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Public Entity Reform during the Roh Administration: Analysis through Best Practices

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Public Entity Reform during the Roh Administration:

Analysis through Best Practices

Jin PARK, Professor¹ KDI School of Public Policy and Management

Abstract

Reforming PEs is a critical component of public sector reform. In order to approach such an important task more systematically, we need to know how PEs reformed themselves during the past 5 years under President Roh. By examining a survey on 125 public entities' best practices, it is possible for us to derive many interesting observations. The first step toward successful reform is establishing an objective, strategies, orientation, and an area of the reform. Depending on the degree of reform levels of each organization, decisions and options may vary. The second step consists of choosing the appropriate initiator, driver and plan-drafter. Although the initiator and driver may differ depending on the degree of the organization's reform level, insiders and outsiders should both participate in the planning process. Because it goes without saying that support for reform is a crucial success factor, the government needs to guarantee terms that are long in duration for the CEOs of PEs. Finally, in order to maximize the utilization of best practices, selection of the most applicable and appropriate cases is of utmost importance.

JEL code: H11 H79 L32 Key words: public sector reform, benchmarking, best practices

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I. Introduction

Public sector reform has been a very important agenda in this Roh administration, and among the wide spectrum of the public sector, a public entity (PE)² has been most active in the reform efforts. What are the major characteristics of the PE reform in the recent five years? What are the problems, and what should be the future direction of the PE reform in the new administration?

In order to capture the major features of the PE reform, this paper investigated each PE's best practices over the past 5 years. Since they have submitted best practices every year starting 2003, each case represents a major reform accomplishment of organizations in each year. This paper surveyed all PEs that are registered in ALIO (ALI public Information in One)³, but 125 PEs have responded to the survey. Those who did not answer the survey were generally small and new PEs that did not have any best practices to report to the Ministry of Planning and Budget. It was generally the head of the innovation team who actually answered the survey.

The survey consists of three parts: the first part is on the PE itself, and the second part is on the major features of each best practice, and the third part is on the utilization of the benchmarking in the reform efforts. Regarding 14 questions of the second part, each PE was asked to answer for each best practices during 2003~2007.⁴

² According to the old classification, PE includes state-owned enterprises, stateinvested enterprises, government-funded institutes, government-subsidized institutes, government-commissioned institutes. The law on managing public entities categorizes the PE into the following five types : market-based public enterprises, semi-marketbased public enterprises, fund-managing semi-government agencies, commissioned semi-government agencies, and other public entities.

³ Alio is a on-line Public Management Information System by Ministry of Planning and Budget which covers 298 PEs.

⁴ Therefore, the PEs had to answer 77 questions. I am very grateful for their kind help.

| | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | | | | | |
| 1. objective | | | | | |
| 2. strategy | | | | | |
| 3. orientation | | | | | |
| 4. area | | | | | |
| 5. initiator | | | | | |
| 6. driver | | | | | |
| 7. drafter | | | | | |
| 8. approach | | | | | |
| 9. resistance | | | | | |
| 10. selling points | | | | | |
| 11. support | | | | | |
| 12. CEO's term | | | | | |
| 13. innovation level | | | | | |
| 14. size | | | | | |
| 15. type of PE | | | | | |
| 16. relevant Ministry | | | | | |
| 17. information source | | | | | |
| 18. benchmarking | | | | | |
| 19. application | | | | | |
| 20. huddles | | | | | |
| 21. improvement | | | | | |

<Table 1: Sheet for Survey Response >


Among 125 respondents, the other PEs takes up the largest share (55%) followed by commissioned semi-government agencies (24%) and semimarket-based public enterprises. Market-based public enterprises and fundmanaging semi-government agencies were relatively few. These composition matches well with the general composition of the all PEs. A typical number of the staffs in PE is 100~499 with innovation level at 4th stage. The numbers at the beginning of the paragraphs and graphs indicate the survey question numbers.

