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Indonesian Bureaucracy Reform: Lessons from Korea

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to make a recommendation to make Indonesian Bureaucracy more competitive. Therefore, the object of the analysis is the Indonesian Bureaucracy centered on personnel management, and the local government's bureaucracy reform and the central government's organizational reform is given the secondary emphasis. Having a competitive civil servant is like growing a tree. In this respect, there are six pillars for competitive bureaucracy as follows, and recommendations are made under each category.

(1) Effective Bureaucracy System (Soil)

Functional positions need to have their own job descriptions different from staffs'. There should be a separate performance evaluation scheme for the functional, for their output is easier to measure. The staff should have different classifications depending on their jobs. And the entering grade for civil servants should be disassociated from the schooling year.

(2) Selection of good people (Seed)

There should be centrally administered national level tests with different degrees of difficulty. Only those who pass one of those tests are eligible for the recruiting process conducted by each ministry. The test subjects should be selected in a way that measures the competency requirement for civil service. Of course proper job matching and rotation is a must for the maximum productivity of a civil servant.

(3) Good Working Environment (Water)

Internet speed in a government should be improved. This will facilitate the use of email as a medium of intra-organizational communication which currently strictly requires official documents. To pull up the salary level, the size of each public organization should be reviewed once in a while, as this is expected to boost.public support.

(4) Strong Incentive to Perform (Sunlight)

We need to introduce a multi-dimensional evaluation, but it should not be criteria based on any personnel decision. The result should be provided to the individual so that he can have his own improvement plan. There should be a balance, among Attitude, Competency and Performance. A relative evaluation scheme should be introduced in a

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gradual manner. The performance payment should be introduced to the current salary adjustment system every two years.

(5) Effective Training (Fertilizer)

LAN needs to conduct 3~6 months of basic pre-service training, after which they are sent to line Ministry's training center for additional 1~3 months of specialized pre-service training. LAN needs to develop the competency analysis for echelon III and IV in general. LAN's accreditation criteria should follow the result of this study.

(6) System for Reform (Agriculture management).

MENPAN needs a Presidential Committee for Bureaucracy Reform benchmarking the Korean case, and should act as a secretariat for the committee. MENPAN needs a Deputy or Director who has no pre-assigned responsibilities. A more fundamental recommendation would be a matrix organization. MENPAN needs to recruit outside specialists as directors whose jobs are to search for reform agendas. One or two Deputies could be from the private or quasi-public sector. MENPAN needs to review the current reform plan, and make it more specific with clear indexes attached to each plan and also a deadline for each reform plan should be set.

Finally for the next candidate projects, the followings are suggested. (1) More detailed design of reform driving organizations and their working relation with the relevant government bodies. (2) A strategic reform plan that includes a sequence, the right mix of the reform, timing etc. (3) Implementation: carrot and stick, change management, forming a favorable coalition, working with law makers, reform performance evaluation system. (4) Reform of the local government: reform agenda, implementation strategies, evaluation criteria.

Keywords: Indonesian Bureaucracy, Government Reform, Korean Experience

JEL: H70, N40

Introduction

The aim of this study is to make a recommendation to make Indonesian Bureaucracy more competitive. Therefore, the object of the analysis is the Indonesian Bureaucracy centered on the personnel management, and the local government's bureaucracy reform and the central government's organizational reform is given the secondary emphasis. Having a competitive civil servant is like growing a tree. In this respect, there are six pillars for competitive bureaucracy as follows: (1) Effective Bureaucracy System (Soil), (2) Selection of good people (Seed), (3) Good Working Environment (Water), (4) Strong Incentive to Perform (Sunlight), (5) Effective Training (Fertilizer), (6) System for Reform (Agriculture management). This paper presents recommendation for 35 major problems in Indonesian bureaucracy.

1. Bureaucracy System

1.1 Functional Position Has No Job Description

There are 2 (two) kinds of positions available in government institution, structural[2] and functional position[3]. Vis-à-vis to functional position, advancement is measured on the basis of total credits earned. Its subsistence is actually meant to provide enhanced function of the organization itself, particularly in the field of research and development. Those staffs are supposed to be only assigned particular tasks by which the result of his/her works are going to be reckoned for their credits. There are several reasons for staffs to choose being in functional positions. In practice, not only for faster advancement in career, but it is also used by certain parties to isolate particular persons from structural hierarchy within offices. People who are hard to cooperate with or those nearly in retirement age fill most of this position. Meanwhile, structural position is the usual position of staff in the office related to day-to-day administrative and decision-making process. For both positions, there are no distinct differences in staffs' roles.

Frequently, there has been an overlap as any functional positions are doing staffs' job, and vice versa. Hence, such indistinguishable roles make the performance management difficult. There are also cases whilst functional positions find it difficult to perform their own particular tasks by the virtue of day-to-day administrative scrutiny which also assigned to them. In the other hand, structural staffs are also given functional tasks as well which caused by the lack of personnel within functional position particularly and within the office generally. In particular, what also essential is the utilization of the functional output. Since in most cases, the output is never be a consideration in decision-making process albeit it closely related to determine the continuance of the institution.

Structurally, the line of commands for functional positions is come directly from the director, but most of the cases the functional position is not freely talk to the director, since before come to the director, the functional position should coordinate with the associate director. Even worst, most of the associate director tends to be more powerful in utilize both functional and staffs, since there is no clear distinction about the limitation of associate director authority in term of directing and monitoring their sub ordinate. Even if, for many cases, the grades of the functional positions is higher or equal with the associate director, however, since the functional position didn't have any authority or independently, still their position seem like the subordinate of the structural positions.

For the future, this condition cannot guarantee will be last happy ever after. The problem appears when there is a different opinion between functional positions and the associate director, as the results the communication stuck. There some kind of cold war among the people. It will be better, if there is a limitation of authority between the

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[2] Please refer to Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) Num. 15 Year 1994 regarding Civil Servant's Appointment in Structural Position Jo. Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) Num. 49 Year 1998.

[3] Please refer to Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) Num. 16 Year 1994 regarding Civil Servant Functional Position. Functional position is defined as position appointing the duty, responsibility, authority and rights of a civil servant in an organization unit by which based on particular skills and expertise.

director and associate director in term of coordinating, directing, monitoring, and evaluating of the staffs and functional positions.

The other thing is related with the evaluation of the staffs and the functional functions. There is no distinction evaluation scheme for these two different types of positions. Even though, in term of commands, structurally the functional position is under the director, but in term of performance evaluation for internal organization requirements, the evaluation conducted by the associate director. In order to please the associate directors, both functional and staff do their job vice versa as associate director will. If they refuse to do the associate director will, they will be evaluated as non loyalty, not competence employees who cannot work as team in office. By the end, this evaluation will effect on career path, and their advancement in internal or organization.

