

**A STUDY ON
THE IMPACT OF U.S. “STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY”
ON THE KOREA-U.S. ALLIANCE**

By

Kim, Jung Hyok

THESIS

Submitted to

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

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By

KIM, Jung Hyok

Last several years, the USFK’s relocation and its transformation have been hot issues in Korea. The USFK has stationed roughly for 60 years right after the Korean War to defend South Korea from the invasion of North Korea and Communists. The alliance has unprecedentedly grown the most successful one in the world. The alliance relations have developed into strong solidarity through the Korean War and the Cold War era.

However, since President Bush took his office, the world security environment has dramatically changed. Even worse, uncertainty of security environment has been spread out since the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War. The 9/11 tragedy catalyzed the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), furthermore, the U.S. needed to

have new strategies to protect the U.S. from potential enemies. As a part of the security strategy, the military transformation and the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) have been launched to get strategic flexibility to cope with new challenges of irregular and disruptive threats. The core concept of the military transformation is to take superiority through the technology and mobility of equipment, and the core concept of the GPR is to get strategic flexibility through relocation or readjustment of the troops abroad in order to deploy its forces to disputes area. These kinds of concepts will be applied to the USFK with no exception.

In this paper, I take a look at the background of the military transformation and the GPR as well as the U.S. strategies for security environment against the new threats of the 21st century. Moreover, this paper analyzes implications of the USFK's expansion of strategic flexibility for the security of the Korean peninsula and the ROK-US alliance, which were led by the changes of the U.S. strategy. Through above analyses, this paper suggests the directions for improving the ROK-US alliance relations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-------|
| ABSTRACT..... | i |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | iii |
| LIST OF TABLES | iv |
| LIST OF FIGURES | v |
| I. Introduction | 1 |
| II. Background of the U.S. Military Transformation and the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR)..... | 5 |
| A. Overview of the U.S. Military Transformation | 5 |
| B. Overview of the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR)..... | 9 |
| III. The Application of Strategic Flexibility to the USFK | 23 |
| A. The meaning of strategic flexibility | 23 |
| B. USFK's Strategic Flexibility | 33 |
| IV. Implications of the USFK's Strategic Flexibility for the ROK-US Alliance | 42 |
| A. The ROK-US Alliance Sustenance Factor | 42 |
| B. Changes in the ROK-US Alliance System | 45 |
| V. Directions of a future ROK-U.S. Alliance..... | 49 |
| A. Maintain the Sustaining the ROK-US Alliance..... | 49 |
| B. Mutual Agreement on Flow-in and Flow-out | 51 |
| C. Establishing Comprehensive Alliance | 52 |
| VI. Conclusion | 53 |
| Appendices..... | 56 |
| Appendix 1. Abstract in Korean..... | 56 |
| Appendix 2. The 38 th SCM | 58 |
| Bibliography | 62 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|---|---|
| Table 1. Concept of Conventional Operation and Rapid Decisive Operation | 8 |
|---|---|

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Shifting Military Portfolio of Capability28

Figure 2. USFK’s Relocation in the Korean Peninsula39

Figure 3. Changing Command System46

I. Introduction

The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (U.S.) have had a strong alliance since the Korean War in 1950. The ROK-US alliance is one of the greatest role models of alliance during the half past century. The U.S. has been the most reliable 'blood-alliance' for Korea, which has kept security and liberal democracy against communist countries such as North Korea and Soviet Union during the Cold War era. However, the ROK-US alliance, one of the strongest alliances in the world, faces the needs of adjustment because of the rapidly and fiercely changing security circumstances in the 21st century. Especially, right after 9/11 tragedy, the security circumstances of the U.S. has dramatically changed, which affected on the ROK-US alliance. The 9/11 catalyzed the U.S.'s global policy fundamentally.

Right after President Bush took his office, he recognized the changes of world wide security environment. Moreover, after the 9/11 in 2001, he declared the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which meant the changes of the U.S. National Security Strategy as well as National Military Strategy. The U.S. executed military transformation and Global Defense Posture Review (GPR), which gave the U.S. strategic flexibility and allowed preparing against various threats including irregular warfare, terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The main concept of military transformation and the GPR is to make all troops over the world seize military strategic flexibility.

After the end of the Cold War, the threat of conventional warfare had dramatically weakened. Nevertheless, the U.S. was still preparing conventional warfare just like World War II or Vietnam War using Tanks, Cannons, and other conventional weapons.

The 21st century's security environment is being diverted to irregular warfare, terror, regional conflict, and cyber war which need quick reactions to deal with. It means that these new threats of security environment require rapid, agile, and decisive response. The U.S. has to make its military forces swifter, lighter, and more deployable to manage these new threats. Thus, it calls for the change of missions and roles of the U.S. forces oversea and the military transformation. As mentioned above, the threat of conventional warfare has faded out in the post Cold War era, so, the meaning of regional station forces is also insignificant. The U.S. announced the plan of base realignment and closure of forces abroad including the USFK. Aforementioned, the USFK should adopt the GPR which has been conducted by the U.S. government to have strategic flexibility.

The realignment or relocation of the USFK will be completed in late 2008. Most of U.S troops will be relocated under the line of Han River which might cause the decrease of the U.S.'s tripwire effect at the border of two Koreas. The meaning of relocation/realignment may be the change in the USFK's missions or the decrease the number of U.S. soldiers in Korea, if so; both are serious problem to the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the USFK's relocation and readjustment on its mission without building a consensus with Korea may damage not only the relationship between ROK and US which is half century-long unbroken alliance, but also the Northeast Asia security environment. Therefore, the necessity of establishing a new ROK-US alliance system in accordance with the change of the global security environment has been on the rise. The command structure is now changing. And the security environment is fluctuating over the Korean peninsula. We can expect new command structure after the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the war time Operation

Control (OPCON) transfer from the U.S. to Korea in 2012.

Even though the threats from North Korea have been decreased notably for last several years, North Korea still remains as one of the main threats to Korea. Consequently, the ROK needs to protect itself together with its strong alliance, the U.S., against the North Korea's invasion. This means that the ROK-US alliance still needs to consolidate national security and defense readiness. In that sense, for the purpose of enhancing the ROK and U.S. alliance, two things should be resolved in advance: first, the ROK-US alliance should be redefined according to the new security circumstances and threats of the 21st century and the U.S.'s new national/military strategies; second, the mission and role of the USFK should clarify the direction of changes and transformation.

In this study, I will analyze impacts of the relocation of the USFK on the Korean peninsula and the ROK-US alliance according to the U.S. strategic transformation. I will suggest the most appropriate way to maintain the boosted ROK-US alliance. In order to maintain the coherence, this study will assume three main conditions as follows: first, North Korea will not collapse but be weakened; second, as the nuclear issue is now settled down, the threats of war will be decreased in some degree; third, the ROK-US alliance is still important to the Korean peninsula to keep peace and stability, moreover, the USFK is also important to secure peace in Northeast Asia as a stabilizer.

Due to the limitation to access the core information of the defense system, this study is based on existing publications, previous studies, and open resources to the public

such as internet website, newspapers, and so on. I referred not only to the official views of both the Korean and the U.S. governments such as White Paper, QDR, and the U.S. policy reports to the Congress, but also the views of the civilian activist groups, NGOs, and scholars who protest the U.S.'s expansion policy like military hegemony in order to maintain a balanced perspective.

This thesis consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the main theme of the thesis. Hence, it covers the purpose and assumption. Chapter 2 will explore the background of the U.S. military transformation and the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) in aspects of changing global security environment, responding to various threats in the 21st century and acquiring strategic flexibility. Chapter 3 will present the meaning of strategic flexibility and the methods to achieve it. It will also examine the USFK's strategic flexibility and concerns about the changes of the USFK. Chapter 4 will analyze the impacts of the USFK's strategic flexibility in the aspect of the ROK-US alliance. Chapter 5 will suggest the directions for a future ROK-US alliance based on the analysis in chapter 4. Finally, chapter 6 will review overall of this thesis and give recommendations for the future ROK-US alliance.

II. Background of the U.S. Military Transformation and the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR)

A. Overview of the U.S. Military Transformation

1. Background of the Military Transformation

The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office, and has justified many of its initiatives for DOD in connection with the concept. Defense transformation can be defined as large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), and organization. The issue is how Congress will take the concept of defense transformation into account in assessing and acting on Administration proposals for DOD.¹

When Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, returned to the Pentagon after a 25-year hiatus, he recognized that the department was still organized to fight the Cold War, which had ended a decade earlier. The military services were structured in virtually the same manner, though at considerably lower levels, as they had been for decades. Key weapons systems, though modernized, were essentially those of the Vietnam War—bombers, fighters, tanks, aircrafts and the like.² With respect to planning, the Pentagon still anticipated the need to fight two major contingencies, just as it had in World War II. War plans were inflexible, and were altered through a process that was more cumbersome than meaningful.³

¹ Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, *Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress*. (Updated November 9, 2006) Visit this website: <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32238.pdf> (Access Date: 16 May 2008)

² Dov S. Zakheim, "U.S. Military Transformation and the Lessons for South Korea on its Path toward Defense Reform 2020," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*. Vol. XIX, No. 4, Winter 2007, p.6.