II. Features of the PE Reform during 2003~2007


1. The five major objectives of innovation under President Roh was efficiency, improvement of service, transparency, public participation and local empowerment. The major objectives of innovation for the 5 years were efficiency followed by improvement of service. Transparency and public participation turns out to be less emphasized.⁵ This may sound somewhat surprising since the current administration did not seek for a small government. The efficiency in this paper, however, refers to higher performance/cost ratio, and the best practices tend to focus on the better performance. The efficiency was a more important goal in a small PE, and whereas service improvement was relatively more important in a PE with more than 5,000 staffs. These make perfect sense that a large organization tends to have more service-related missions. Also 6th level organization focuses more (57.1%) on the service to the people.


⁵ Since the local empowerment is not an adequate objective for the PE innovation, it was not included in the multiple choices.

1-1. Objective of Innovation




1-2. Efficiency by the size of the organization







1-3. Improvement of service by size

2. Among 5 reform strategies suggested by Osborne (2000), setting new visions and mission (28.2%), introducing market or competition (24.7%), and reforming organizational culture (23.9%) were more frequent answers than delegating authority (9.8%), and performance management (12.9%). Among the 5 strategies, setting new visions and mission, and reforming organizational culture, which takes up 52.1% are relatively less enforcing, and therefore generally less effective strategies than the other three. The most compelling strategy is introducing market or competition. We can confirm this in the following graph that only 14.3% of organizations that are in the most advanced reform level chose the new vision whereas 42.9% chose the introducing market or competition.








2-2. Setting new vision and mission

3. In terms of the orientation of the reform, internal⁶ (53.6%) and external reforms (46.4%) are generally balanced. There is a tendency however that the 6^{th} level PEs tend to focus more on the external reforms. This coincides with the result of the survey on the reform objective: the 6^{th} level organization focuses more on the service to the people.





4. Regarding the area of the reform, customer satisfaction ranked number one followed by personnel management, program outcome and construct a new vision. Improving ethics, finance and knowledge management were not major responses. As we have seen in the innovation strategy, an advanced organization tends to focus less on the new visions and personnel management,

⁶ Internal reform refers to improvement in internal system or work process whereas external reform means improvement in the service or performance.

but more on the program outcome and knowledge management than the other PEs do. This implies that the internal preparation should be given a priority when an organization is in the initial stage of innovation, but as the reform advances, the gravity should be shifted towards more on the external innovation such as service or program outcome. Though knowledge management is a part of the internal reform, it is kind of a luxury good that appeals to only the advanced PE.


4-1. Innovation area






4-2. Construct vision

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








5. The initiators of the reform agenda were dominantly insiders such as the board member and the staffs. The outsiders such as external advisory group or the Ministry were relatively not important initiator. The relative importance of the staffs to the board members was drastically increasing as the innovation level advances. In the first level, staffs vs. board members were 19.4%: 64.5%, but it becomes 57.1%: 14.3% in the sixth level. This also appeals to our intuition that the advanced organization will have broader human infrastructure for innovation. The role by the staff in initiating the reform agenda was the most outstanding under the fourth year CEO who just started his second term. The 6th level organization tends to rely more on the advisory group (28.6%) than the board members (14.3%).


5-1. Reform Initiator














6. The drivers of the reform were project divisions (36.4%), innovation team (33.1%) and administrative division (26.5%). The CEO's office was not a major reform driver. The role of the innovation team has been increasing before 2007 whereas the administrative division has been losing its power before 2007. The administrative division has been traditionally the main driver of a reform. Around 2003~2004 when the innovation team was newly established, the administrative team maintained its traditionally strong role in the reform, after 2005, however, the innovation team has gained its power. The year 2007 seems to be the outlier because many PEs have been included at the beginning of 2007 by the new law, and these newly established or classified PEs are acting like a PE in 2003. As the reform level advances, the project division is gaining whereas the administrative division is losing its importance as a reform driver.