It is will be priority to design different the evaluation performance for those types of position, staffs and functional positions. Planning of career path for each people is based on their competence and expertise, and plus independently for functional position both in decision and in doing their job. Eventually, this planning will motivate them to be highly motivated and highly performance employees.

Korea does not have the functional position. Most of the functional research position in Korea is independent in the form of government-funded research institutes such as KDI and KIPA.

In order to achieve better delineation among both positions in Indonesia, there is supposed to be a job rotation between the structural and the functional positions, in addition to strengthen the output of the functional positions by its organization. Functional positions need to have its own job description different from staffs'. In addition to that, the functional should be placed in a separate directorate when the director has an incentive to utilize the functional as the one of the staffs. Eventually, there should also be a separate performance evaluation scheme for the functional, for better measurement of their output. Considering the practice that has been going on repeatedly, these recommendations should then be implemented immediately.

1.2 Differentiation among Staffs

Staffs have too wide range of grades II-A to III-B, and there is no job specification for them. Actually, there is a practice of using Position Details (*Uraian Jabatan-Urjab*) to break down clearly duties and responsibilities of each staff. In *Urjab*, there are lists of jobs which will be assigned to a particular staff and signed by his/her supervisor. The superior associated to Urjab is that it is going to be reviewed periodically serving as one of the tools in performance valuation. Nevertheless, the document has never been into practice in reality by which overlaps and overloads of jobs among staffs are common. Such practice makes the performance management difficult, and thereby makes bureaucracy loose. Phenomenon of free riders cannot be avoided in this evaluation scheme. Since most of the evaluation criteria only based on their attitudes and it is very lack of evaluation about the real performance. Even since now, there are no practical instruments which can captured and solve the free riders phenomenon. The only punishment for those free riders, they will automatically isolate from the social life of the organization environment. Nature selection will play their role in this section, since there is no formal ways which regulate it. Then they become 'idle asset' in any unit of work. It is very rare to find that the structural position can utilize the 'idle asset' into productive ways. Most of the time, the structural function use this 'idle asset' only for administrative requirement, but as the matter of facts, their job done by other people.

There are three kinds of staffs under Director: (1) Associate Director, who has his specified job, and (2) Staffs, who sometimes has his own job or sometimes assists Associate Director, and (3) Typist or Secretary. As for Indonesia, there is a need to introduce three categories of staffs like in Korea. The categories would be: (1) Specialized Staff, those who pass the grade III-B should be classified into a specialized position, which has specified job description; like an echelon without staffs, (2) General Staff, anyone between II-C to III-A is a general staff, and he either works with a specialized staff or has his own specified job upon director's decision, and (3) Secretary, his/her jobs include data compiling, typing, handling phone calls, inter-office delivery, coffee service and other simple administration. Ever since the changes would only going to be happen within staffs without any other outrages physical alteration in organization as whole; this policy should be implemented as soon as possible.

1.3 Schooling, Entering Grade, and Minimum Grade for Echelon

A starting grade for high school graduates is II-A, and for college graduates it is III-A, and for Masters Degree holders is III-B. A schooling year cannot fully represent the applicant's competency, and this system reduces social mobility since schooling year may reflect one's family income. There has been a view on the vicious circle in the society. People who can spend more time in the school are the one coming from higher level family income. Since higher grade commonly means higher income, then using schooling time as a determination of entering grade is one of the causes of such vicious circle. However, such matching is actually rooted from the society itself who exceedingly value the time spent in school, yet not related to one's competency.

Still related to entering grade, minimum grade for each Echelon is too high, so it is often ineffective regulation. If a staff started his/her career at the entering grade of III-A, then normally it will take 20 years to reach Echelon II's minimum grade, which can be considered too long for a minimum. In overall, it is also one of the reasons for the absence of incentives for staff to perform better. Not only experiencing discrimination in terms year of schooling, one is also facing a very long years in order to get into particular positions. As the result, this system produce the gap between competences and grades requirement for any kind of strategically position. It is very common in Indonesia, person who hold the structurally function doesn't mean that they have the competency for that position. Most of the case, their grade lead them to the structurally function, meanwhile their expertise will be consider after their grade. Ideally, their competency leads them to the structural function not vice versa.

The only bridge, that uses to solve the gap between grade and competency through care taker scheme. For instance, if there is vacant position for the level of echelon II, meanwhile person who has specific expertise for that position still his grade is below the minimum requirement, so the highest officer in the organization can make a formal decision which allow that person to hold the echelon II position as care taker for a year, and after than he will be officially hold echelon II position. As note, this procedure only for those who have I level lower than required grades for the vacant position. During, he play this role as care taker, he doesn't have facilities as echelon II, but his previous facility until officially inaugurate as echelon II. With other word, we can say that, this care take care scheme is short officially shortcut to the higher position and grade.

In Korea experience, there is no schooling requirement for civil servants as long as one passes the state-level entrance exam. There is age regulation, 20-32, for applicants for high level civil servants, but this will be abolished next year. Since the minimally required grade is not that binding, it is very well observed. To become Echelon II after entering the III-B, for instance, the minimum year is 8 years, but it takes around 15 years in general.

In the case of Indonesia, there should be an abolition vis-à-vis the match between schooling year and the grade. Instead establish 3 (three) tests with different entering grades, and provide the grade accordingly. Acknowledging the rooted culture in the society upon time spent in schooling, the recommendation could be mixed with the requirements needed in order to take the three expecting greater acceptance from the society.

Table 1

	Test X	Test Y	Test Z
Starting Grade	III-B	II-C	II-A
4 Years Later	III-C (Echelon III)*	II-D (Echelon IV)	II-B
12 Years Later	IV-A (Echelon II)*	III-B (Echelon III)	II-D
20 Years Later	IV-C (Echelon I)*	III-D (Echelon II)	III-B (Echelon IV)
28 Years Later	IV-E (Echelon I)	IV-B (Echelon II)	III-D (Echelon III)

*The grade in * marked echelon is the minimum grade newly proposed.*

Indonesia is also supposed to have a one-grade lower the minimum grade for each echelon. As a way forward, the government should initially announce the policy of abolishing schooling with entering grade before conducting the recruitment process, and will have to actually implement it after 2 years; not only to give a preparation time for the new test, but also to consent on rooms for evaluation. Meanwhile the newly proposed minimum grade for Echelon can be implemented from the next promotion decision.

1.4 Shortcut for Advancement

In Indonesia, there are many short cuts for advancement such as more schooling, or research outputs, which has nothing to do with the competency of a civil servant. For instance, Grader II-A will advance to III-A as soon as he receives his/her Bachelor Degree. Such practice gives a wrong incentive for a candidate to enter into the government through an easy gate (Grade II) and to leap forward to Grade III. There are many cases of abuses happening in which civil servants just went to any school only to get the degree without consideration of the quality of the school or the matching between the degrees with his/her current jobs. Nevertheless, there has also been control mechanism applying in Indonesian namely Grade Advancement Apposite Test (*Ujian Penyesuaian Kenaikan Pangkat*)[4]. The test is mandatory for those who already have a Bachelor Degree and wish to have an automatic advancement. However, this test is not merely can describe the real competence that produces by the employee who passes this test with job competency requirement. Most of the time, this instrument is only to formalize their newly status with newly school certificates. But, it cannot precisely measure about their competence for their newly position.