³ *Ibid.*, p.6.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had launched military transformation, which he did not coin the term “transformation”, but he certainly popularized it. It was Army Chief of Staff, GEN. Eric Shinseki, who had in the late 1990s announced a program he termed “transformation.”⁴ GEN. Shinseki hoped to set a new direction for a post-Cold War Army that had found itself engaged in peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the Balkans even as it continued to maintain, and attempted to modernize, its heavy forces. Shinseki’s efforts nevertheless had borne few fruits in the year before Rumsfeld took office. After Rumsfeld was sworn into the office, he initiated a series of studies that addressed all of the areas he wished to transform. Finally, this has been called the “Rumsfeld Doctrine.”⁵

The United States required transformation in changing the form, or structure of U.S. military forces. These were the nature of military culture and doctrine supporting those forces; and streamlining its war-fighting functions to more effectively meet the complexities of the new threats challenging the U.S. in the new century. Preparing for the future will require the U.S. military to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstance.⁶ U.S. military doctrines have been conducting similar operations with

⁴ He came into office in June 1999 with a clear vision for "transformation" and talked passionately about the army's need to adjust from thinking about traditional enemies to what he called "complicators", including both terrorists and the then little-known phrase "weapons of mass destruction". Gen Shinseki might thus have relished the arrival of a Republican team equally committed to change. Visit this website: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/29/iraq.usa> (Access date: July 20, 2008)

⁵ The Rumsfeld Doctrine (named after Donald Rumsfeld) is a journalist created neologism concerned with the perceived transformation of the United States Military. It would be considered Rumsfeld's own take on RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). It seeks to increase force readiness and decrease the amount of supply required to maintain forces, by reducing the number in a theater. This is done mainly by using LAVs (Light Armored Vehicles) to scout for enemies who are then destroyed via airstrikes. The basic tenets of this military strategy are: 1. High technology combat systems, 2. Reliance on air forces, 3. Small, nimble ground forces

Afghanistan and the Iraq wars are considered the two closest implementations of this doctrine. Visit this website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rumsfeld_Doctrine (Access Date: July 24, 2008)

⁶ Linda D. Kosaryn, “High-Tech Weapons, Resourceful Troops Will Keep Army Strong” American

those of World War II and Desert Storm in 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, and with fewer conventional threats facing the U.S., the challenges of fighting new enemies demands new way of thinking. In particular, after the Iraqi War, traditional alliance has transformed into the ‘Coalition of the willing.’⁷ Rumsfeld stated that any kind of advanced weapons cannot transform U.S. forces without the transformation of the way of thinking, training and fighting.⁸

2. Purpose of the Military Transformation

The purpose of the military transformation which the U.S. intended could be summarized as minimizing the possibility of damage by counter attack of the enemy, materializing Network Centric Warfare (NCW)⁹ and Effect Based Concept (EBC). These carry out war through information network under the dispersion to attack enemy dimensionally, and developing and distributing Effect Based Capabilities as a combination dimension. The US is developing Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) which is simultaneous and asymmetric military operations. This meant that reorganization of a military structure such as strengthening the Navy and the Air

Forces Press Service, Feb 14, 2002. Visit this website:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43936> (Access Date: 24 July 2008)

⁷ Han, Seok Pyo, “The US military transformation and its implication on the ROK-US Alliance: focusing on strategic flexibility,” Seoul National University M.A Thesis, 2006, P.19 and footnote 21.

⁸ Williamson Murray, “Military Culture Dose Matter” *Strategic Review*, Vol.27, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp 30-40; Thomas G. Mahnken, “War and culture in the Information Age,” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter 2000. Pp. 40-45.

Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on ‘21st Century Transformation of US Armed Forces,” 31 Jan. 2002. Visit this website: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183> (Access Date: 10 July 2008)

⁹ Network-centric warfare (NCW), now commonly called network-centric operations (NCO), is a new military doctrine or theory of war pioneered by the United States Department of Defense. It seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive warfighting advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces. This networking combined with changes in technology, organization, processes, and people—may allow new forms of organizational behavior. Specifically, the theory contains the following four tenets in its hypotheses: 1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing; 2. Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; 3. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command; and 4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

Visit this website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare (Access Date: 10 July 2008)

Force as well as selected specialized ground Army was needed because the concept of war which the U.S. thought was changed from conventional operations to rapid decisive operations. That was the main reason that Rumsfeld Doctrine was borne, which it refers to a military strategy of blitz tactics with lightened, mechanized, flexible and rapid military power.¹⁰ Table 1 shows differences between the conventional operations and rapid decisive operations. Nowadays' rapid decisive operations emphasize on simultaneous operations which need plans and execution at the same time. Therefore, the time is critical factor to achieve successful operations. In addition, rapid decisive operation focuses on capability, not numbers.

Table 1. Concept of Conventional Operation and Rapid Decisive Operation

| Conventional Operation | Rapid Decisive Operation |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Sequential, Progressive | Simultaneous, Parallel |
| Deploy, Lodge, Build-up, Plan | Understand, Access, Strike, Sustain, and Move while planning |
| Linear | Distributed |
| Attrition-based | Effect-based |
| Achieve numerical superiority | Achieve qualitative superiority, attack the enemy's capabilities |
| Symmetrical | Asymmetrical |
| Terrain-oriented | Time-definite orientation |
| Force-oriented | Coherence-oriented |

Source: Chris Shepherd, *Campaign Plan 2001 Status Briefing*, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2000.

¹⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*, 2003, pp. 180-182; Rowan Scarborough, "Decisive Force now measured by speed" *The Washington Times*, 7 May 2003.

The security environment has been changed rapidly since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. faces the transforming of its military structure in order to follow or meet the rapidly changing threats in the 21st century all over the world. That is, the Global Defense Posture Review, as is known as the GPR. Under the GPR, U.S. military bases, troops, and infrastructures throughout the world have to be re-aligned. In this sense, the most important concept of the Military Transformation and Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) is an “acquiring strategic flexibility” which allows intervening in unstable parts of the world using its limited numbers of Armed Forces. In the consequence, realigning the ROK-US alliance and relocating the USFK is inevitable and Korea should keep in mind what will happen during the U.S. executing the Military Transformation and the GPR.

B. Overview of the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR)

1. Background of the GPR

The global posture review had its origins in the 2001 Report of the statutory Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). On November 25, 2003, President Bush announced that the U.S. would intensify consultations with friends, allies, and partners overseas about the GPR. President Bush also mentioned “we would realign the global posture of our forces to better address the new challenges we face and would be consulting around the world on this matter.” The concept of this GPR means not only merely to reduce the number of the troops and soldiers from the oversea and to establish state-of-the-art weapon systems, but also to adjust the location, characteristic, and size of troops including comprehensive realigning of the relationship with alliances and military cooperation system.¹¹

¹¹ Douglas J. Feith, “Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Visit this website:

Right after President Bush announced the concept of the GPR, Secretary Rumsfeld suggested the four notions of operating military forces overseas. The first notion is that U.S. troops should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and needed. In some cases, the presence and activities of U.S. forces grate on local populations and has become an irritant for host governments. A second governing concept is that American troops should be located in environments that are hospitable to their movements. Because U.S. soldiers may be called to a variety of locations to engage extremists at short notice, we need to be able to deploy them to trouble spots quickly. It makes sense to place a premium on developing more flexible legal and support arrangements with its allies and partners. Third, the U.S. needs to be in places that allow its troops to be usable and flexible. For example, the 1991 Gulf War was a stunning victory. But it took six months of planning and transport to summon the U.S.'s fleets and divisions and position them for battle. In the future, no one can expect to have that kind of time. Finally, the U.S. believes they should take advantage of advanced capabilities that allow the U.S. to do more with less. The old reliance on presence and mass reflects the last century's industrial-age thinking.¹²

The effects of the GPR were embodied by the remarks of President Bush to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Convention on the 16th of August 2004. President Bush points out that the world has changed a great deal, for decades, America's Armed Forces abroad have essentially remained where the wars of the last century

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=590> (Access Date: July 20, 2008)

¹² Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, 23 September 2004, Visit this website, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156> (Access Date: 26 July 2008); Cha, Doo Hyun, "Implications of the U.S.'s GPR for East Asia's security," *Current Issues and Policy*, The Sejong Institute, Vol. 98, (Sep. 2004) pp. 1-3.

ended, in Europe and in Asia. America's current force posture was designed, for example, to protect the U.S. and its allies from Soviet aggression where the threat no longer exists. He also mentions that the readiness posture of Armed Forces abroad must change with it, and so the U.S. can be more effective at projecting the strength of spreading freedom and peace. The new plan will help the U.S. fight and win these wars of the 21st century. It will strengthen its alliances around the world, while they build new partnerships to better preserve the peace. Although the U.S. still have a significant presence overseas, under this plan, over the next 10 years, they will withdraw about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel, and about 100,000 family members and civilian employees.¹³

The global posture decision process and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) are tightly linked; indeed they depend on each other. They are both key components of President Bush's transformation agenda, and they both will be critical instruments for stability in the lives of service members and their families. Together, they will help to provide more predictability in assignments and rotations. The progress made to date on global posture enables DOD to provide specific input on overseas changes for the BRAC 2005. That input will allow domestic implications of the global posture review with forces and personnel either returning to or moving forward from U.S. territory to be accounted for as effectively as possible within the BRAC decision-making process.¹⁴

¹³ President Bush's Remarks to Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Dr. Albert B. Sabin Cincinnati Cinergy Center, 16 August 2004, Visit this website:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-12.html> (Access Date: 27 July 2008);

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, 23 September 2004, Visit this website,

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156> (Access Date: 26 July 2008)

¹⁴ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, 23 September 2004, Visit this website,

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156> (Access Date: 26 July 2008)

It seems that the origins of the GPR are from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Defense Transformation which were propelled right after the end of Cold War. The military concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a theory about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military and others. Especially it tied to modern information, communications, and space technology. The Defense Transformation can be defined as large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), and organization.¹⁵

The U.S. argues that new technologies make the Defense Transformation possible and that new threats to the U.S. security make the Defense Transformation necessary. The U.S.'s vision for the Defense Transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in the U.S. defense planning on irregular warfare, including terrorism, insurgencies, and civil war; potential catastrophic security threats, such as the possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states; and potential disruptive events, such as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine the current U.S. military advantages. The U.S.'s vision for the Defense Transformation calls for shifting U.S. military forces toward a greater reliance on joint operations, network-centric warfare,¹⁶ effects-based operations, speed and

¹⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_in_Military_Affairs (Access Date: 16 July2008)

¹⁶ Network-centric warfare (NCW), now commonly called network-centric operations (NCO), is a new military doctrine or theory of war pioneered by the United States Department of Defense. It seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive warfighting advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces. This networking, combined with changes in technology, organization, processes, and people—may allow new forms of organizational behavior. Specifically, the theory contains the following four tenets in its hypotheses: 1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing; 2. Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; 3. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command; and 4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

agility, and precision application of firepower. Transformation could affect the defense industrial base by transferring funding from “legacy” systems to transformational systems, and from traditional DOD contractors to firms that previously have not done much defense work.¹⁷ The Defense Transformation concept is more comprehensive than the RMA, that is, the defense readiness posture of conventional warfare (or ‘industrial age force’) of the Cold War era is shifting to that of the 21st century (or ‘information age force’). Under the concept of the Defense Transformation, rapid response to uncertain security environments and rotational replacement depending on the mission are very important. The U.S. military should be operated strategically by giving importance on capability than number, and widening perspective from the regional to the global.¹⁸

2. Main Issues of the GPR

1) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

The Department of Defense Global Posture Review, also known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), is intended to reduce United States overseas forces over a six-to-eight-year period from the numbers and locations of overseas bases (basing “posture”) left over from the Cold War era to new locations optimized to support current allies and confront new potential threats. Overall, U.S. installations overseas would decline from 850 to 550. Roughly 70,000 personnel, mostly from the Army, would return to the U.S. The Congressional Budget Office projects the potential cost of this relocation effort at \$7 billion, but with a potential

