635 | 99.5 |  | 10.0184 | 913.3512 |  |  | 12.4418 | 27235995 |
| Tanzania | 1993 | 282.972 | 23.0709 | 24.8934 | 98.8 | 31 | 3.72468 | 532.2664 | 5.7227 |  | 17.9831 | 28157097 |
| Tanzania | 1994 | 278.426 | 22.1152 | 24.439 | 97.8 | 39 | 6.43061 | 489.0821 | 4.916599 |  | 20.614 | 29067463 |
| Tanzania | 1995 | 279.938 | 16.9936 | 19.5959 | 96.6 | 42.8333 | 7.59122 | 288.7825 | 15.4055 |  | 24.0747 | 29944314 |
| Tanzania | 1996 | 284.729 | 13.4991 | 16.4718 | 94.7 | 33.965 | 10.3599 | 182.2257 | 12.9877 | 1.77 | 19.9372 | 30780441 |


| Tanzania | 1997 | 287.267 | 12.481 | 14.7211 | 92.2 | 26.27 | 9.22741 | 155.7754 | 10.1793 |  | 16.2181 | 31586173 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Tanzania | 1998 | 290.65 | 10.8377 | 19.5525 | 89 | 22.8925 | 12.4908 | 117.4557 | 10.0927 | 2.08 | 12.3977 | 32378333 |
| Tanzania | 1999 | 297.349 | 10.3288 | 17.051 | 85.1 | 21.8942 | 9.802 | 106.6841 | 14.00377 |  | 12.5297 | 33183058 |
| Tanzania | 2000 | 304.359 | 10.5193 | 16.3547 | 80.5 | 21.5775 | 13.2801 | 110.6557 | 15.65354 | 2.08 | 13.3649 | 34020370 |
| Tanzania | 2001 | 314.547 | 12.4143 | 17.0006 | 75.4 | 20.0573 | 14.1096 | 154.1148 | 14.90983 |  | 17.0066 | 34895206 |
| Tanzania | 2002 | 328.525 | 11.8708 | 16.763 | 70.5 | 16.3982 | 16.8342 | 140.9159 | 11.08037 | 2.1 | 17.5808 | 35806500 |
| Tanzania | 2003 | 342.05 | 14.9564 | 18.8085 | 65.7 | 14.517 | 18.4406 | 223.6939 | 9.21343 | 2.13 | 18.5626 | 36760704 |
| Tanzania | 2004 | 359.037 | 13.9448 | 22.1558 | 61.2 | 14.1403 | 20.025 | 194.4575 | 9.4045 | 2.08 | 19.6513 | 37765253 |
| Tanzania | 2005 | 374.999 | 10.8344 | 24.6578 | 57.2 | 15.2489 | 17.8836 | 117.3842 | 10.21433 | 2.11 | 20.8228 | 38824421 |
| Tanzania | 2006 | 389.082 | 13.3056 | 27.2193 | 53.6 | 15.6521 | 17.5871 | 177.039 | 8.40113 | 2.16 | 22.5625 | 39942441 |
| Tanzania | 2007 | 404.978 | 16.9303 | 29.2099 | 50 | 16.0704 | 16.3866 | 286.635 | 9.04489 | 2.12 | 24.2417 | 41119787 |
| Tanzania | 2008 | 422.44 | 11.4148 | 29.3536 | 46.9 | 14.9821 | 19.0316 | 130.2977 | 4.703699 | 2.02 | 25.1425 | 42353855 |
| Tanzania | 2009 | 434.704 | 13.9055 | 28.4304 | 44.2 | 15.0305 | 20.1905 | 193.3629 | 2.8883 | 1.91 | 23.2279 | 43639795 |
| Tanzania | 2010 | 451.547 | 13.085 | 31.5162 | 41.5 | 14.5459 | 24.8714 | 171.2172 | 8.34574 | 1.92 | 27.8332 | 44973321 |
| Tanzania | 2011 | 466.368 | 10.3174 | 36.0591 | 39.3 | 14.9619 | 20.5757 | 106.4487 | 2.2709 | 1.87 | 31.0574 | 46354550 |
| Tanzania | 2012 | 483.482 |  |  | 37.7 | 15.4605 |  |  | -0.5406 | 1.81 |  | 47782977 |
| Zambia | 1991 | 660.282 | 29.3351 | 11.3651 | 114.7 |  | 4.64479 | 860.5481 |  |  | 34.6126 | 8038234 |
| Zambia | 1992 | 633.774 | 35.9488 | 10.5684 | 114.6 | 54.5667 |  | 1292.316 | -111.14 |  | 36.3913 | 8229452 |
| Zambia | 1993 | 661.298 | 28.7201 | 11.4724 | 113.9 | 113.308 |  | 824.8442 | -70.004 |  | 33.5695 | 8423029 |
| Zambia | 1994 | 590.078 | 22.9932 | 11.3229 | 112.6 | 70.5583 |  | 528.6873 | 15.957 |  | 36.0049 | 8625470 |
| Zambia | 1995 | 559.43 | 62.7696 | 12.4354 | 110.8 | 45.5333 |  | 3940.023 | 10.6037 |  | 36.0168 | 8841349 |
| Zambia | 1996 | 582.99 | 19.8423 | 11.2477 | 109 | 53.7833 |  | 393.7169 | 10.7102 | 1.44 | 31.3258 | 9073331 |
| Zambia | 1997 | 586.276 | 16.6551 | 13.0689 | 107.2 | 46.6917 | 9.5456 | 277.3924 | 22.273 |  | 30.1214 | 9320064 |
| Zambia | 1998 | 559.916 | 11.5432 | 14.816 | 105.3 | 31.8 | 1.18689 | 133.2455 | 7.341499 | 1.64 | 26.9032 | 9577432 |
| Zambia | 1999 | 557.147 | 20.9956 | 14.6315 | 102.7 | 40.5167 | 1.94816 | 440.8152 | 13.729 |  | 27.2196 | 9839151 |
| Zambia | 2000 | 561.793 | 25.6551 | 15.9314 | 99.4 | 38.8 | -0.94611 | 658.1841 | 12.7696 | 1.64 | 26.476 | 10100950 |