A civil servant more schooling will enhance his competency and credential, but it has nothing to do with one's advancement in the short-run. A special merit such as Medal of Honor will help though. Government of Indonesia should abolish the automatic advancement due to more schooling. Other various short-cuts for the advancement, which are now abused in many cases, should be minimized. The jump in the grade is only possible by passing the higher level test or strengthening the control mechanism as already existed. In order to protect the current enrollment who are expecting automatic promotion and to consent on rooms for evaluation, this policy should be implemented 4 years after the announcement.

1.5 Ministers from Civil Service

For civil servants, becoming a Minister is their ultimate wish, which is not possible in Indonesia unless one becomes a member of the parliament. That is because a Minister in Indonesia is considered as political rather than structural positions. Thus, in order to be a political appointee, one should probably a member of a political party. Oppositely, in the spirit of neutrality and professionalism, there is a regulation to outlaw every civil servant to become a member of any political parties. Related to the problem, if civil servants do not have a long-term goal, they tend to makes less efforts and more corruption. There should be a hope for the high ranking officials.

In Korea case, around 50% of the Ministers have been nominated among civil servants, and 90% of vice Ministers, and 99% of Assistant Ministers. Ratio of Ministers with career military background ('62-'79 under former-general President Park) is 38.3% in the non-economic Ministries, 14.9% in economy-related Ministries, and 0% in Ministry of Finance.

Unlike in a parliament system of U.K., in a presidential system like Korea and Indonesia, the cabinet may have more members with civil service background, which is also good for the reform. Hitherto, since this is a political issue, it may go beyond the scope of this study.

2. Recruiting System

2.1 Partial Centralization of the Recruiting Process

In Indonesia, the recruiting processes which an institution wants to apply vary one another. For instance, the steps of recruiting new civil servants for Ministry of Finance differ from those for Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence, there is no single standardized system which can be used to be applied to all institutions. In addition to that problem, most of the selections put a much more emphasis on the interview process. As an abstract and subjective measurement, it allows disguises and frauds to happen along the process. The current decentralized recruiting process with such much emphasis on the interview opens a door for nepotism. As also previously explicated, this condition is also worsening by the fact that the starting grade depends only on the schooling year, which cannot provide any information on the competency of the candidate.

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[4] Please refer to Law (Undang-undang) Num. 8 Year 1974 regarding Civil Servants Principals Jo. Law (Undang-undang) Num. 43 Year 1999 and Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) Num. 99 Year 2000 regarding ut

In Korean case, MOPAS selects the new entrants and distribute them to each Ministry based on individual's wish and their score. The interview used to be a rubber stamp, but gets more important as transparency improves. There are 9 grades, and there are three tests through which you can start your civil career at 5th (Associate Director), 7th, and 9th, respectively. If you pass the 5th level test, you can be promoted to a Director General, if 7th level, Director, and if 9th level, Associate Director (Echelon III).

To achieve a better recruiting process which really measures the competency of the candidates, the recommendations should be as follow:

Table 2

	Test X	Test Y	Test Z
Central Government	80%	20%	0%
Provincial Government	40%	50%	10%
Municipal Government	10%	40%	50%
Village Government	0%	20%	80%

1st step: MENPAN & BKN with a help of LAN administers a multiple choice test for all candidates. The score provides an eligibility to take the 2nd step test X, Y, Z. (for instance 85%- for X, 70%-for Y, 60%-for Z) the eligibility lasts 2-3 years;

2nd step: written tests (X, Y, and Z) which select around 120% of the sum of all Ministries' recruitment need for each level. If you pass Test X, you are eligible for III-B, if pass Test Y, II-C, and if pass Test Z, II-A. Advancement to III-B or II-C therefore should be a little bit more difficult than the other level advancement (please refer to **Table 1**). This will reduce the discretion in the 3rd step by line Ministries;

3rd step: Each Ministry conducts document review (with the score in the 1st, 2nd step test) and interview (An additional test is a possible option).

Since well-established test-administration is a key to the success, the new system needs 2 years of preparation after announcement. After two years of preparation, let the new recruiting system and the old system co-exist for another 2 years.

2.2 Subject of Entrance Exam

As previously explained above, there is no single standardized system which can be used to be applied to all institutions. Such stipulation is also applied to subject of entrance exam. Each of the institution determines their own test subjects whereby sometimes do not measure specific qualifications needed for particular department or, oppositely, giving a very specific kind of tests. For instance, the current common test subjects applied in most recruitment system (Government, English, Science, etc) do not measure the required competency.

There are many fields of civil service: general administration, diplomacy, economics, education, social welfare, legal affairs, corrections, congress, and many engineering and technical fields. 1st Round (common for all fields, multiple choices): Public Service Aptitude Test (logical language, data interpretation, and judgment), Constitution, TOEFL (Minimum PBT 530, IBT 197 higher for the diplomacy field). 2nd Round Test for General Administration field: *Compulsory* (Administrative Law, Public Administration, Economics, Politics) and *Elective* (Civil Law, Information Management, Survey Methods, Public Policy, Local Administration). 3rd Round: Interview

As for Indonesia, it is recommended to have 2 (two) steps of tests as follow:
1st Multiple choice Test: Public Service Aptitude Test, Psychology Test, and English (replaceable by TOEFL) etc;
2nd Written Test: Public Administration, Economics etc.
Since this policy is related to the recruitment process, it is also better to proceed with the same time line and allocation as to the previous section. It means the new system needs 2 years of preparation after announcement. After two years of preparation, it will then be implemented in the next recruitment process.

2.3 Job Placement

The job placement is made without considering competency. It is because the Minister or the personnel committee dominates the placement decision. There are in certain circumstances the demeanor of interview to discover the aptitude and concern of the civil servants. Nevertheless, such practice was never happen, even for a consideration in job placement. As a result, the decision is sometimes made by nepotism; those with a lot of connections within win. As a matter of fact, there has been many cases where one has to pay a large amount of money to the officer dominates the placement decision in order to get a better particular placement, e.g. big city, directorate, etc. Depending on Ministers, it varies across Ministries. The best practice was that Director Generals determines the directors they wish to work with, and the directors determine the associate directors.

Introduce formal process, other than a rubber stamp, that a candidate specifies his wanted positions with a priority. After examining the priority mad, let the direct boss of the position make a choice among applicants. The rationale would be that he is going to need the best person that can contribute most by choosing the best from the list available. In this respect, performance evaluation for the boss is also very important. MENPAN needs to conduct a job placement satisfaction survey for all Ministries once a year, and publish the result. This policy can be implemented as soon as possible.