Visit this website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare (Access Date: July 10, 2008)

¹⁷ Ronald O’Rourke, “Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service(CRS) Report for Congress, (Updated November 9, 2006) Visit this website: <http://fas.org/spp/crs/natsec/RL32238.pdf> (Access Date: 16 July 2008)

¹⁸ Choi, Jong Chul, “The ROK’s Strategic Response Initiative on the Expanding Strategic Flexibility on the USFK,” *National Strategy*, The Sejong Institute, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2006) pp. 59-60.

savings payoff of \$1 billion per year if the number of U.S. troops overseas was reduced to a minimum number needed to receive and host deployments.¹⁹

With the end of the Cold War, these basing arrangements need to be updated to ensure that U.S. forces are optimally positioned to respond to potential the 21st Century military threats. And the U.S. DOD classifies into three types of oversea bases according to its mission and function. With its new posture, it will be defined its facilities in the following manner: Main Operating Base (MOB), with permanently stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure, will be characterized by command and control structures, family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures. Examples include: Ramstein Air Base (Germany), Kadena Air Base (Okinawa, Japan), and Camp Humphreys (Korea). Forward Operating Site (FOS) will be an expandable “warm facilities” maintained with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. FOSs will support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. Examples include: the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Cooperative security locations will be facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence. Instead they will be maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host-nation support. CSLs will provide contingency access and be a focal point for security cooperation activities. A current example of a CSL is in Dakar, Senegal, where the Air Force has negotiated contingency landing, logistics, and fuel contracting arrangements, and which served as a staging area for the 2003 peace support operation in Liberia.²⁰

¹⁹ Robert d. Critchlow, “U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Development and Oversight Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, 31 October 2005, p.2 and footnote No. 4. Visit this website: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33148.pdf> (Access Date: 1 August 2008)

²⁰ Department of Defense, Strengthen U.S. Global Defense Posture, September 2004

The biggest changes would happen in Europe, where the military would shutter nearly 200 facilities and draw down roughly 40,000 troops from 105,570 as of June 2005. Some of the forces remaining in Europe would periodically deploy from bases in Germany for temporary duty to locations in Romania, Bulgaria, or Central Asia. For Asia, the plan advocates consolidating bases in South Korea, with a drawdown of nearly 12,500 personnel (from a strength of 32,744 troops in June 2005), and move headquarters for remaining units out of expensive Seoul real estate to locations further south. Adjustments are also envisioned for troop dispositions in Japan, with an interim agreement proposing to move 7,000 of the 15,000 Marines currently on Okinawa to Guam. Other U.S. forces in Asia could potentially deploy to the Philippines, Malaysia, or Singapore for exercises, training, and as-needed forward basing. Reliance on air and naval capability would increase in the Pacific given the vast distances in the region. The U.S. presence in Africa would likely expand. The U.S. already has established Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda, where the focus would be on training and cooperation.²¹

As we can see, the U.S.'s Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) seems to increase its military response capability against terrorists, WMD holding countries, and potential adversaries. In other words, the U.S. seems that they can get some advantage throughout this Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). That is, the GPR will cover the next three issues; winning the war on terrorism and preventing proliferation of

Report to Congress, Visit this web site;

http://www.defensecommunities.org/ResourceCenter/Global_Posture.pdf (Access Date: 2 August 2008)

²¹ Robert d. Critchlow, "U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Development and Oversight Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, 31 October 2005, pp. 3-4. Visit this website:

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33148.pdf> (Access Date: 1 August 2008)

WMD, enhancing control power at the 'Arc of Instability'; mid-long term check against China.

On the first hand, while protecting the CONUS the U.S. wants to win the War on Terrorism. The attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that its liberties are vulnerable. The prospect of future attacks, potentially employing weapons of mass destruction, makes it imperative the U.S. acts now to stop terrorists before they can attack again. The U.S. continues to root out transnational terrorist networks, sever their connections with state sponsors, eliminate their bases of operation, counter dangerous proliferation and establish a global antiterrorism environment. This mission requires the full integration of all instruments of national power, the cooperation and participation of friends and allies. The WMD threat is not limited to a specific region or type of conflict. The enemies are evolving and its strategy must be flexible and enable proactive measures. These actors will threaten the United States, its allies, and partners with the use of WMD. Non-State actors include terrorists, extremists, terrorist networks, transnational threats, non-governmental organizations, businesses, rogue scientist and technicians, as well as individuals acting independently of any organization. Failed States or States in transition that cannot guarantee the security of their WMD pose additional challenges.²²

Secondly, the U.S. classifies countries that are poor or have possibility to be hotbed of terror as an "arc of instability." There exists an "arc of instability" stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to the U.S.'s

²² The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff (USJCF), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, p. iii.

interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists.²³ The U.S. seems to reduce military forces from large bases such as Germany and Korea, and to relocate them into these areas such as Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Singapore, East Europe, and so forth to deal with dirty small war effectively.²⁴

Thirdly, the U.S. considers China as one of countries of the highest possibility of potential conflict in the aspect of future strategic interests. In the National Security Strategy of the U.S. in 2006, it portrays China as dramatic economic success country, but the role as global leader is not matured yet. And also, the U.S. warns that China should not continue military expansion in a non-transparent way; expand trade, but acting as if they can somehow “lock up” energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up; and support resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes. The U.S. will continue its cooperation with China for successful anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation, but in mid-long term perspective, the U.S. is realigning its forces around China to check against China and respond contingency situation of it. In addition, the U.S. military encompasses around China border to obtain the military superiority. In west, the U.S. stations 10th Mountain Division with 1,500 personnel of and 30

²³ Ibid., p. 5

²⁴ Kim, Sung Han, “New Military Security Paradigm and the Strategy of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC),” Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005. P. 33

helicopters at the excuse of Afghanistan War. Including military personnel in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, the number of the U.S. military is up to 110,000. In east, it is covered by the USFK, the PACOM and the USFJ with more than 80,000 military personnel. In south, the U.S. gets into stride its military cooperation with Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thai for ‘anti-terrorism,’ which gives pressure to China at the southern part.²⁵

In this regards, the U.S. is establishing strategic belt in Eurasia continent to connect with small scale military bases one another by reducing its long term stationed bases in the European and Asian countries.

2) Lightness and Swiftness of the U.S. military

The U.S. has changed its military concept from a tripwire and a fixed force to a deployable force, and has been transforming its military by equipping with capability to deal with battlefield and rapid mobility rather than just numbers. According to the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan war, modern warfare is not conducted by large scale of military but high-tech weapon, fusion operations of air-ground, collecting information and analysis, psychological warfare, and Special Operation Force are decisive factors to win the war. Therefore, the U.S. is likely to make its forces lighter, faster, and stronger.

While the U.S. military drives the extensive Defense Transformation, the U.S. Army modularizes its structures to guarantee the ground forces’ rapid deployment and to achieve force interchangeability in units. The modularization of the Army will

²⁵ Song, Ui Dal, “U.S. military encompasses China,” Joongangdaily, 22 February 2005, visit this website:
http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_service/read_body.jsp?Y=2005&M=02&D=22&ID=0502222004

increase the number of available combat brigades. Modularization is the Army's reorganization from three to four combat brigades per division. More importantly, all brigades will be organized similarly to achieve force interchangeability, just like "Lego." Reserve Component brigades will modularize as well. Together, this will significantly increase the number of interchangeable forces in the Army's rotation pool. More available Active brigades reduce dependence on the Reserve Component. These changes will facilitate better use of the Reserve Component by increasing both predictability and lead-time of call-ups. In a similar manner, the other Services are organized to create a robust pool of interchangeable forces. The Air Force will continue to use its Air Expeditionary Force construct to manage its rotation base. The Marines are re-organizing around Expeditionary Strike Groups. The Navy will form Expeditionary Strike Forces to better manage its rotational base.²⁶ Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters and improvement of joint interoperability across all Army units; Force design upon which the future network centric developments; reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle: One year deployed and two years at home station for the Active Component; One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force; One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force.²⁷

The U.S. Navy and Air Force are also seeking an improvement of "Jointness" and "Speed" likewise the Army. The U.S. Air Force launches 'KC-X' program and 'FALCON' program. The KC-X is the name of the United States Air Force program

²⁶ Lieutenant General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Director for Force Structure Resource, and Assessment, Testimony before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Total Force, March 10, 2004. Visit this website: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/040310-cartwright.htm (Access Date: 2. August 2008)

²⁷ Andrew Feickert, "U.S. Army's Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Updated January 24, 2007, pp.1-3. Visit this website: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32476_20070124.pdf (Access Date: 2 August 2008)

to procure its next-generation aerial refueling tanker aircraft. This aircraft is intended to replace some of the older Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers. This contract is for 179 new tankers and will be worth an estimated the U.S. \$40 billion. New aerial refueling tankers will fly about 12,500km and with its maximum fuel capacity of 250,000lb, which was improved from KC-135's 5,550km and 200,000lb. The KC-X program will enhance the USAF's rapid deployment capability dramatically.

Moreover, the U.S. military is improving the power projection ability of the Navy and Air Force to the oversea. The U.S. accounts for its success on Iraq war was the quick and safe transportation of combatants to the Gulf, and then it is expanding the maritime and the aerial transportation capacity. The Air Force plans to increase the number of C-17 cargo plane from 130 to 180. For the Navy equipment, the U.S. has 3 100ft level catamarans, which can reach 3,600km in 48 hours, that is, twice time faster than other cargo ships. The U.S. military thinks of procuring these ships in recent year.²⁸

3. The U.S.'s "strategic flexibility" for oversea bases

As mentioned above, the concept of the BRAC, lightness and swiftness of the U.S. military, and the strategic flexibility of oversea bases are not able to be split separately. In cases of contingencies or threats or disputes are broken out, the U.S. will send any available service which can respond quickly to the problems in those areas. However, if the U.S. can deploy its stronger forces than before to the conflict areas and can operate with quicker tempo, the military forces that are committed to those areas might be whether the nearest U.S. troop, or the one far away from it. If so,

²⁸ Kim, Sung Han, "New Military Security Paradigm and the Strategy of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)," Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005. p.35

the regional forces in oversea bases are turned to the global level network forces. These network forces can be used immediately whenever they are needed without fixed station in specific area. That is the strategic flexibility.