| Zambia | 2001 | 574.438 | 16.3617 | 17.5667 | 95.3 | 46.2333 | -1.56063 | 267.7052 | 24.8395 |  | 28.1377 | 10362147 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Zambia | 2002 | 578.789 | 22.7852 | 20.5861 | 90.5 | 45.198 | 7.06036 | 519.1653 | 22.9647 | 1.69 | 28.5044 | 10625422 |
| Zambia | 2003 | 593.437 | 18.4468 | 24.1747 | 85.6 | 40.571 | 10.5786 | 340.2844 | 19.1694 | 1.68 | 28.3358 | 10894515 |
| Zambia | 2004 | 609.824 | 22.4278 | 23.6282 | 80.9 | 30.7271 | 17.1592 | 503.0062 | 12.7593 | 1.68 | 37.7776 | 11174668 |
| Zambia | 2005 | 625.854 | 17.9026 | 22.3929 | 76.5 | 28.2095 | 15.6493 | 320.5031 | 9.885099 | 1.56 | 34.5662 | 11470052 |
| Zambia | 2006 | 647.362 | 15.3933 | 20.7807 | 73 | 23.1532 | 25.7424 | 236.9537 | 14.13363 | 1.69 | 38.4909 | 11781605 |
| Zambia | 2007 | 668.642 | 10.0815 | 20.6161 | 69.8 | 18.8891 | 17.1987 | 101.6366 | 8.231799 | 1.79 | 40.9126 | 12109611 |
| Zambia | 2008 | 689.335 | 8.42943 | 19.5222 | 67.1 | 19.0632 | 14.704 | 71.05529 | 6.6176 | 1.77 | 35.3746 | 12456586 |
| Zambia | 2009 | 709.999 | 10.2295 | 19.5708 | 64.4 | 22.0631 | 25.4764 | 104.6427 | 8.667801 | 1.71 | 35.0131 | 12825039 |
| Zambia | 2010 | 741.442 | 6.16685 | 21.0667 | 62.9 | 20.9163 | 31.3349 | 38.03004 | 12.41454 | 1.67 | 46.7762 | 13216941 |
| Zambia | 2011 | 767.911 | 5.79737 | 23.4293 | 58.7 | 18.8368 | 30.2708 | 33.6095 | 12.40432 | 1.86 | 46.0431 | 13633765 |
| Zambia | 2012 | 798.26 |  |  | 56.4 | 12.1498 |  |  | 5.56418 | 2 |  | 14075131 |
| Zimbabwe | 1991 | 697.99 | 4.66184 | 20.5854 | 51.5 | 15.5 | 13.9571 | 21.73275 | -7.8417 |  | 23.8835 | 10733068 |
| Zimbabwe | 1992 | 620.708 | 12.1893 | 22.3628 | 53.4 | 19.7708 | 11.4895 | 148.579 | -22.2939 |  | 27.2273 | 10981252 |
| Zimbabwe | 1993 | 614.392 | 7.8541 | 23.5917 | 55.4 | 36.3308 | 21.2029 | 61.68689 | 8.742498 |  | 30.7196 | 11210821 |
| Zimbabwe | 1994 | 658.339 | 8.47623 | 21.3715 | 57.2 | 34.8608 | 18.8999 | 71.84647 | 12.5967 |  | 34.6 | 11428605 |
| Zimbabwe | 1995 | 647.442 | 7.20826 | 24.5773 | 59.1 | 34.7317 |  | 51.95901 | 12.1379 |  | 38.2363 | 11639325 |
| Zimbabwe | 1996 | 702.052 | 4.48571 | 18.0405 | 60.5 | 34.2342 |  | 20.1216 | 12.8003 | 2.27 | 36.1301 | 11846109 |
| Zimbabwe | 1997 | 708.92 | 4.12957 | 18.0497 | 61.4 | 32.5467 |  | 17.05335 | 13.8107 |  | 37.5953 | 12045841 |
| Zimbabwe | 1998 | 718.418 | 4.34122 | 20.6015 | 61.6 | 42.0558 |  | 18.84619 | 10.2362 | 2.13 | 43.3931 | 12229480 |
| Zimbabwe | 1999 | 703.612 | 3.75996 | 2.5537 | 61.3 | 55.3858 |  | 14.1373 | -3.1339 |  | 37.4086 | 12384670 |
| Zimbabwe | 2000 | 675.6 | 2.7752 | 11.798 | 60.8 | 68.2083 |  | 7.701735 | 12.3418 | 1.72 | 38.1598 | 12503636 |
| Zimbabwe | 2001 | 680.801 | 2.49512 | 12.1178 | 59.9 | 38.0208 |  | 6.225624 | -38.6865 |  | 34.9589 | 12586810 |
| Zimbabwe | 2002 | 617.593 | 3.27328 | 10.1725 | 58.9 | 36.4792 |  | 10.71436 | -103.581 | 1.6 | 31.8348 | 12640924 |
| Zimbabwe | 2003 | 511.331 | 3.39405 | 13.8138 | 57.8 | 97.2917 |  | 11.51957 | -334.408 | 1.55 | 32.3971 | 12673072 |
| Zimbabwe | 2004 | 480.878 | 3.38742 | 5.10781 | 57.4 | 278.917 |  | 11.47461 | -3.46301 | 1.55 | 34.4698 | 12693112 |