Job placement made integrated with career path of employees. Since, so far there is no clear standard to determine job placement of the employee. All decision made based on the superior decisions through the mechanism of decision of the Board Evaluation of Position and Grade (BAPERJAKAT) which consist all echelon 1, general bureau, and inspectorate. BAPERJAKAT job is to made decision related with job placement of structural functions below of level echelon 1. Meanwhile, for job place of staff and functional staff made by BEPERJAKAT which consist only Secretary General or Prime Secretary, General Bureau and Human resource department. Sometime, job placement made by BAPERJAKAT for staff and functional staff disturbing and even didn't match with regulation which regulate about the career path of the functional position.

2.4 Job Rotation

The job rotation after the initial placement does not have a standard norm. Someone stays in a position for so long whereas someone moves around so frequently. A career development plan is not present in each Ministry. A rotation is endeavored as a means of enhancing the resources of employees and giving opportunity to explore other areas within offices/institutions. There has been provisions concerning rotations, yet such provisions usually reserved for officials (Echelon IV-Echelon I). It is not to pronounce that those rotations are not good enough. However, rotations should also be happened among staffs, especially in the purpose of supporting the development of those staffs. Current practices are no special provisions regulating the rotations system of a staffs. Therefore, it seems to be a customary case within office/institutions some staffs are just stay in certain area/division for more than 10 years. In addition to that, those staffs are unlikely to know what other areas are doing. Please remember that anyhow areas/divisions within offices/institutions are integrated, by which it is better to give staffs real experiences on each of the areas/divisions.

In Korea, it is a problem that the job rotation is so frequent, which lowers the specialty of a civil servants. However, job rotation is made pretty much regularly, and respects one's career path.

A job rotation should be made in a regular base. The terms may vary across ministries depending on their need. For instance, staffs may be rotated for every 2 years in each area/divisions giving enough time for them to contribute and learn more in that particular areas /divisions. Another option, staffs could be placed in certain areas/divisions for a long time (e.g. more than 5 years). Yet within that period, there should be internships in other areas/division hoping that staffs would have an immense opportunity to learn and understand better how the offices/institutions integrates during their internships. These internships would probably going to be only like 3 months and after that the staffs are going to get back to its original posts. In addition that, provision on request for rotations from staffs should also be provided. It will then be incorporated to internships recommendation and supervisors' evaluation result. Each ministry should come up with a career development model such T or I model, and should respect each individual's career plan.

3. Working Environment

3.1 IT Support and Driver for e-Government

Due to the slow internet, use and exchange of information is very much limited. Use of intra-net system for business process has not been introduced. Meanwhile, related to e-Government, In Indonesia, it was officially introduced to public administration by Presidential Decree (*Keputusan Presiden*) Num. 6 Year 2001 on Telematics, which states that the government of Indonesia has to use Telematics technology to support good governance.[5] Furthermore, e-government should have been introduced for different purposes in government offices. In fact, hardly any of government institutions have been successfully implemented their project for e-Government. Even if they already have implemented, the next obstacle would be how to integrate those e-Governments.

In Korea, IT-based business process is common: e-Z-won, e-finance system, G2B, G4C, local fiscal information system etc. To settle inter-Ministerial issues, President Kim (1998-2002) and President Roh (2003-2008) both had a special committee for e-Government.

The most urgent step for Indonesian Government is to expand the capacity of the internet so that government agencies can have as fast Internet speed as that in major Hotels. This will greatly enhance the productivity of the government. There should be a stronger driving force for e-government. There have been also many discussions on integrating the project of e-Government wholly rather than being developed separately on each of the institutions; demanding a superior accomplishment of e-Leadership. Robert Burke defines e-Leadership as "…*no different from any other form of effective leadership except that in e-leadership you have no option but to be very good at it. It requires a high level of transformational leadership because of the highly participative nature of the e-world between e-Organizations and e-Customers and the interconnectedness between leader and follower with the ever-increasing reality of the blurred lines between the two.*"[6] Since e-Government requires many inter-Ministerial decisions, and since e-Government is a major tool for bureaucracy reform, MENPAN's involvement in the e-Government should be strengthened.

3.2 Use of Knowledge Produced by Research Institutes

Each Ministry has research institutes as part of the government, but their research outputs are not fully utilized by a Ministry. One of the problems with most of government research institute is the lack of expertise within the institutes. Not only there are only a few people really dedicate their work on research and development, but also the incentive for people to join, as in low level of payment. Hence, Ministry sometimes just could not rely on the research output in compared to independent research groups for instance.

The use of knowledge produced by government-funded research institutes is also a problem in Korea. Researchers in KIPA and KDI are not civil servants, so they are better paid, and are more flexible and specialized in their research.

Since the research function is in the government, there are three problems:
1.   A research position is considered as a one of the job rotation, thus resulting in no specialization in research;
2.   The government fully controls the research resulting in loss of neutrality;
3.   The pay level is low, resulting in difficulty in attracting good researchers.

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[5] Please also refer to Presidential Decree (*Keputusan Presiden*) Num. 6 Year 2003 regarding National Policy and Strategy for e-Government Development. E-Government strategy for Indonesia are to develop reliable, trust and affordable public services; organization, management system and business process reform; optimal use of ICT; public-private partnership; human resource development and increase society e-literacy; realistic and measurable implementation plan

[6] http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/RobertBurke/eleadership.htm

Research Institutes under each Ministry are better being quasi-government body, funded by the government but not part of the government itself.

3.3 Salary and Adequate Size of Government

For a better working environment, better salary is a must. Level of civil servant salary in Indonesia can be pigeonholed as low. There is an immense discrepancy on civil servants' salary compared to private salary scheme. Government officials and policy analysts maintain that Indonesia's civil servants are poorly paid and have been for decades. This conclusion is supported by anecdotal evidence and casual empiricism. Filmer and Lindauer systematically analyze the relationship between government and private compensation levels using data from two large household surveys carried out by Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics: The 1998 Sakernas and 1999 Susenas. The results suggest that government workers with a high school education or less, representing three-quarters of the civil service, earn a pay premium over their private sector counterparts.[7] Hence, it is suspected as one of the reason why many expertises chose not to be in the interior of the government. However, for a better salary, we need a consensus among people, and that's why we need to check the adequate size of the government, which more likely a trade-off. It would be hard to examine the adequate size of each Ministry, since they will be loath to the decision of downsizing. Currently, there is no legal provision to examine the adequate size of each Ministry. Nevertheless, the need for such provision is indeed essential to gain public support for higher salary.

Korea has a little more than 1 million (2.5% of population) now, but 10% of civil servants and 30% of staffs in SOEs were reduced during '98-'02 (early retirement, outsourcing, etc.).Yet, the salary rose by 30% on average in the same period. (If you are a director in late 40s, your average total gross salary will be 65,000 US$.) cf. OECD countries tend to have higher % due to high social welfare.