The strategic flexibility of oversea bases, however, generates the change of the relations with the host nations. In the past, the main purpose of U.S. troops in oversea bases was to protect the host nations from other countries' invasion. The expansion of the U.S.'s strategic flexibility turns its host nations' characteristics to staging points²⁹ or coaling stations³⁰ preparing for disputes. If this happens, the possibility of host nation's involvement in regional conflicts which are associated with the U.S. will be increased against their will. And also, the host nations' excuse for spending defense cost sharing for its own national security will be weakened. In the mean time, the potentiality of the friction between the U.S. and the host nations which have never existed before will be arisen.³¹

A key premise behind the U.S. global footprint in the 1990s was that American forces helped maintain regional stability. The new posture, deliberately optimized for flexible war fighting, will be viewed as supporting a very different and more controversial strategy, one based on preemption and armed intervention. As the military analyst Andrew Bacevich of Boston University has observed, "the political purpose [of U.S. troops abroad] is [now] not so much to enhance stability, but to use

²⁹ Unlike normal bases, the facilities of a staging area are temporary, mainly because for a certain time it will hold much more troops and material than would be reasonable in peacetime. Militaries use staging areas to deploy military units, aircraft and warships plus their materiel ahead of an attack or invasion. In former times this used to be generally the border area of one's own country, but in recent wars (Gulf War, Kosovo War, Iraq War) it may also be the border area of another unrelated country granting access

³⁰ A seaport built for the purpose of replenishing supplies, including but by no means limited to coal. The term is most often associated with 19th and early 20th century blue water navies, who used coaling stations as a means of extending the range of warships.

³¹ Choi, Jong Chul, "The ROK's Strategic Response Initiative on the Expanding Strategic Flexibility on the USFK," *National Strategy*, The Sejong Institute, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2006) p. 71

U.S. forces as an instrument of political change.” The new posture would also represent a different kind of relations with host nations. In the past, U.S. forces were based in other countries in order to protect them from invasion or hostile action by others. The host and the United States shared the same risks and the same foe. Washington's new vision, however, hearkens back to U.S. policies of a century ago, when many host states served largely as “staging points” and “coaling stations” for operations elsewhere. Although it is still possible to argue that, under the proposed changes, the U.S. presence in foreign countries will serve local interests, and that fighting terrorism and containing the spread of WMD will increase host nations’ security, the link (at least for many foreign publics) may appear less clear, and this could pose problems down the road.³²

Chapter 2 provided core concept and background of transformation and GPR. And it showed why the United States needed to implement the military transformation and GPR. It was important to follow the mainstream of this thesis. However, more important thing is what the U.S. wanted to get from that implementation. In depth analysis regarding on this issue will be followed by next chapter.

³² Kurt M. Campbell, “New Battle Stations? Council on Foreign Relations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No.5, September/October 2003. Visit this website: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82507/kurt-m-campbell-celeste-johnson-ward/new-battle-stations.html> (Access Date: 3 Aug. 2008)

III. The Application of Strategic Flexibility to the USFK

A. The meaning of strategic flexibility

1. Concept of “Flexibility” on the military strategy

Military flexibility is more important than ever because nobody can expect complicated security environment and battlefield condition of today easily. The 21st century security environment faces various military and non-military threats; it becomes difficult to find the countermeasure against threatening. In this situation, military’s mission and its scope of activity having been broadened from the conventional operation to the counter-terror and supporting national catastrophe as well as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as peace keeping operations (PKO). Consequently, under the uncertain and complicated security environment, flexible thinking and countermeasures are necessarily needed for the military and leaders in order to successfully complete various duties.

In the aspect of strategic theory and military doctrine, flexibility functions as one of the War Principles. For example, British military adopts flexibility as one of the ten Principles of War.³³ They emphasize that flexibility is an essential principle to cope with unpredictable and changeable conditions as well as in order not to indulge in dogma. On the other hand, the U.S. doctrine does not adopt “Flexibility” as one of the nine Principles of War³⁴; however, it functions same as the Principle of War. In order to achieve the military victory and strategic success simultaneously, the nine

³³ Ten War Principles: The selection and maintenance, Maintenance of Morale, Offensive Action, Security, Surprise, Concentration of Forces, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Co-operation, Sustainability, British Ministry of Defense, British Defense Doctrine, Joint warfare Publication 0-01, 2001, pp.3.1-3.4

³⁴ Nine War Principles: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Forces, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity. Visit this website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principles_of_War (Access Date: 25 May 2008)

Principles of War should be adopted harmoniously; in addition, flexibility plays a role as binding material for these nine Principles of War, as if it functions like the tenth Principle of War.³⁵

As discussed earlier, future forms of warfare can take many paths, and much uncertainty lies ahead. Flexible responses are often born of flexible planning. Further, in tomorrow's unfolding environment where asymmetric and other nontraditional threats will be more prevalent, open-minded, nonjudgmental and critical thinking skills—at all ranks and levels of war—will become the tools to eliminate dangerous blind spots and develop effective solutions. That is flexibility. As we go through the 21st century, the need for flexibility is an indispensable condition for conducting a victory for military operations in uncertain security conditions and ambiguous battlefield environments.³⁶

2. U.S. military strategy in the 21st century and strategic flexibility on the GPR

The concept of flexibility has close relations to that of “speed” or “adaptation.” It is an “agile and flexible crisis response system” which is most needed to the 21st U.S. Military. During the Cold War era, military strategy, which had a possibility of nuclear war against the Soviet Union in mind, was based on information about the enemy which enabled the U.S. Military to establish the military readiness posture in advance throughout careful plans and a prudent decision making process. However, many irregular threats and disputes in post-Cold War era are very difficult to solve unless they are treated in several days. Even though they are solved, generally they take long time to be handled. Thus, today's U.S. wants to establish flexible response system

³⁵ Robert S. Frost, “The Growing Imperative to Adopt ‘Flexibility’ as an American Principle of War,” US Army War College, 1999, pp. 16-19

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 30-32

which can respond quickly to the changing security environments and various unpredictable threats in the 21st century.

In order to meet the needs of the time, the U.S. military marks a change in missions and capability. The U.S. is going to convert their mission from fixed military which have performed around the world during the Cold War era to a 'Rapid Deployment Force' or a 'Regional Force', and maintain the strategic flexibility by enhancing the mobility of forces and lightening the troops. These efforts are seen at the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) which is conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the changes of the 21st U.S. military strategy.

1) Various threats and military preparation

The Joint Chief of Staff (JCF) has defined three major threats which the U.S. is facing today as; a wider range of adversaries, a more complex and distributed battlespace, technology diffusion and access. Firstly, a wider range of adversaries means adversaries' capability of threatening the United States, its allies, and its interests range from states to nonstate organizations to individuals. There are states with traditional military forces and advanced systems, including cruise and ballistic missiles, which could seize the control in key regions of the world. A few of these states are 'rogues' that violate treaties, secretly pursue and proliferate WMD/E³⁷, reject peaceful resolution of disputes and display callous disregard for their citizens. Some of these states sponsor terrorists, providing them financial support, sanctuary and access to dangerous capabilities. There are non-state actors, including terrorist networks, international criminal organizations and illegal armed groups that menace

³⁷ WMD/E: Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects

stability and security.

Secondly, a more complex and distributed battlespace means that adversaries threaten the United States throughout a complex battlespace, extending from critical regions overseas to the homeland and spanning the global commons of international airspace, waters, space and cyberspace. There exists an “arc of instability” stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists.

Thirdly, technology diffusion and access means that global proliferation of a wide range of technology and weaponry will affect the character of future conflict. Dual-use civilian technologies, especially information technologies, high-resolution imagery and global positioning systems are widely available. These relatively low cost, commercially available technologies will improve the disruptive and destructive capabilities of a wide range of state and non-state actors. Advances in automation and information processing will allow some adversaries to locate and attack targets both overseas and in the United States. Software tools for network-attack, intrusion and disruption are globally available over the Internet, providing almost any interested adversary a basic computer network exploitation or attack capability. Access to

advanced weapons systems and innovative delivery systems could fundamentally change warfighting and dramatically increase an adversary's ability to threaten the United States.³⁸

The U.S faces a number of dangerous and pervasive threats. Traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges will require the Armed Forces to adjust quickly and decisively to change and anticipate emerging threats. Three key aspects of the security environment have unique implications for executing this military strategy and will drive the development of concepts and capabilities that ensure success in future operations.³⁹

In the National Defense Strategy defines four matured and emerging challenges. First, traditional challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict. Second, irregular challenges come from those employing “unconventional” methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. Third, catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. Forth, disruptive challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate the current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.⁴⁰

The strategy acknowledges that although the U.S. military maintains considerable advantages in traditional forms of warfare, this realm is not the only, or even the most

³⁸ The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff (USJCF), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, pp. 4-6.


³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

likely, one in which adversaries will challenge the United States during the period immediately ahead. Enemies are more likely to pose asymmetric threats, including irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges. Some, such as non-state actors, will choose irregular warfare - including terrorism, insurgency or guerrilla warfare - in an attempt to its will through protracted conflict. It then describes the refinement of the Department's force planning construct to better align the shape and size of U.S. forces to address these new challenges and to conduct the full range of military operations.⁴¹

Since these threats are acted complicatedly and complexly, the U.S. needs inevitably to modify the concept of traditional threat-oriented combat readiness. The adversaries of the U.S. are using various assault methods such as WMD, terror, and missiles. Even worse, their entity and behaviors are assessed as uncertain and unpredictable. As mentioned above, the military readiness posture should be moved from traditional threat-oriented method toward covering overall threats including irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threat. See figure 1 to refer more precisely.

Figure 1. Shifting Military Portfolio of Capability



Note: As the diagram shows, the Department is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.
Source: Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)*, 2006, p. 19

⁴¹ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)*, 2006, pp 19-20.

2) The Concept of the Military Strategy

The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) establishes four strategic objectives: secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and maintain global freedom of action; establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order; and strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges. The National Military Strategy (NMS) establishes three supporting military objectives: to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries. These are the ends of the strategy and help to assure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries and deter aggression and coercion while ensuring the Armed Forces remain ready to defeat adversaries should deterrence and dissuasion fail. They serve as benchmarks to assess levels of risk and help to define the types and amounts of military capabilities required.⁴²

Joint operating concepts (JOCs), currently under development, support each objective and link specific tasks to programmatic actions as well as guide the development of plans and the execution of operations. The current set of JOCs –Homeland Security, Stability Operations, Strategic Deterrence and Major Combat Operations – represent related actions that support all of the NMS objectives. While some of the JOCs may focus on specific elements of the strategy, success requires integrated action and unity of effort across each of the concepts. Although military objectives have enduring elements, the ways to achieve those goals must evolve through experimentation, operational experience, and the development of transformational capabilities.⁴³

⁴² The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff (USJCF), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, p.9.