6-3. Administrative division by year





7. Those who drafted the reform plan were mostly the internal branch (51.4%) followed by the internal taskforce (26.2%) and joint taskforce of internal and external members (15.5%). The role of the internal division weakens seriously in the advanced organization, where joint taskforce plays a major role in drafting the plan. Regarding the relative importance between the internal division and the joint taskforce, the first level organizations' answer was 73.5%:8.8% compared to 14.3%:42.9% by the sixth level. This is a proof that it is good to invite outsiders' expertise in the reform plan. One may argue that the advanced organization's sufficient financial resources could be the reason behind the more frequent use of the outsider expert. However, the cost of the joint taskforce does not have to be that burdensome. As a supporting evidence, I would like to note that the joint taskforce was more important in 2006 (21.8%) than in 2003(8.3%), but year 2007 was again an exception to this trend (15.4%)














7-3. Internal and External taskforces

8. Among four approach of the reform, 'overall and gradual' was the number one (40.9%) followed by 'partial and gradual' (25.9%) and 'overall and rapid' (21.8%). Partial and rapid approach was not a popular option (11.4%). Partial and gradual, that is, most conservative approach started with 37.1% in the year 2003, but ends with 16.5% in 2007. Instead the revolutionary method, overall and rapid recorded only 15.7% in 2003 but 26.8% in 2006. Again the year 2007 was an outlier. As the innovation level proceeds, the most conservative approach becomes less important whereas the revolutionary approach emerges as the major option. The ratio between the most conservative and the revolutionary approach was 38.7%:6.5% for the first level PE but 0%:57.1% for the sixth level. This implies PEs need to adopt a revolutionary approach to make a good innovation performance. It is also notable that the CEO who has stayed in his/her position more than 4 years tends to prefer the partial and gradual approach more than those who stayed less than three years, which appeals to our intuition.







40.0 37.1 35.0 31.1 30.0 25.0 20.5 20.0 16.5 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 2004 2003 2005 2006 2007













8-4. Generally Gradually






9. The degree of resistance to the reform shows a normal distribution around 'some resistance'. A serious or very serious resistance was centered around 2005. My best guess is that it is because the reform drive by the government and the PE management was heightened after the ruling party's winning the general election in 2004. Surprisingly PEs in level 3 innovation level tends. This gives a hypothesis that the step from the level 3 to the level 4 requires a type of innovation that generates more resistance. One notable observation is that 45.1% the organizations with 3,000~4,999 staffs answered that their reform entailed serious or very serious resistance when the average answer was only 21.7%.







9-2. Very strong resistance by year




9-3. Very strong resistance by the reform level




10. Regarding the question asking in which criteria the best practices were evaluated best, persistence (31.8%), mission-orientedness (25.1%) were the two frequent answers. General applicability, originality and objectivity followed next with $11 \sim 13\%$ choice. Difficulty (4.3%) was not a major reason behind the good evaluation for the case, at least to each PE's perspective. The answer objectivity decreases but mission-orientedness increases with the innovation level. This is because the level 6 organizations have already prove themselves in an objective way, and because they focus more on the program outcome and service to the people as the survey question number 4 suggested. On the other hand, the objective proof turns out to be the strong pressure for the PEs in their lower level of innovation. As the CEO stays longer in his position, objectivity becomes more important whereas persistency decreases. The objectivity vs persistency was 8.2%: 34.0% for the first year CEO, but 33.3%: 11.1% for the six year. It is very much understandable because it is easier to prove the outcome of the cases with objective ways when you stay in your position long enough, and because persistency loses its importance when it is certain that you will have to step down soon.





10-1. Characteristic of the case





10-2. Objective by terms in office














10-5. Strategically fit by the reform level

11. The support for the innovation at the organizational level was either absolutely full or enough (71.8%) for the reform, and 28.2% answered that the support was either not enough or none. As we can imagine, the full or enough of support recorded 100% in the advanced organization whereas only 61.3% for the retarded PEs in their innovation. The CEOs in their 4th or 5th year turns out to be most supportive as the not-enough or no support answer recorded $5\sim9\%$ for those CEOs compared to $27\sim33\%$ for 1st $\sim3^{rd}$ year CEOs. However, this number soars to 66.6% for the 6th-year CEO, which shows the drastically decreasing support for probably the last year of his term. It is worth noting that the PEs under the Ministry of Finance and Economy show relatively good support for the innovation. The size of the organization was not an important variable in the support level.