Though Indonesia does not have serious fats in the bureaucracy, we need a regular check-up on the function and the adequate size of the employment of each Ministry by MENPAN. Such check-up would give a control mechanism upon apposite size of each Ministry and may also probably serve as a tool for institutional performance management system. In order to have better outcomes out of this recommendation, government needs to announce and publicize the plan as soon as possible within 2 (two) years period. Since this would be a relatively susceptible issue, it would allow feedbacks from each Ministry.

3.4 Decision Layers

One needs four layers of approvals in general (Echelon III – II – I – Minister), but sometimes there are more than 5 hierarchies, which seems unnecessary. Many hierarchies are bad news for good working environment, as it consumes more time to go into the top decision-maker. That is somehow becoming the deficiency in decision-making process by which in many cases those classified as a critical and significant need to go such a long hierarchy before eventually taking actions upon. As a result, the performance of the institution is at stake, often exposed by the media as incompetence.

In Korea, the central government generally has only Echelon I and II, and sometimes III when the Directorate is large. However, Korea has two more steps above the Echelon I (Assistant Minister, Vice Minister).

To avoid more than five layers of hierarchy as in Indonesia case, if there is a need for Echelon IV, it is better to instead increase Echelon III positions in a Directorate. Increasing Echelon III positions would cut the hierarchy by one-layer to go up for the Minister; expecting more efficiency in the process. If the Directorate is big enough to have Echelon IV, say more than 50 people, the Directorate needs to be divided into two different Directorates. Such division would create clearer line of tasks on the two Directorates. It happens sometimes in Indonesia to divide Directorates by the reason of the workloads, though many issues rise along the way (e.g. budget). Of course, if the head of an organization is echelon II, echelon IV or even V can be the lowest position. Despite of the issue on

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[7] Filmer, Deon and Lindauer, David L.,**Does Indonesia Have a "Low-Pay" Civil Service?**(June 2001). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2621.

budget and probable resistances, this policy should be implemented as soon as possible. It will adjoin with the outcomes of the institution and provision introduced on the previous section.

3.5 Intra-Organizational Communication

For a communication with a supervisor or equivalent positions, one should write a formal written form which called *Memo* or *Nota Dinas*. For instance, there should be a *Memo* just for inquiring additional office supplies or Nota Dinas just for reporting customer complaints. In addition to that, sometimes staff has to go back and forth revising the draft before signed by his/her supervisor. There are no comprehensible formats of *Memo* and *Nota Dinas*; depends on the style and even mood of the supervisors. Consequently, it adds more time to the process of informing leading to what called *Bureaucracy Red Tape*. In addition to such red-tape, electronic means of communication (e.g. email) or oral are not consider as a formal means, culturally and legally. Not only pertained to sensitive related matters/issues, but also this type of communication form is even compelling to the daily affairs in the office.

As for Korea, intra-organizational communication especially horizontal level is very informally conducted: an email or even a telephone call is good enough. Vertical communication for an official outbound letter needs a formal approval process. But for internal decision-making, the process is being either formal or informal depending on the seriousness of the issue.

For internal decision-making, whether it is horizontal or vertical communication, use of electronic means or even a phone call should be encouraged. Such use should be encouraged in the government offices and provided with legal basis. Initially, there should be national/institutional rules in provision of communication means drafted by Lembaga Administrasi Negara. Once it agreed, the implementation should be taking into force 6 months later, considering the time of ratification and socialization in each of the government offices. For the official outbound letter, a formal process should be maintained but electronic approval system should be in place. Such system will save the time spent on the letter and to avoid staff has to go back and forth revising the draft before signed by his/her supervisor.

3.6 Inter-Ministerial Discussion before Cabinet Meeting

In Indonesia, there is a concept of inter-ministerial communication chaired by a Minister of Coordinator (*Menteri Koordinator*)[8], for instance Minister of Coordinator for Economics or Minister of Coordinator for Social Welfare, etc. Nevertheless, there is no formal arena that relevant Ministries get together and have a meaningful discussion before one agenda is forwarded to the cabinet meeting. As a result, inter-ministerial communication is not very active.

In Korea, Vice-Ministers Meeting presided by the Prime Minister's Office is compulsory before an agenda is forwarded to the cabinet meeting. And this is where real negotiation and compromise are happening. An economic issue is discussed in the economy-related vice-ministers meeting, a kind of subcommittee of the VM meeting. A bill that was discussed in the economy-related VM meeting is generally not discussed again in the VM meeting.

The recommendation for Indonesia is Echelon I's Meeting should be formalized before the cabinet meeting. A secretary general or prime secretary can represent his/her ministry, but concerned Deputies can be present too. The Echelon I's Meeting can be chaired by the SETNEG, and we can think of sub-committees chaired by the coordination ministries.

4. Incentive to perform

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[8] Please refer to Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden) Num. 100 Year 2001 regarding Position, Duty, Function, Authority, Organizational Hierarchy and Working System of State Minister of Coordinator. The State Minister of Coordinators is defined as President's assistants under and responsible to the President. They have the job to assist the President in coordinating and synchronizing the policy's preparation and formulation, and its implementation in particular field within state activities.

4.1. Evaluator

In order to assure the objectivity in measuring civil servants' performances, government is implementing work performances evaluation system on daily jobs and duties of a civil servant. The result of such evaluation system is translated into a set of list at the end of each year which called Job Performances Evaluation List (*Daftar Penilaian Pelaksanaan Pekerjaan*-DP3). It is based on Law (Undang-undang) Num.8 Year 1974 as amended by Law (Undang-undang) Num.43 Year 1999 in Article 20 regarding Personnel Specifics: "*To better assure the objectivity on consideration of promotions and grade advancements, thereby should be job performances evaluation*" (Translated). In addition to that, government also issued Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) Num.10 Year 1979 regarding Civil Servants' Job Performances Evaluation.

It is only the boss and the superior who evaluates civil servants. There is no chance to hear from a peer group or the lower staffs. Every year, all civil servants in Indonesia will have what called as DP3 as an instrument to evaluate employee performance during a year conducted by their superior. For instance, the staff and functional position evaluate by deputy director (Echelon III), then deputy director evaluated by director (echelon II), next, director (echelon II) evaluated by deputy (echelon I) and deputy (echelon I) evaluated by the chairman or minister (Highest rank position in each ministry or government agency). So far, this DP3 it is not really shows the real performance of employees. Most of about the items are to measure compliance, loyalty, only a few relations among the employee. This evaluation of performance used for staffs, functional positions either for structural positions. However, this instrument only captured the superior point of views without any feed back to the subordinates which being evaluated. Thus, there is no record for each individual personally to improve their own performance regard to previous evolutions. By the end, there is a chance for subordinates do the same errors.