⁴³ Ibid.

Under this concept, the National Military Strategy suggests three strategic principles: agility, integration, and decisiveness. Agility is the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions. As commanders conduct operations they must consider the effects of surprise and the possibility that their forces may have to transition from one type or phase of an operation to another quickly, or conduct phases simultaneously, regardless of location. Decisiveness allows combatant commanders to overwhelm adversaries, control situations and achieve definitive outcomes. Achieving decisiveness may not require large force deployments but rather employing capabilities in innovative ways. Integration focuses on fusing and synchronizing military operations among the Services, other government agencies, the commercial sector, non-governmental organizations and those of partners abroad to provide focus and unity of effort. Strategic agility, integration and decisiveness allow the Armed Forces to move at great speed and distance to undertake combat operations quickly in sometimes overlapping conflicts. Agility, decisiveness, and integration support simultaneous operations, the application of overmatching power⁴⁴ and the fusion of the U.S. military power with other instruments of power. These principles stress speed, allowing U.S. commanders to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities, rapidly seize the initiative and achieve endstates.⁴⁵ These three strategic principles are mainly based on the strategic flexibility which emphasizes on its "speed" and "adaptation."

In the U.S. strategy visualization, it seems that the direction of military strategy is moving toward the expansion of strategic flexibility. Until 2005, the U.S. had the war

⁴⁴ Overmatching power is the precise application of combat power to foreclose enemy options and rapidly seize the initiative to achieve conclusive victories.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

executing strategy, so called, ‘1-4-2-1’⁴⁶. The NDS directs a force sized to defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions (Europe, the Middle East, the Asian Littoral, and Northeast Asia).), and conduct two, overlapping “swift defeat” campaigns. Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to “win decisively” in one of the two campaigns. However, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 modified the ‘1-4-2-1’ strategy toward as ‘1-1-1’ strategy which means that the U.S. Department has refined its Force Planning Construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: Homeland Defense, War on Terror / Irregular (Asymmetric) Warfare and Conventional Campaigns. In all cases, the Department should increase its capabilities to conduct operations against enemies who employ asymmetric approaches. This refined force planning construct for wartime describes the relative level of effort the Department should devote to each of the three objective areas.⁴⁷ This means that the U.S. seizes strategic flexibility by expanding its interests in not only the four interest regions which mentioned above but also other regions.

Bush Administration declares the strategy of preemptive attack also seems that they want to establish strategic flexibility. The U.S., if necessary, under long-standing principles of self defense, defense of key allies and regional partner, it does not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. The QDR mentions that “When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize”. This is the principle and logic of preemption. And also, safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role. They are

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 21.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)*, 2006, pp. 35-39.

going to strengthen deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities); active and passive defenses, including missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure, all bound together by enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence systems.⁴⁸ In order to conduct the success of the preemptive strategy, the military needs to be transformed to move swiftly. That is why the preemptive strategy has deep relation with strategic flexibility.

3) Instruments of military strategy

In order to implement the military objective and the strategy of the U.S., strategic flexibility becomes one of important instrumental concepts. The instruments of the U.S. military strategy include both military and non-military availability. That is defined as 'Total Force,' and composed of its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the U.S. regards the allies and regional partners as one of the key components of Total Force. That is, the U.S. wants to strengthen its relations and alliance with allies and regional partners to conduct the global security measures.

Today, the U.S. military is transforming itself to execute its military strategy and cope with various threats which the U.S. is facing now. The U.S. maintains its ability to deter adversaries and defense the trans-national terrorism and improves its ability to execute unconventional warfare for long-duration, in order to develop its ability of executing conventional warfare as well as to overwhelm the unconventional war and

⁴⁸ The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff (USJCF), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, pp. 23-26; The white house, *The National Security of the United States of America*, 2006, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁹ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)*, 2006, pp. 75-79.

counterterrorism. The QDR proposed to strengthen forces to defeat terrorist networks, the Department will increase Special Operations Forces by 15% and increase the number of Special Forces Battalions by one-third. The U.S. Special Operations Command (U.S. SOCOM) will establish the Marine Corps Special Operations Command. The Air Force will establish an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron under the U.S. SOCOM. The Navy will support the U.S. SOCOM increase in SEAL Team manning and will develop a riverine warfare capability. The Department will also expand Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units by 3,700 personnel, a 33% increase. Multipurpose Army and Marine Corps ground forces will increase their capabilities and capacity to conduct irregular warfare missions.⁵⁰

B. USFK's Strategic Flexibility

Strategic flexibility of U.S. troops abroad which is executed in the scope of the U.S. Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) applies to the USFK with no exception. The U.S. will not give up the USFK's strategic flexibility even though Korea denies it. So, this is hot military issue between Korea and the U.S. because the mission and the scope of activities of the USFK will be readjusted. I will check the significant changes in the mission, role and freedom of flow-in-and-out of the USFK because of strategic flexibility.

1. Changes in the mission and role of the USFK

The expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility means that the role of the USFK is changing from a defensive posture against North Korea since Cold War era towards a 'regional and global force,' that is, more flexible, rapidly deployable force to the

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

wider Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, the USFK will become more mobile and readily available throughout the world in order to cope with irregular threats of the 21st century.⁵¹ South Korea and the U.S. refer to this as "strategic flexibility" for the USFK. And the U.S. emphasizes on the USFK's mission as not only for conventional warfare but also counterterrorism and counter proliferation which is directly related to the U.S.'s National Security Objective.

According to the Bush Administration's strategic flexibility for U.S. forces abroad in order to respond security threats of the 21st century, the changes of the USFK's mission and role is inevitably visualized. Moreover, the U.S. expands the mission of the USFK up to responding terrorism and WMD which appeared in the 21st century. In order to increase the USFK's strategic flexibility, the U.S. is going to enhance the missions and roles of Korea and lessen the responsibility of the USFK in the sense of defending the Korea. By doing so, the USFK can play a role as a regional stabilizer in Northeast Asia, not sticking in the Korean peninsula.

In this regard, the USFK is transferring of some military missions to the ROK military pursuant to an agreement between the ROK-US in the 34th SCM, December 2002. Of the ten military missions that have been assumed by the USFK, with the exception of day and night search and rescue operations, the ROK military has already taken over the JSA security mission, the decontamination operation mission in the rear area, expediting the burying of mines, the management of the air to surface firing range, mission of counter-fire operation headquarters, the control of the main supply route, the operation of counter-SOP forces at sea, the control of close air support (CAS), and weather forecasting. Day and night search and rescue operations will be transferred by

⁵¹ Choi, Jong Chul, "The ROK's Strategic Response Initiative on the Expanding Strategic Flexibility on the USFK," *National Strategy*, The Sejong Institute, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2006) p.80.

the end of 2008. Although the two nations agreed to review the transfer of additional military missions in the 37th SCM (October 2005), the two decided to integrate it into the tasks for transition of the OPCON in accordance with the agreement to coordinate the military command relationship.

The transfer of the military mission of the USFK is meaningful in terms of the improvement of Korea's leading role in its defense as well as the expansion of the mission corresponding to the increment of Korea's military capabilities. Taking into account Korea's military capabilities on the basis of this backdrop, the two countries will move ahead with the transfer of the military mission on a gradual and phased basis.⁵²

2. Freedom of “Flow-in and Flow-out”

The other reason why the U.S. considers the importance of the USFK's strategic flexibility is because the U.S. wants to utilize the USFK to other regions outside of the Korean peninsula. If the U.S. thinks that the USFK is the optimized force for deploying to the disputing area, the U.S. is likely to dispatch the USFK rapidly to that area without Korea's intervention. For this, the U.S. demands the freedom of the USFK's flow-out and flow-in.⁵³ In August 2004, the U.S. converted 3,600 personnel from 2 ID to Iraq as a part of strategic flexibility, especially flow-out and in.

However, this issue of flow-out and flow-in is very sensitive to Korea. This means Korea can be faced a security vacuum or be involved in the disputes if the USFK is dispatched to regions other than the Korean peninsula in order to intervene to regional

⁵² Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*, 2006, pp. 127-128.

⁵³ Choi, Jong Chul, “The ROK's Strategic Response Initiative on the Expanding Strategic Flexibility on the USFK,” *National Strategy*, The Sejong Institute, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2006) p.81.

disputes or Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). If the U.S. uses the Korean peninsula as its 'staging points' or 'coaling station,' Korea has a high possibility of being involved in those disputes.

The meaning of "flow-out" is that the USFK is dispatched to other region. We can make assume some situations according to the size of flow-out of the USFK; first, converting minimum power while remaining most of existing power, second, conversely, converting main power, third, and moving out the whole USFK. If the U.S. withdraws minimum of power, there is no difference with previous condition to deter the aggression of North Korea. However, if the U.S. converts magnitude of power from the USFK or whole of the USFK, Korea will face the significant security vacuum crisis. And then, if the USFK intervenes in disputes, the Korea's possibility of involvement might be high because Korea is regarded as mother base of the USFK. In this regard, adversaries of the U.S. might consider Korea as their enemy. Likewise, flow-out of the USFK power can cause Korea's defense power vacuum and bring danger of Korea's intervention in disputes directly or indirectly. But the possibility of the second and third assumption which converts the USFK with magnitude of power or as whole is very low. The strategic importance of the USFK bases and Korea for the U.S. is growing further as the U.S. containment strategies against China become more concrete. As former President Noh said in L.A., "Korean peninsula is not a place which the U.S. can give up easily even if the U.S. is not happy with South Korea, because of the peninsula's strategic position."

Flow-in means that the U.S. might deploy additional power to the Korean peninsula. It can be classified as two situations; firstly, a contingency situation in Korean

peninsula like North Korea's invades South Korea, secondly, the U.S. uses Korean peninsula as its staging point or coaling station in order to intervene regional disputes other than the Korean peninsula or execute MOOTW. The first one is advantage for the situation of defending Korea, but the second one might be problematic. In the case of the U.S. uses Korea as its lodgment for deployment, it can affect Korea's security circumstance negatively. For example, Turkey denied the U.S. using its airport when the U.S. was preparing the war with Iraq in 2003. Turkey worried the case if they provide the U.S. with the military facilities and allow passing their territorial sky, there would be resentment from other Islamic countries and possibility of being intervened in the war.⁵⁴ Just like Turkey's position at that time, if U.S. forces flows in to the Korean peninsula for a purpose of using Korea as 'staging position' or 'coaling station,' probability of Korea being involved in disputes will increase.