11–2. Fully + Adequately by the reform level

12. Regarding CEO's years in office, 1 or 2 years takes up 66.5% whereas 3 or more years shows only 33.5%. Among the 1st level PEs, CEOs with 1 or 2 years in office take up 80.6%, but the number drops down to 57.2% among the 6th level PEs. This is an evidence that a longer term in office is a plus to the reform progress. Ratio of CEOs with 4 or more years of service was 0% in market-based PEs and fund-managing semi-government agencies, 3.4% for semi-market PEs. The number increases to 9.4% and 8.9% for commissioned semi-government agencies and other PEs. The ratio of CEOs with 5 or more years of service was 4.7% and 7.0% in less than 99 and 100~499 PEs, but 0% in PEs over 500 staffs. A smaller PE tend to offer longer terms in office for the CEO.





13. The innovation level of each firm increases each year: In year 2003, the 1st level PEs vs. 5^{th} + 6^{th} level PEs were 38.6% to 5.4% but 5.8% to 37.7% in 2007. In 2007, however, 1st level organizations increase due to the newly established or categorized PEs. The fourth year CEO shows the highest innovation level: 50.0% of them lead their PEs to 5^{th} or 6^{th} level, which is aligned with the observation in the survey 11. The size of the PE turns out to have a positive correlation with the reform level. The ratio of either level 5^{th} and 6^{th} was only 3.3% for a PE less than 100 staffs but 51.1% for a PE with more than 5,000. Among the Ministries, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Ministry of Construction and Transportation, and Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy had relatively advanced PEs.




14. The size of a PE depends on the type of the organization: In terms of the ratio of PEs with 499 or less staffs was 19.2% for market-based public enterprises, 40.1% for semi-market-based public enterprises, 39.4% for fund-managing semi-government agencies, 59.0% for commissioned semi-government agencies, and 68.7% for other PEs. As we have seen in the survey 13, bigger organizations tend to be more advanced in their progress of innovation. 48.4% of the 1st level PEs had 99 or less number of staffs, but the ratio was 0% for the 6th level PEs. Only 3.2% of the 1st level PEs had more than 3,000 staffs, but the number increases to 100% when it comes to the 6th level.

15. Among the type of the PEs, semi-market-based PEs had clear excellence in the reform level: 57.1% of the 6th level PEs were semi-market-based PEs. 89.5% of PEs under Ministry of Science and Technology were in the other PE category, but the ratio drops down to 0% in (semi) market-based PE category.

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On the other hand, 70% of PEs under Ministry of Construction and Transportation were either market-based or semi-market-based PEs. As we have seen in the survey 12, PEs with 6th year's service by the CEO were either commissioned semi-government agencies or other PEs.



14. Under 499 people by category of organization


16. Among 5 major Ministries with many PEs, MOCT and MOFE tend to offer shorter terms for the CEO. This is due to the relatively bigger size of PEs under the both ministries. Market-based public enterprises were typically under MOCIE, and semi-market-based public enterprises under MOCT, fund-managing semi-government agencies under MOFE, commissioned semi-government agencies again under MOCIE, and other PEs under MOST. It is worth noting that 57.1% of the 6th level PE were under MOCT.

III. Utilization of Best Practices

17. The media for learning about the best practices of the other organization is either publication of Ministry of Planning and Budget or information sharing amongst PEs. Newspaper or so-called best practice fair turned out to be not effective media.


18. 35.0% of PEs learn from the other organization's best practices many times. The answer 'once or twice' (53.7%) or 'none' (11.4%) is considered to be the same answer. The ratio of 'many times' is decreasing with the tenure of the CEO, but is increasing with the innovation level. Surprisingly, the 6th level PEs were outliers: 100% of whom answered that they adopted once or twice, and

0% say 'many times'.