Since there is no two ways information which mixes between the superior point of views and floor (peer) point of views, evaluation of performance can be misleading, particularly in term of team work of people in their own unit even in echelon II and echelon I levels, then the question is: *"Do superior be able to evaluate and to figure out what are really happen in their intern unit without any peer evaluations?"* Therefore, this current system become visible for unfair evaluation by the superior based on his or her favoritism of their personal judgment. And the other things are people tend to compete in no appropriate way just because they want to have good evaluation, try hardly to please their superiors. As result, there are opportunities to make such nepotism, favoritism, collusion and gratification by the end these tricks bring people to corrupt.

This system will discourage people to do something significant, innovative, creative, since there are no guarantees of balance evaluations of their performances. As a result, the problem related with the evaluator is not about mechanism or method in evaluation of evaluators but it either related with willingness of the evaluator in giving the real score based on the fact. Just because, the person who is being evaluated much senior than the evaluator, the evaluator is being hesitated to evaluate them in the real performance. Thus, the evaluation performance is being useless.

Meanwhile, if we look at to the Korean Experience related with mechanism of evaluation by the evaluator, they using the 360 degree multi-dimensional evaluation as a very often practiced in a Ministry. However, the result is only used for reference and self-improvement, but not officially used for personnel decisions such as appointment, promotion. However, at first, there is a cynical view that a multi-dimensional evaluation is just a popularity test, but it has proved that when the result is a good way of seeing oneself from a more objective and critical perspective.

There are some points need to consider by the Indonesian Governments ass follow: (1) Introduce a multi-dimension evaluation, but it should be independent from any personnel decision. The result should be provided to individual so that he can have his own improvement plan. By doing this, employee will have reference to improve their performance, which part that they need to improve, which part that they need to keep on that and which part that should be eliminated to increase their performance. By the end they can avoid persist errors. (2) We should differentiate the relative weight of each evaluator, and together with score. There needs to be a written evaluation comment for evaluated. This deed needs to be done to differentiate evaluations based on position and relation of people who give those evaluations. For instance, among the employee they evaluate their associates related with their team work, their cooperation, and their responsibility of job of team work, their attitudes during working as a team, then their contributions as a team mates. In other hands, the superior evaluation more related with their

authority of their subordinates in term of employee performance both substantively and administratively. (3) To eliminate the hesitations of people in peer evaluation, there is should be guarantee that what they write in their evaluation is secret and only for whom have right to have it.

4.2. Performance Criteria

Eight of nine performance criteria are about attitude such as loyalty, honesty, discipline… and there is an only one performance criterion, achievement. Current evaluation performance instrument (DP3) only shows number such as from 10-100 about scoring performance of individual which divided within categories of evaluation as such compliance, loyalty, ability to in relationship with other party, and so on. And each category fill by scored from 10-100 based on the evaluator (superiors) judgments without any diverse opinion from the peers. And this evaluation performance submitted to the Department of Human Resources Development in each ministry as a reference for them increasing the employees' salaries within certain time, usually every 2 years'. But, actually this evaluation of performance criteria didn't really describe about their real performance. There is no significantly different among employees who have strong performance and poor performances. As long as they do in general way, they will pass it.

Even though, for functional positions there are certain criterions to evaluate their performance based on they earned on numbers credits requirements for certain grades, still as the matter of fact it is not shows they real performances in qualitative, for quantitative may be yes, since they can earned required credits for their grades, but for qualitative it can be totally different than what is shows in quantitative performance. For instance, let say lecturer is one of functional position. As quantitative she/he already successfully earned credits required, and then move to the next grades, "do we can say that if there is an improvement on her or his quality in teaching, researching related with his or her expertise?"

Most of performance evaluation done by the superior is about employee compliance of the superior willingness (both substantive and administrative). Meanwhile, there is no precisely indicator or criteria to measure about their performance in term of substantive matters and administrative matters. Even if there is a performance evaluation related with administrative and substantive matters, this performance evaluation measured as unit performance. For instance, performance evaluation of substantive matters measured by budget absorption on each term of budget year compare with the physical achievement of each term, there is no further evaluation about the outcome of the output of that budget year. As long as they can fulfill what the budgeting administrative requirement asks, it is enough. But the question is*: "is it enough to evaluate the performance only based on physically evidences to meet the budget administrative requirements, without any further monitoring of the outcome of the output?", "Does this measurement be able to measure both quantitative and qualitative performance of employees?*

So far, performance of individuals both qualitative and quantitative didn't announce as rewards for those who achieve the highest performance. As result, employee lack of motivation to performance well since there is no reward on it.

Performance bias in such evaluation might happen when the evaluator like or dislike the manner of the individual. Hence, those who liked by the supervisor will grade positively on the entire aspect of performances and oppositely for those in appalling manners. Another example of bias would be the state of the evaluator to play safe without giving highest or lowest score to individuals resulting in mostly average and identical scores among employees. In addition, there has been major critique on the use of DP3 as performance evaluation, which is only the latest year considered for regular grade advancement; not the years prior to it. The requirements of only last year DP3 scores means that only the third year scores considered, without giving any weight on the historical records of scores in the subsequent years (the first and second years). Such regulation is explicated in Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) Num.3 Year 1980: "*Regular grade advancement for one higher grade above previous grade could be given to civil servant following 4 years of its previous grade; and a minimum score categorized as good for each of performance evaluation criteria in the last year.*"

In the other hand, Korean Experience show that the evaluation criteria for director or above: A minister can choose one of the three evaluation categories, achievement rate for individual performance target, leadership and performance of the unit (Directorate or Bureau), and job competency. Therefore, the evaluation criteria are different depending on the rank and position.

Based on the Indonesian status quo in performance criteria and Korean experience, There are three recommendations for Indonesian Government as follow: (1) There should be a balance, for instance, among attitude (40%), competency (30%), and performance (30%). Among 100% scores, proportion among attitude, competency and performance should be balance since these 3 items being unity for best synergy. However, after determine the proportion the next step is to define derivatives criteria for each 3 main criteria. (2) The government should develop standard criteria for each echelon and staffs, and let each ministry modify the standard to its situation. Every institution has their own uniqueness based on their main duties regard to this Government needs to develop the general standard criteria that can be measured, achievable, vividly, for each echelon and staffs which divided within certain categories. In this respect, there should be solid coordination among government institution associated with job such as LAN, BKN, and MENPAN. These three organizations will coordinate, planning, creating, monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the criteria and pooling the input from each ministry about their own modification of this standard. (3) This change should be implemented a year after the announcement. Every progressive change should be implemented as soon as possible, a year after the announcement it very reasonable timing otherwise it will lose it moment and everything will be useless and everybody will lose their motivation and courage to make any progress, even worst they will forget about it, if it delayed for long time.

4.3. Absolute vs. Relative Performance Evaluation

The absolute performance evaluation cannot point out the bad or good performer. The convention that one is expected to get the higher evaluation points than the previous year makes the evaluation system even more useless. Meanwhile higher evaluation point is not merely reflecting the real performance. It becomes a common mistake so far, performance evaluation based on DP3 of most people show evaluation point increasing every year. As the matter of fact not all employee can perform well every year. That should be normal distribution which shows the real performance of each employee.