Likewise, if additional U.S. forces flow in the Korean peninsula to manage the crisis will consolidate the Korea national security, but the additional forces flow-in for the purpose of deploying other conflict areas will cause unintended intervention to disputes and make unstable of national security.

3. The USFK's lightness and swiftness

The U.S.'s military transformation for lightness and swiftness for the subject of U.S. troops abroad is adapted to the USFK with no exception. The ROK-US committed to reduce the USFK by 12,500 personnel in 3 stages by 2008. If downsizing is implemented according to the agreed plan, the size of the USFK troops stationed will be reduced to about 25,000 soldiers by the end of 2008 from 37,500 in 2003. And the

⁵⁴ Joint Chief of Staff, General Analysis on Iraq War, 2003, p.226.

U.S. commits to an \$11 Billion program of enhancements directly contributing to the defense of the ROK.⁵⁵

The USFK announced in May 2003 to allocate \$ 11 billion for next three years until 2006 for the investment to modify and reinforce its war potential posture. Such major projects as the following are considered to strengthen the USFK Intelligence Collection Systems and Sensors, C4ISR (command management communication and information sensor function), Network and Targeting Ability, Improved Precision Munitions, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile and the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) Systems, AH-64D Apache Longbows with Laser-guided Bombs, "Stryker" light armored vehicle, M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley etc. And moreover, "Bunker Buster" tactical bomb to attack the underground complex of North Korea will possibly be considered. Just like above, the USFK reduces its personnel but increases the fire, mobility, and precise hitting ability.

4. Relocation of the USFK


A relocation project for the Yongsan Garrison has been discussed since March 1988, not only to meet the national desire for the transfer of foreign troops stationed in the center of Seoul but also to provide the conditions for the stable stationing of the USFK in conjunction with a balanced development of the land, and the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance. The ROK-US agreed to transfer the Yongsan Garrison involving UNC/CFC to the Pyeongtaek area with a target date of the end of 2008. This relocation project began by concluding the Yongsan garrison transition agreement together with the ratification of the National Assembly in December 2004.

⁵⁵ 36th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), October 2004.

Due to the time needed to secure the site because of the residents' opposition, evaluation of the environmental impact, and additionally the negotiation of cost sharing between the ROK and the U.S., the deadline for the transfer will be determined on the basis of the ROK-US consultation.

The USFK's moving and relocation of camps/bases are conducted through 2 stages. In the 1st stage, the USFK will integrate small dispersed bases stationed north of the Han River into Camp Casey in Dongducheon and Camp Red Cloud, Camp Stanley in Euijeongbu area by 2006, and in the 2nd stage, major bases will be moved to Pyungtaek and Gunsan area by 2008. The USFK is scheduled to be redeployed into 16 bases within 2 regions as shown in figure 2. During this process, more than 50 million Pyung will be transferred to the ROK.

Figure 2. USFK's Relocation in the Korean Peninsula



Source: *Defense White Paper*, 2006, Chapter 4, p.113.

The ROK government made a "master plan for the facilities" in 2006, and plans to undertake foundation work in 2007, after completing an evaluation of the environmental impact; an investigation of the index of cultural assets; measures of migration such as support for migration of residents in the area concerned; and the establishment of a migration complex⁵⁶

Moreover, the relocation of the USFK to Pyeongtaek will put U.S. troops south of the Han River. This means that the USFK's mission, role, and range of activity are expanded, that is, the USFK is not just fixed at the border between two Koreas, but has flexibility of maneuver. This will give the United States time to respond to a North Korea's attack, which the U.S. will be able to destroy within minutes. With Air Force and Naval Forces in Pyeongtaek, the U.S. will be able to achieve their military strategic goals by committing USFK troops throughout the Asia-Pacific region, including China and North Korea. In other words, one of goals for the USFK's strategic flexibility, its broader focus as a rapid deployment force in the Asia-Pacific Theater, is to constrain China. The U.S. has tightened its control over the Middle East Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia; it has strengthened its ability to respond to this outstretched them more easily. By moving to Pyeontaek, the U.S. attempts to deter the challenge and potential threat posed by a rising power of China. Like above, it is possible to see the U.S.'s clear intention of the USFK relocation.

⁵⁶ Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*, 2006, pp. 111-114

In this chapter, we explored the meaning of strategic flexibility and the main intention of acquiring flexibility in military forces, especially, the USFK. And also examined what the USFK's flexibility indicated in Northeast Asia. The next chapter will search for the implications of the USFK's flexibility for the Korean peninsula and the ROK-US alliance.

IV. Implications of the USFK's Strategic Flexibility for the ROK-US Alliance

A. The ROK-US Alliance Sustenance Factor

As factors to sustain more than 50 years of the ROK-US alliance relationship, there are the ROK-US's mutual sharing of benefit, identity and institutionalized alliance. As the ROK-US have maintained alliance relationship, they have continually shared mutual benefit and as they have shared identity of democracy and market economy, they have strengthened the solidarity of the ROK-US alliance. Moreover, after the conclusion of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the ROK and the U.S. have consulted on security issue, operated association and committee to strengthen combined forces defense system, institutionalized the ROK-US alliance relationship as executing regular combined exercises and expanded alliance union for over half century to cope with security situation, alliance relationship has been able to be sustained.

Here analyzes that how the expansion of strategic flexibility of the USFK affects sustenance factor of the ROK-US alliance. First, through the USFK's strategic flexibility, benefit and loss shared by both and each country will be analyzed as well as unbalance of benefit and loss. Second, for the aspect of institutionalized alliance, expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility will be analyzed to find out how it will affect on current the ROK-US security cooperation system and institutionalized level of combined defense system

To make and sustain alliance, allies need to share the mutual benefit. If the shared

benefit is unbalanced, forming and sustaining alliance is difficult. In this perspective, through the expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility, shared benefit of security by both countries is needed to be verified and it will bring the positive effects if both countries can share the benefit mutually. However, if the loss is greater than benefit or benefit is unbalanced, it will bring negative effects.

For the common benefit for the ROK and the U.S., firstly, expansion of the USFK's operational range and possibility of additional flow-in will sustain the security of Northeast Asia. Secondly, while the U.S. wants to expand the strategic flexibility of troops abroad to improve anti-terrorism execution ability, the expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility helps to sustain security from terrorist groups for not only the U.S. but also the ROK. Thirdly, if the USFK operates the non-proliferation of WMD, Korea also can be protected from the threat of WMD.

In terms of the benefit for ROK, first, ROK can have the possibility of additional support from U.S. troops beside reinforced power that is currently planned on wartime OPCON-5027. If additional U.S. troops are needed to solve the Korean peninsula crisis, it will be provided through strategic flexibility. Second, the ROK restored quite a few U.S. troop stations and training camps that were given for free. Through the restored sites, ROK is able to create additional social wealth. Third, as missions that were in charge of the existing USFK are transferred to the ROK, regulation on the importation of high tech weapon system is expected to be lifted or mitigated.

On the other hand, the U.S.'s benefits are as follow. First, owing to mutual agreement of relocation and operation of the USFK with Korea, the U.S. can increase the level of

completion of Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) that the U.S. globally promotes. The U.S. can maintain Korea as a Power Projection Hub (PPH) which was used to be a fixed station of U.S. troops. Second, the USFK becomes utilized in not just Northeast Asia, but any country in the world when it is needed. Moreover, because additional U.S. troops can be committed to Korea under certain conditions, the U.S. becomes to be able to operate the USFK extensively to sustain its influence on Northeast Asia and all over the world. Third, through swiftness and lightness of the USFK and efficient management of the U.S. station, eventually, the U.S. becomes to be able to reduce national defense expenditure. Fourth, through strengthening of the ROK's combat power, sales of weapon system as well as other war supplies to the ROK might be increased. That is, during the process of the introduction of weaponry, as Korea considers interoperability of the U.S. troop's equipment, the probability of procurement of the U.S. made weapon system will be increased.

If the expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility is done like above, there will be positive effect on the ROK-US alliance seeing that both the ROK and the U.S. eventually get benefits and these can be also shared mutually. Because of the established the ROK-US alliance, each country can strengthen benefits that were enjoyed by both countries or can make new benefits.

However, loss from the USFK's strategic flexibility is also expected. As for the loss of the ROK, firstly, while possibility of the USFK's involvement in disputes other than the Korean peninsula is increasing, the ROK's possibility of involving in disputes is also increased. Second, it might be different by the size and period, but through flow-out of the USFK, possibility of security vacuum occurrence will be increased

compared to the past. Third, while the ROK promotes 'Koreanize of the ROK defense', increase in national defense expenditure will be huge burden for the Korean government. Fourth, due to expansion of the USFK power and its sphere of activity, it might suppress North Korea militarily or irritate China which will affect negatively on North-South relations and Sino-Korean relations.

Unlike expected loss of the ROK, loss of the U.S. is estimated insignificant. Through the USFK's strategic flexibility, loss of the ROK and the U.S. is a little bit unbalanced. Generally, benefit of both country is somewhat balanced, but loss of the ROK is much greater. Therefore, potentiality for Korea's dissatisfaction is bigger than that of the U.S. The unbalanced benefit and loss from both countries through expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility could negatively affect the ROK-US alliance relationship.


B. Changes in the ROK-US Alliance System

The ROK and the U.S. have established the combined ROK-US defense system and security cooperation system through the Security Meeting Consultative (SMC), the Military Council (MC), and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and have developed as one of the strongest alliance in the world. Then, how will the expansion of the strategic flexibility of the USFK affect on the ROK-US alliance system? If the existing alliance system aggravates, their relationship will exacerbate. In contrast, their relationship will be consolidated from strong existing alliance system.

First of all, the most influential changes on institutionalization of the ROK-US alliance are disorganization of the CFC and the ROK's independent execution of the War-time OPCON. I will see how these changes will affect on alliance institutionalization.