19. When the PEs apply the other organizations' best practices, 65.3% of them generally learn only the idea and modify the case to their own needs and situation. Only 5% of PEs say that they transplanted the case without much change. This ratio was surprisingly high at 28.6% among the 6th level PEs and at 29.4% among PEs more than 5,000 staffs.



19. Adaptation


20. As a huddle for the benchmarking, inadequate information (59.5%), no helpful case (20.6%), low accessibility (11.9%), and resistance (7.9%) were answers. As the innovation level progresses, resistance and low accessibility becomes less of a huddle. Smaller organizations point out the resistance as a huddle more than the bigger PEs. 20.9% of PEs with 99 or less staffs say that the resistance is a huddle as oppose to 0% of PEs with 1,500 or more staffs.



20. Huddles for benchmarking

21. For better utilization of best practices: First, really 'best' practices should be chosen by the government (40.2%), second, the cases should be widely disseminated (30.3%), third, encourage each PE to benchmark others' best practices (19.7%). More diversified cases should be collected (9.8%) was considered less important task. PEs seem to be not satisfied with the current selection process or result of the best practices. The pattern of the answer was quite different for the 6th level organization: 0% answered 'good choice of best practices' but 85.7% chose encouraging benchmarking. This reflects their advanced level of innovation: They have been successful in proving themselves, and hope the other organizations to follow their footsteps. Regarding dissemination, around 28.8%~31.0% of 1st ~ 3rd year CEOs think dissemination is important, but the ration drops to 0%~16.7% for 4th ~ 6th year CEOs.





IV. Conclusion

Reforming PEs is a very important part of public sector reform. For a more systematic approach to this important task, we need to know how PEs have reformed themselves in the past 5 years. As we have seen in the previous chapters, a best practice is a mirror of the reform. We could derive many interesting observations from the pattern of best practices.

Properly setting an objective, strategies, orientation, area of the reform is the first step towards a success of a reform, and the choice depends on the level of the reform level of each organization. The second step is choosing the right initiator, driver and plan-drafter. Though an initiator and a driver may vary depending on the level of the organization's reform level, plan should be made jointly with the insiders and outsiders. And it goes without saying that support for the reform is a crucial success factor. The government needs to guarantee long terms in office for the CEOs of PEs.

In order to maximize the utilization of best practices, selection of right cases is the utmost important. Benchmarking is one of the most effective tools for public sector reform.

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Appendix I

Questionnaire

Please answer below questions. After you answer from 1 to 14 for 2003, then go back to the question 1 and answer again for 2004. Please repeat these steps until 2007. After you complete the process, please answer from 15 to 21. Thank you very much for your help.

- 1. (Innovation Objective) What is your objective of innovation in 00 year?
 - (Choose the most important one)
 - ① Effectiveness: better performance or reducing the cost.
 - ② Improvement of service
 - ③ Transparency: ethics, fight against corruption
 - ④ Participation: cooperative relation with labor union, protecting minority, managing conflict etc.
- (Innovation Strategy) What kind of innovation strategy do you take for innovation in 00 year. (Select only one)
 - 1 Setting new vision and mission
 - ② Introducing market or competition
 - ③ Delegating authority and responsibility
 - ④ Performance management
 - ⁵ Reforming cooperate culture
- 3. (Orientation) Which orientation did you take for innovation in 00 year?
 - ① Internal: reforming internal system and process
 - ② External: improve outputs, service
- 4. (Innovation area) What was the reform area in 00 year?
 - 1 Constructing new vision
 - ② Improving ethics
 - ③ Improving personnel management
 - ④ Improving financial management
 - ⁽⁵⁾ Managing knowledge