| Zimbabwe | 2005 | 452.789 | 6.80223 | 2.00044 | 57.1 | 235.675 |  | 46.27033 | -66.442 | 1.21 | 33.5486 | 12710640 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Zimbabwe | 2006 | 436.644 | 5.14538 | 2.22468 | 57.2 | 496.458 |  | 26.47494 | -600.222 | 1.2 | 35.9562 | 12724248 |
| Zimbabwe | 2007 | 420.169 | 9.19875 | 5.0784 | 57.8 |  |  | 84.617 |  | 1.23 | 37.7854 | 12740163 |
| Zimbabwe | 2008 | 344.742 | 14.6468 | 3.28591 | 58.7 |  |  | 214.5287 |  | 1 | 41.4669 | 12784065 |
| Zimbabwe | 2009 | 362.4 | 12.8838 | 10.7095 | 59.6 |  |  | 165.9923 |  | 0.98 | 29.2776 | 12888938 |
| Zimbabwe | 2010 | 391.55 | 10.4456 | 14.001 | 59.3 |  |  | 109.1105 |  | 1 | 47.6373 | 13076928 |
| Zimbabwe | 2011 | 419.236 | 7.83082 | 12.4495 | 58.6 |  |  | 61.32174 |  | 1.14 | 49.4109 | 13358721 |
| Zimbabwe | 2012 | 428.536 |  |  | 55.7 |  |  |  |  | 1.29 |  | 13724320 |


[^0]:    ${ }^{2}$ See the Paris declaration of 2005 which outlined five principles to be followed in order to make aid more effective.
    ${ }^{3}$ Impact of aid on welfare improvement or poverty reduction in the region is beyond the scope of this paper.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ A classic debate between prominent Economists John Maynard Keynes and Bertil Ohlin on the potential repercussions of World War 1 reparations demanded of Germany highlights how contradictory the impacts of foreign resource transfers can be even from a theoretical perspective. See Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk (1998).

[^2]:    ${ }^{5}$ Hussein et al (2012)

[^3]:    ${ }^{8}$ Kye Woo Lee (2013) notes that the Paris Declaration does not include principles or policies related to optimal aid allocations which could improve development effectiveness of the policy.