In fact, the USFK's strategic flexibility and the War-time OPCON are separated issues. Restitution of the right was not the issue that the USFK's strategic flexibility and the GPR considered. But during the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) conference, which was held in September 2005, the ROK suggested the issue to the U.S. and the issue became main agenda of SMC, which was in October of the same year. From these processes, the issue became full-scale debate. At the 38th SMC (see Appendix 2.), which was held in October 2006, both sides agreed on the ROK's independent right to execute War-time OPCON in someday between 15 October 2009 and 15 March 2012, disorganization of the CFC, and establishment of a new parallel command structure. The date for OPCON transfer was later finalized to be April 17, 2012 – when the ROK's Defense Minister, Kim, Jang-Soo, met the U.S. Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, in Washington, D.C. on the 23rd February 2007. This means that current the CFC based command system will convert to the new parallel command system, in which the ROK and the U.S. control their own forces. Also the Alliance Military Coordination Center (AMCC) will be installed to support MC and it will match up with the ROK and the U.S. for military operation. (See Figure 3)

Figure 3. Changing Command System



Source: Ministry of National Defense, website: www.mnd.go.kr

From the U.S.'s perspective, the ROK's demanding redemption of the War-time OPCON can be a great advantage to the GPR and the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces abroad. The ROK's execution of the War-time OPCON and disorganization of the CFC imply that the U.S. only plays a role as an auxiliary supporter to defending the Korean peninsula and more flexible employment of the USFK is possible. From this point of view, the ROK's execution of War-time OPCON and disorganization of the CFC are said to be coherent with increasing in strategic flexibility of the USFK and the GPR.

Like above, opinions regarding the USFK's strategic flexibility, redemption of the ROK's War-time OPCON and disorganization of the CFC are varies. The Ministry of Defense, Government and some specialists conceive that new command system will be able to maintain the ROK-US combined defense like the previous CFC based command system. They believe that the U.S. will intervene and dispatch U.S. forces due to 25,000 of the USFK forces and 100,000 of U.S. citizens living in Korea. According to the U.S. Domestic Law, specifically, "War Power Act," the U.S. will dispatch the reinforcement forces to the Korean peninsula not because of Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).⁵⁷

In contrast, there are views that the ROK's independent execution of the War-time OPCON and disorganization of the CFC can aggravate the ROK-US combined defense system and alliance.⁵⁸ Some people point out that automatic intervention of

⁵⁷ Cho, Sung Yeol, "Redemption of the Wartime OPCON and the Future of ROK and US," Korea Institute for Future Strategies, 14 September 2006, Visit this website: <http://www.kifs.org/contents/sub3/issue.php?method=info&sId=1897#content> (Access Date: 13 August 2008)

⁵⁸ Lee, Sang Hyun, "Korea-U.S. Agreement on Transition in Wartime Operational Control and the Future of Korean Defense," *Current Issues and Policy*, The Sejong Institute, (Apr. 2007), pp. 5-8.

U.S. forces in case of the ROK's crisis may not be guaranteed. Also they point out that even if the AMCC is installed, dualistic command system may be inefficient in the aspect of unity of command. Then, North Korea may think this as aggravation of the ROK-US alliance and incentives to wage war against South Korea.

However, both views are not easy to assert to reach the conclusion; the probability of negative effects is considered a little higher than positive effects. Because the meaning of the dissolution of the CFC has the possibility which is the destruction of the ROK-US joint operational plans or the reduction of joint exercises. The destruction of joint operational plans and the reduction of joint exercises have a possibility to cause the weakening of the ROK-US combined defense capability. In this position, the expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility and the probability of weakening of the ROK-US combined defense system are likely to affect on the ROK-US alliance negatively.

In this chapter 4, we examined the influences on the ROK and US alliance and the Korean peninsula. USFK's strategic flexibility had both positive effects and negative effects at the same time for the Korean peninsula and the ROK-US alliance. In that sense, the closer examination on the changes for the ROK-US alliance is needed for better relationship between two countries. Next chapter will suggest methods how to improve a future ROK-US alliance for constructing better and stronger relationship and alliance. Next chapter would be the main part of our discussion.

V. Directions of a future ROK-U.S. Alliance

Up to now, this paper has provided the meaning of the USFK's strategic flexibility and its impacts for the ROK-US alliance. Consequently, it verified that its strategic flexibility has both of negative and positive effects on the ROK-US alliance at the same time. In order to sustain the improved future ROK-US alliance in the changing 21st security environment, Korea should accept U.S. strategic flexibility and minimize the negative effects. Hence, I would like to suggest the direction of improvement for the ROK-US alliance while diminishing the negative effects on the alliance.

A. Maintain the Sustaining the ROK-US Alliance

At the 38th SMC, which was held in October 2006, both sides agreed on the ROK's independent right to execute War-time OPCON in someday between 15 October 2009 and 15 March 2012, disorganization of the CFC, and establishment of a new parallel command structure. The date for OPCON transfer was later finalized to be April 17, 2012 – when the ROK's Defense Minister, Kim, Jang-Soo, met the U.S. Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, in Washington, D.C. on the 23rd February 2007.

As the great premise of Korea's independent War-time OPCON execution and the new ROK-US military command structure has been settled, we have to find the way to establish the consolidated the ROK-US combined defense system while reducing the concerns about current issues on changes. For this, I suggest two methods to maintain the ROK-US alliance.

Firstly, even though both countries have their own military command structure, so called 'parallel command system', new war-time operational plan should have an

integrated single-plan like a current plan and achieve feasibility. Like above figure 3, the future combined operations will be led by Korea and the U.S. will support Korea. As a matter of fact, the unity of operational plan is the first priority and command and order system should be inspected before executing real operations. In the view of ‘unity of command,’ the potentiality of decreasing efficiency of operations is very high; therefore, both countries should take a look at it closely.

Secondly, through the continuing combined exercise, the ROK-US combined combat capability should not be weakened. The annual combined exercises such as Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL, now the name was changed to Ulchi Freedom Guardian, UFG from 2008) and Reception Staging Onward-movement & Integration (RSOI, changed to Key Resolve, KR) have played key roles in establishing the ROK-US combined defense system. Through these exercises, Korea has drawn insufficiency of the operations and made up for the weak points as well as tested for the feasibility of the operations. Like the preceding, the new combined command system should be verified. Both Korea and the U.S. have already trained the combined exercises under the assumption of the ROK leading the operations since the UFL in 2006. After UFG in 2008, Gen. Lee, Sung Chool, deputy commander of Joint Forces Command (JFC) said, “This exercise was very important phase to convert the wartime OPCON in 2012,” he continued “we will continuously establish the system of plan, execution, and organizational structure by using lessons learned from this UFG in 2008.”⁵⁹ Like above exercise, Korea has to smoothly land to the ground in 2012.

⁵⁹ Lee, Seok Jong, “Successful Finish of the First UFG Exercise,” The Korea Defense Daily, 25 August 2008.

B. Mutual Agreement on Flow-in and Flow-out

From now on, Korea acknowledges the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea; however, Korea has to be fully aware of the number of U.S. forces flowing in and out of Korea. In detail – first, there has to be a mutual agreement regulating the amount of U.S. forces flowing in and out of Korea and period which they are allowed to stay in Korea. If a lot of U.S. forces flow out of peninsula and those forces are not replaced for a long time, it could lead to security vacuum. Also, if this absence of force continues, it could lead to side effects such as reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. Second, there has to be a mutual agreement related to deploying U.S. forces in Korea to place in disputes or military operations. This could lead Korea to be involved in a dispute it did not intend to. Third, there has to be a mutual agreement concerning the flowing in and out of main forces for the purpose of deterring against North Korea. Absence of main forces such as, fighter wings, high-tech information weaponry, missiles, and etc could lead to serious military power vacuum.

On December 2004, at the council conference, Christopher R. Hill, the former ambassador of the U.S. in Korea said, “The main purpose of U.S. forces in Korea is to defend the peninsula and no U.S. forces will be utilized without the agreement between Korea and the United States.”⁶⁰ At an interview, Michael Green, the former NSC senior advisor, said, “When rearranging the main forces that could affect the national security we will negotiate with Korea in advance. However, we won’t be restraint to the agreement and the U.S. cannot come up with an agreement that regulates the U.S.” Korea is worried about the flow in and flow out of U.S. forces due to the U.S.’s vague attitude and this implies that Korea could be dragged by the

⁶⁰ Christopher R. Hill, The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, 25 October 2004, Visit this website: http://seoul.usembassy.gov/ambsp_10252004.html (Access Date: 24 August 2008)

United States' policy.

C. Establishing Comprehensive Alliance

Korea's view on the ROK-US alliance is changing. Compared to the past, Korea is equal or better than North Korea when it comes to conventional forces. Also, Korea's economy has grown rapidly. We can say that Korea's status has also moved up. Thus, the ROK-US alliance should not only be a military relationship of suppressing the North, but develop into 21st century security alliance as the U.S. pursuits.

To become a comprehensive alliance, Korea and the United States have to strengthen its relationship and begin cooperating politics, economics, military and etc. Share the basic value which is democracy and the market economy; focus on the leading peace –oriented the ROK-U.S. alliance rather than corresponding to the threats. Additionally, the relationship between Korea and the United States has to develop into a comprehensive alliance by making a common agenda such as traditional military threats, new security threats like terrorism, WMD, human rights issue, and etc.

VI. Conclusion

The expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility means that its mission will not be fixed at the Korean peninsula to defend South Korea against North Korea's invasion but will be expanded to cope with various tasks like rapid deployment forces. Korea has a possibility of being engaged in unexpected disputes when the USFK is involved in the disputes other than the Korean peninsula. It will cause tremendous changes in the ROK-US alliance and Korea's security environment. Therefore, this paper has attempted to redefine the relationship between the ROK and the U.S., and introduces new direction of the ROK-US alliance to deal with the new security circumstances. This paper also suggested methods to improve the ROK-US alliances by minimizing the negative effects of the USFK's strategic flexibility through analyses of the ROK-US alliance in the 21st century.

Right after the 9/11 tragedy, the U.S. launched the military transformation and the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) because the U.S. wanted to deal with various threats of not only conventional warfare, but also terrorism, WMD, and other security environmental changes in the 21st century. On this base, the U.S. can get the strategic flexibility throughout base realignment and relocation of the forces abroad. Consequently, the USFK has to be changed consistent with the U.S. national military strategy and also the ROK-US alliance has to be modified in order to meet the requirement of both countries. In this regard, this paper suggested the modest way to maintain and improve the relationship between the ROK and the U.S. without any conflict.

At first, chapter 2 provided background of the U.S. military transformation and the GPR. It gave concrete concepts of the military transformation and the GPR. The core concept of the military transformation could be summarized as follow: first, minimizing the possibility of damage by counter attack of enemy; second, network centric warfare (NCW) and effect based concept (EBC). On the other hand, the main issues of the GPR were the base realignment and closure (BRAC) and the lightness and swiftness of the U.S. military.