There should be introducing relative performance evaluation which can capture widely range of employee performance not only based on scoring as absolute performance evaluation but also in qualitative ways depends on their relative achievement within performance. In this respect, there will be varies performances of employees.

So far, individual performance totally separate purpose with unit or department performance. And the instrument to measure this either different and there is no bridge to describe connection between personal performance with unit and department performance. If personnel performance evaluation conducted in term of count the raise of gradual salary of each personnel every two years, but for unit or department performance evaluation made to fill administrative accountability of budget absorption of each echelon II and Echelon I unit.

However, there is no link between personnel performance evaluation and unit or department performance evaluation, since there are totally different purposes and mechanism and evaluator of these performances. If personnel performance evaluation purposes for internal organization either the evaluator come from internal organization. In other hand, performance evaluation for unit or department performance evaluation conducted by external evaluator such as BPKP and BPK.

Performance evaluations of functional positions are conducted by fostering institutions which have specialization expertise authorities in term of standard requirement for certain functional position. For instance, researcher functional position performance evaluation in each government institution is conducted by LIPI to decided whether the researcher earned required credits needed by their grades or not. If they so, then the researcher can stay in their position and within 2 years they will have increasing in their grade, faster than regular grades for those who do not have functional positions.

So far, even if there is a link between performances evaluation of regularly for every employee with their functional position performance evaluation only to determine their regular grades and their incentives. However, there is no correlation between those two evaluation performances in term of outcome of these people. It seems that each instrument walk on their on track without any point to meet.

Meanwhile, if we look at to The Korean Experiences have so far, they adopts relative evaluation scheme: for performance salary, for instance, Excellent (20%), Outstanding (30%), Average (40%), Understandable (10%) with fixed ratio for each.

There are some recommendations for The Indonesian Government, as follow: (1) a relative evaluation scheme should be introduced in a gradual manner. One suggestion is S (20%), A (70%), B (10%). (2) One may introduce the evaluation on the team and relate it with the individual evaluation. For instance, better performing directorate can have S (30%), A (65%), B (5%) whereas low performing directorate should have S (15%), A (70%), B (15%). (3) With this reform, the old custom requiring score improvement every year will be discarded since the evaluation is based on relative judgment. (4) To produce synergy performance of institution, it may create link between personnel performance and unit or department performance. Eventually, it will create competition between personnel and institution. The other thing is to create link between regularly personnel performance evaluation conducted by internal organization with functional position performance evaluation conducted by fostering institutions of functional positions.

4.4. Performance Payment

Since the performance evaluation does not have financial rewards, people tend to think: "When there is no consequence, why bother to make people unhappy?" there is no other non-monetary compensation either. This situation makes people less motivated, since there is no differentiate reward between hard worker and lazy worker, between outstanding employees with minimum standard employees. Only person who have strong motivated and idealism can live with this situation, but the question is **"For how long they can stand with this situation?"**

Even though, there is effort from MENPAN Institution to make pilot project by increased some ministries employee salary and allowances in term of improve their productivity. But, the problem is how long this project will be running, how about other ministries, and how about budget constraint? This situation make discrepancy of salary among public servant in the same grades, just because they working in different ministry. For long term this situation will not good for coordination between ministries. Ministries with lower salary and allowance will less their motivation by the end they will less productivity.

So far, if there is an increasing salary every year, the percentages of this, merely only based on performance of annually budget. Mostly the increasing is not significant with the inflation rate. Thus, even though, salary has increased, still in term of standard of living there is not much change.

Increasing salary or allowance for Indonesian Public Servants being very sensitive issue since it related with budget constraint either political will. Sometime, the incumbent political leader using this issues as their campaign commodities to attract the voters. The other thing, this issue also can create resistance due to high visibility.

In Indonesian case, the gap salary among grades it is not much different, but amount of allowances of each grades and between structural and functional position and staffs are much different.

In this respect, it is really necessary to set up the cumulative salary with minimize difference between grades performance on the annual performance salary for each ministry. And also the cumulative allowance either with minimize difference among grades and positions.

If we look at the Korean Experience, director or above gets cumulative annual performance salary (distributed monthly): 0% (bottom 10% of the evaluation), 3% (40%, 5% (30%), 7% (top 20%) of the basic annual salary >>> internal resistance.

There are some recommendations for the Indonesian Government, as follow:

(1) The cumulative salary with minimize differences (say, if 5% is the average rate of increase, 4%, 5%, 6% increase) should be implemented first to the current salary adjustment system in every two years. Off course this idea should be considering about budget constraint and inflation rate as well. (2) Cumulative allowance annual performance should be set up as well, to limit the discrepancy among which those have structural or functional allowance with the ordinary staffs which only have general staff allowance, meanwhile their weight of job much or less same with person who have functional position. (3) We do not recommend the non-cumulative performance pays because it needs extra budget, and creates more resistance due to high visibility. Without cumulative

performance pays, it is means there is not limitation, and it is not good for annual budget performance. Therefore, it should cumulative performance pays to avoid resistance due to visibility.

4.5. Automatic Advancement Every Four Years

A civil servant can automatically advance one step in the rank system every four years. Though there is a test between grades (I-I, II-III), it is only a rubber stamp. There is advancement delay provision for the low performer; however, it almost never works. This system will spoil unperformed employees, they can easily and enjoyed automatically advance every four years without much efforts. Even though, their performance is could be totally different with persons who did hard work during their job. However, within this system there is not much different. Virtually, this system will decrease motivation of young, intelligent and hardworking employees which give much energy but anyway they have same treatment as employee who only working less productively than others.

In future, beside minimum tenure requirement which should be hold by person who will get advancement, they also need to go through competition for advancement. In Indonesia, this system already applied in Bank Indonesia (BI) – Indonesia Central Bank. However, this system didn't use yet in other government institution. In BI, to go through the advancement people should be pass the required test need for the next grades. If they do not pass the test they will stay in their current grades until their retirement. In BI, if there is a vacant position even it for strategic position, they do open recruitment to other department or even outside organization, only best candidates will get that position. Once again, this system didn't use in other government organization.

Nevertheless, there has also been control mechanism applying in Indonesian namely Grade Advancement Apposite Test (*Ujian Penyesuaian Kenaikan Pangkat*). Please refer to Law (Undang-undang) Num. 8 Year 1974 regarding Civil Servants Principals Jo. Law (Undang-undang) Num. 43 Year 1999 and Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) Num. 99 Year 2000 regarding Civil Servant Grade Advancement Jo. Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) Num. 12 Year 2002. The test is mandatory for those who already have a Bachelor Degree and wish to have an automatic advancement. Another problem with this system is that not only sometimes it is just a matter of formality, but also it opens door for nepotism. There are many cases in some government institutions where civil servants should pay certain amount of money in order to pass the test. Actually, the government of Indonesia has the possibility to enhance the current system of test to go for grade advancement. Nevertheless, there should be some additional check and balance mechanisms within the system to ensure the transparency and accountability of the system.