- 6 Program outcome
- O Consumer satisfaction
- 5. (Initiator) By whom the innovation in 00 year has been first raised?
 - 1 By the board
 - 2 By the staff
 - ③ By external advice
 - ④ By the Ministry
- 6. (Reform Driver) Which division drives innovation in 00 year?
 - 1 Innovation team
 - 2 Administrative division
 - ③ Program division
 - 4 CEO's office
- 7. (Drafting of plan) Who drafted the plan in 00 year? (Choose all possible answers)
 - 1 Internal division
 - ② Internal Taskforce
 - ③ Joint taskforce with Internal and external members
 - ④ External expert
 - (5) Other organizations or Ministries
- 8. (Reform Approach) What kind of approach did you take for innovation in 00 year?
 - 1 Partially and Gradually
 - ② Partially and Rapidly
 - 3 Generally and Gradually
 - 4 Generally and Rapidly
- 9. (Resistance) How strong was the resistance in 00 year's reform?
 - ① Very strong
 - ② Significant
 - 3 Some
 - ④ Little
 - ⑤ None

- 10. (Selling points) What are the <u>two</u> most distinguished selling points in the innovation in 00 year?
 - Objectivity
 - 2 Persistence
 - ③ Creativity
 - ④ General applicability
 - 5 Mission-orientedness
 - ⁽⁶⁾ Overcoming resistance

11. (Support for reform) Was there enough support for innovation in 00 year?

- ① Fully
- ② Adequately
- ③ Not adequately
- ④ None

12. (CEO's years in office) How long does your CEO has worked in office in 00 year?

- 1st year
 2nd years
 3rd years
 4th years
 5th years
 More than 6th year
- 13. (Level of Innovation) What stage were your organization in 00 year?
 - ① 1st stage : Initiating
 - ② 2nd stage : Igniting Innovation
 - 3 $\texttt{3}^{\texttt{rd}}$ stage : Improving simple work process
 - 4 4th stage : Diffusion of the need for reform
 - (5) 5^{th} stage : Reform starts to settle down
 - ⑥ 6th stage : Reform is built in the system
- 14. (Size of PE) How many employers do you have in 00 year?
 - under 100
 between 100~499
 - ③ between 500~1499 ④ between 1500~2999
 - (5) between 3000~4999
 (6) more than 5000

15. (Types of PE) What type is your organization?

- ① market-based public enterprises
- ② semi market based public enterprises
- ③ fund managing semi-government agencies
- ④ commissioned semi-government agencies
- (5) other public entities
- 16. (Relevant Ministry) What is your relevant Ministry in terms of working relation?
 - ① Ministry of Finance & Economy (MOFE)
 - 2 Ministry of Education
 - ③ Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST)
 - 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
 - ⁽⁵⁾ Ministry of National Defense
 - (6) Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs
 - O Ministry of Culture and Tourism
 - (8) Ministry of Agriculture
 - (9) Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy (MOCIE)
 - 10 Ministry of Information and Communication
 - (1) Ministry of Health and Welfare
 - 12 Ministry of Environment
 - ① Ministry of Labor
 - (4) Ministry of Construction & Transportation (MOCT)
 - (15) Ministry of Maritime Affairs & Fisheries
 - Others:_____
- 17. (Source of information) How did you get the information on the best practices?
 - ① News Media
 - 2 Publication by Ministry of Planning & Budget
 - ③ Information sharing between organizations
 - ④ Special event such as Best Practice Fair
 - 5 Others _____
- 18. (Bench-marking) since 2003, have you ever benchmarked others' best practices?
 - Several times
 - ② 1~2 times

- ③ None (go to question # 20)
- 19. (Adaptation) How did you adapt the case?
 - 1 Directly copied
 - ② Partly modified
 - 3 Took only the idea, and modified significantly
- 20. (Huddle) What kind of huddles did you face when you benchmarked the case?
 - (Choose all possible answers)
 - ① Internal resistance
 - ② Inaccessibility to the cases
 - ③ Inadequate information
 - 4 No useful case
- 21. (Suggestion) What should the government do to better utilize the best practices?
 - 1 Collect more cases
 - ② Select good cases
 - ③ Wider dissemination
 - ④ Encourage more active benchmarking

- Thank you very much-

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