Chapter 3 could be summarized into two issues. Firstly, it explained what the strategic flexibility was and why the strategic flexibility was important and necessary. Namely, there would be various threats in the 21st century security circumstances such as a wider range of adversaries threatening the U.S. and its allies, a more complex and distributed battlespace, and technology diffusion and access which affect the character of future conflict. Secondly, due to the USFK's strategic flexibility, the ROK-US alliance and the USFK's mission would be changed inevitably. This kind of changes would be the expansion of the USFK's mission/role, increasing the freedom of flow-in and flow-out, and relocation of the USFK. And also these changes could increase concerns about the national security vacuum and the possibility of being involved in unexpected disputes.

Chapter 4 analyzed the impacts for the USFK and the ROK-US alliance which were generated by strategic flexibility. As a result, it defined that the USFK's strategic flexibility had effects on the ROK-US alliance at the both side of positive and negative.

Chapter 5 suggested the direction for the improvement of the ROK-US alliance with diminishing negative effects. Firstly, establishing the ROK-US combined defense system, secondly, establishing prior consultative body for the USFK forces' flow-in and flow-out, thirdly, establishing the comprehensive ROK-US alliance system.

As we have seen, the main purpose of this thesis has been to explore the missions and roles of the USFK and the ROK-US alliance. However, it was difficult to analyze all the characteristics of the USFK and the ROK-US alliance due to the certain limitation of scope and research. Nevertheless, this paper provides clear view on the changes of the USFK and the ROK-US alliance and suggests the way to improve the relationship between two honorable nations to meet the various threats in the 21st century. However, regards on this subject, further studies on different large scale assessments are needed not merely this strategic flexibility of the USFK but more complicated issues like the defense cost sharing and the Korea's operational capability without the USFK.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Abstract in Korean

국문초록

지난 수년간 주한미군의 재배치와 임무의 변화는 국내에서 뜨거운 논쟁이 되어왔다. 주한미군은 한국전쟁 이후 한국에 주둔하여 약 60여 년간 한국과 함께 북한과 공산세력의 침략에 맞서왔으며 세계에서 유례를 찾아보기 힘들 정도의 모범적인 동맹관계를 형성해 왔다. 한국전쟁과 냉전시대를 거치면서 동맹관계는 더욱 굳건한 형태로 발전 되었다.

하지만 부시 정부 출범 이후 세계의 안보정세는 급격히 변화하였고, 이라크 전쟁과 아프가니스탄 전쟁을 거치면서 안보에 대한 불확실성은 더욱 확산되었다. 9/11테러를 촉매제로 하여 미국은 테러와의 전쟁을 선포하게 되었고, 잠재적인 적의 위협으로부터 미국을 보호하기 위하여 새로운 안보전략이 필요하게 되었다. 그 안보전략의 일환으로 국방변혁과 해외 주둔 미군 재배치 검토(GPR)를 통해 비정규적이고 파괴적인 잠재 위협에 대처할 수 있는 전략적 유연성을 확보할 수 있게 되었다. 국방개혁의 핵심 개념은 장비의 첨단화와 기동화를 통한 비교우위를 점하는 것이고, GPR의 핵심개념은 해외주둔 미군을 핵심거점에 재배치/재편성함으로써 신속하게 특정 분쟁지역에 전개할 수 있는 전략적 유연성을 확보하는 것이다. 특히 이러한 전략적 유연성의 개념은 주한미군에도 예외 없이 적용된다.

본 논문에서는 미군의 군사변혁 및 해외주둔 미군 재배치 검토 (GPR)의

배경을 살펴보고, 미군의 새로운 안보위협에 대처하기 위한 전략을 분석하였다. 또한 미군의 전략변화가 주한미군에 미치는 영향과 그에 따른 주한미군의 변화를 분석하였으며, 주한미군의 전략적 유연성 확대가 한반도 안보 및 한미 동맹에 미치는 영향을 분석하여 발전적인 한미동맹 관계를 유지할 수 있도록 방향을 제시하였다.

Appendix 2. The 38th SCM

The 38th ROK-US SCM Joint Communiqué

October 20, 2006, Washington, D.C.

1. The 38th Republic of Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington, D.C. on October 20, 2006. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and ROK Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang Ung led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace and the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lee Sang Hee, presided over the 28th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on October 18, 2006.

2. Secretary Rumsfeld expressed appreciation for the continued deployment of the ROK armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and recognized that the ROK armed forces are making a critical contribution to both Iraqi and Afghan reconstruction, helping the respective governments to build a safe and free nation for their people. Minister Yoon assured continuing close consultations between ROK and U.S. forces in this regard. The Minister and the Secretary shared the view that bilateral cooperation between the two countries on the Global War on Terrorism would strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

3. The Secretary and the Minister expressed grave concern regarding the North Korean nuclear test of October 9, condemned in the strongest terms the North's clear threat to international peace and security as well as the stability of the Korean Peninsula, and demanded that North Korea refrain from any further action that might aggravate tensions. Both sides welcomed and expressed their support for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. Secretary Rumsfeld offered assurances of firm U.S. commitment and immediate support to the ROK, including continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty. Minister Yoon expressed appreciation for the close cooperation and steadfast support of the U.S. in the face of North Korean intransigence. The Minister and the Secretary observed that their respective Presidents had reaffirmed the shared principle of a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and had agreed to seek a common and comprehensive approach for the resumption and progress of the Six-Party Talks in the ROK-U.S. Summit Talks held on September 14 of this year. Both the Secretary and the Minister shared the view that North Korea should refrain from provocative actions which could worsen the situation. Both sides also urged North Korea to fully implement the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks of September 2005, including North Korean abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, its early return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and

full implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements.

4. The Minister and the Secretary also shared the common understanding that the North Korean missile launches of July 2006 were a provocative action that constituted a threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as international peace and security. Both sides agreed that North Korea's continued development of WMD and long-range missiles, along with the danger of the proliferation, were a challenge to the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Taking note of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695, both sides demanded that North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programs and agreed to seek peaceful resolution to this issue.

5. The Secretary and the Minister welcomed the continued development of the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a comprehensive, dynamic and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship, based on shared values. Both sides concurred that the ROK-U.S. Alliance remains vital to the future interests of the two nations and that a solid combined defense posture should be maintained in order to secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both sides praised the fact that the capabilities of the ROK-U.S. combined forces remain at peak readiness.

6. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the Alliance, including the U.S. presence in Korea, continues to ensure security on the Korean Peninsula and stability in Northeast Asia. In this regard, both sides recognized the importance of the United Nations Command. Secretary Rumsfeld reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the security of the ROK and the Mutual Defense Treaty. Minister Yoon further reaffirmed the ROK commitment to mutual defense for the preservation of peace and security.

7. The Minister and the Secretary received reports on the results of the ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiative (SPI) discussions and expressed satisfaction that, through close consultations, the ROK and the U.S. are making progress both in pending issues concerning realignment of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and in the joint studies on the development of the future ROK-U.S. Alliance. Both sides agreed to continue and to enhance SPI consultations in 2007 based on the accomplishments of the past two years.

8. The Secretary and the Minister expressed satisfaction with the fact that the ROK and the U.S. reached agreement on the Joint Study on the Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance based on the common understanding of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both sides also noted that the Study determined that the future Alliance would contribute to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and globally. They agreed that the Study presents a way forward for the future ROK-U.S. Alliance in response to the changing security environment.

9. The Minister and the Secretary reviewed the results of the Command Relations Study (CRS) including the issue of wartime operational control, which has been carried out in accordance with the agreements reached at the 37th SCM. They highly praised the fact that the ROK and U.S. have agreed to the CRS roadmap. Both sides agreed to expeditiously complete the transition of OPCON to the ROK after October 15, 2009, but not later than March 15, 2012. The transition will be based on a mutually agreed and reasoned plan. The Military Committee will report progress on the implementation of this plan annually to the SCM. Both sides agreed to begin immediately to develop a detailed joint implementation plan within the first half of 2007 in accordance with the agreed Roadmap. In noting the target year establishment, Secretary Rumsfeld offered assurance that the transition to a new command structure will be carried out while maintaining and enhancing deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and ROK-U.S. combined defense capabilities. He stated that the U.S. will continue to provide significant bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains a fully independent defense capability. The Secretary further noted that the U.S. will continue to contribute U.S. unique capabilities to the combined defense for the life of the Alliance. Both sides pledged the fullest commitment to meeting agreed-to benchmarks and timelines regarding the transition.

10. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the progress of relocation of Yongsan Garrison and other United States Forces Korea (USFK) bases. Both sides expressed satisfaction that the relocation and return of the bases are proceeding despite some challenges, and agreed to exert greater effort to advance the 11. The Minister and the Secretary noted with satisfaction that the modernization of the air-to-ground training range at Jik-do to ensure conditions for the ROK and the U.S. air forces is on track, and Secretary Rumsfeld expressed appreciation for the determined efforts of the Korean government in resolving the issue. Minister Yoon acknowledged that ensuring sufficient and sustained training conditions for USFK is of critical importance for combined readiness. Both sides agreed to make the utmost efforts for the early completion of the modernization of Jik-do range so that training conditions for ROK-U.S. combined military forces are guaranteed.

12. The Secretary and the Minister recognized the successful implementation of mission transfers and combined military capability enhancement plans based on the close consultation between the two countries. Both sides also acknowledged positively the successful agreement on the issue of strategic flexibility of United States forces based in Korea which was presented in the Joint Statement of Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership held in January 2006.

13. Both sides positively recognized the work of the SCM subcommittees (the Security Cooperation Committee (SCC), the Defense Technology and Industrial Cooperation Committee (DTICC), and the Logistics Cooperation Committee (LCC)). They noted that the DTICC had been given increased stature by raising the level of the Co-Chairs to the Under Secretary/Vice Minister level. They also acknowledged

that as the Alliance evolves, the SCM subcommittee structure must be examined and adjusted to meet current needs, and agreed that the SPI would develop recommendations for consideration at the 39th SCM.

14. The Minister and the Secretary concurred that the 38th SCM and the 28th MCM, through intense discussions on issues pertinent to the realignment of the Alliance and the conclusion of the joint studies on the development of the future ROK-U.S. Alliance, strongly supported the continuous development of a future-oriented Alliance. Both sides agreed to hold the 39th SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2007 in Seoul.

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