In other hand, if we look at the Korean Experience shows that in each ministry have a cap number of civil servants for each grade set by MOPAS. Since the cap is generally binding, the one who fulfills the minimum tenure requirement should also go through competition for advancement.

The some recommendation for the Indonesian Government, as follow: (1) in each public organization, annually at least some candidates should not be allowed advancement. For those who get the lowest evaluation category 3-4 times out of 4 years, advancement should be delayed. Only 5% possibility of advancement delay will change the culture a lot. This strategy will make all employees 'wake up' and try to show their best performance. Since there is no guarantee for them to have automatically advancement, to achieve that they need to fulfill not only minimum requirement for the next grades but also should be pass from the test needed for their advancement. (2) **This** Policy should be implemented after a new evaluation system is introduced. If there is no political will from the leaders and organization as whole to implement this breakthrough, good idea only stay inside of drawers without knowing the impact or changes caused of it. And it will lose it moment, finally people will forget it.

5. Training

5.1. Pre-Service Training

As the recruitment process is all decentralized, the pre-service training is also decentralized. As a result, there are no economies of scale in the training, and no chance to get to know officials in the other Ministries. Since the pre-service training has two years of grace period, sometimes it is done too late.

According to Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden) Num.5 Year 1996, pre-service training is defined as training required to be appointed as civil servants. Appointed as constructor for pre-service training is LAN whereby functionally responsible for coordination, provision, execution, as well as supervision. It is also explicated in the regulation that LAN is responsible for pre-service training of Grade III; meanwhile each of government institutions is responsible for Grade I and II by which the decentralization of pre-service training is happening. Even though it is the responsibility of LAN for Grade III, yet still each of the institutions should provide the substantial subjects to be integrated in the training.

Pre-service training conducted so far only for 1-2 months. The courses in pre-service training focused on how to build loyalty, patriotism, and basic knowledge of public service. All material provided in general knowledge for all public servants. Meanwhile, to give new entrants basic knowledge about their own institution, usually before or after pre-service training some institution provide additional short training for their own new entrants which separate from pre-service training and they even give them 3 months of apprenticeship by tour of duty in every their main unit. This system already did in some government institution such as LAN, DEPLU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), BIN (National Intelligent Agency), LIPI, BPKP and some other government institution but not whole and it is not formally set up as national regulation for all new entrants, it is only based on the initiatives and needed of each ministry to support their new entrants by knowledge of their institution.

Since all training for public servants decentralized exemption solitary for SPATI (Training for those who will be promoting as echelon I or already hold echelon I position) conducted only by LAN. It is will be better to conduct the pre-service training merely by LAN, because LAN has expertise more than any government institution in Indonesia in term of training for public servant. Instead of providing the material for courses in pre-service training it will be better if LAN plays role as centre of pre-service training for whole new entrants public servants in central governments. Before the new entrants are dispatched to line ministries.

In contrast, if we look at to The Korean Experiences, KOTI provides 6 months of pre-service training for new entrants in the central government, after which they are dispatched to line Ministries. And In each Ministry, a new entrant goes through 3 months of apprenticeship.

As recommendations, there are some point need to be considered by the Indonesian government : (1) LAN conducts 3-6 months of basic pre-service training, after which they are sent to line ministry's training center for additional 1-3 months of specialized pre-service training should be conducted by LAN depends on the recruiting system. (2) It would be better if the specialized pre-service training can be conducted right after the basic pre-service training. But we can leave the current system as it is, and only add the basic training before the placement.

5.2. Structural Training

Whereas the structural training for echelon I & II is conducted by LAN, those for echelon III & IV are done by the Training Centers in each ministry, and LAN only accredits the program by each centers. However, whether each Centre provides necessary competency training remains a questions.

According to Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) Num. 14 Year 1994, structural training is defined as training required for civil servants who are going to be appointed in structural positions. There are 3 (three) kinds of structural training: SPAMA (Training for those who will be promoting as echelon I or already hold echelon III and IV position), SPAMEN (Training for those who will be promoting as echelon I or already hold echelon II position) and SPATI (Training for those who will be promoting as echelon I or already hold echelon I position).

In most case, structural training provided for those who will be predicted hold the structural position in the future; however, now it already change most of people who take that training are people who hold the structural position before they take their structural training.

The problem is there so many people who already took that training before hold the structural position didn't promote into structural position as structural training they took for that position. As a result they seem like person who waiting the up line player in the bench seats.

Training only provided for those who really need it to support their job by considered on their training hours per year. Not for create player to sit in bench seats. There should be matching between training purposes and job requirements. Just because this person already achieve certain grade it doesn't mean this person should take certain training, if there is no follow up of this training in the future, it will be useless. Furthermore, it doesn't mean if you already achieve certain grade, can be automatically having training without showing your performance, it will be useless. It means you choose the wrong person for training.

Meanwhile, based on Korean Experience, KOTI provides a structural training before director level, and the structural training for the higher level is out-sourced.

Based on the status quo of the Indonesian government and the Korean Experience, there are some recommendation for the Indonesian Government, as follow: (1) LAN needs to develop the competency analysis for echelon III and IV in general. LAN's accreditation criteria should follow the result of this study. (Action plan I of the LAN). Since there is no clarity define between competency analysis of echelon III and echelon IV. In practice, competency for both echelon pretty much same, the thing that make this two echelons different is minimum grade required for this two echelon. Minimum grade for echelon IV is III b and minimum requirement grades for echelon III is III c. (2) the competency analysis may be discussed or jointly conducted with BKN. (3) Part of the structural training for echelon III and IV will have to follow the guidance made by LAN whereas the other part will be subject to the special needs of each ministry.

5.3. Competency-Based Training

For each position, there should be a list of competency and training subjects so that one can find his needed training area after examining the competency gap of his own. Mostly, there is no human resource to hand the responsibility. As the matter of facts, is being human resources development department job in each ministry to make a list of competency and training subjects. So there is matching between competency requirement and training subject. Virtually, it will increase productivity of every unit within organization.

The problem is very rare to find HRD department which doing this, most of case they simply arrange of training for every budget year, without make preliminary research about training needed by organization. Most of training they arrange based on their own judgment not based on the real need of organization. Thus, in much case, they training program not much help improving employee competency in general, since there is no match between job requirement and training program provided by HRD department.

What the HRD Department need to do is to ask each unit within organization to make list of training they needed which is really necessary to support performance of that unit. And then each unit submitted they list to the HRD Department. The next process is, HRD make list of training of the year based on input from each unit and then match it with the budget available.

Therefore, what HRD Department planning for a year, meets the organization needs of training. Meanwhile, regard to the Korean Experience, some ministries had job analysis, and formulated required competency in each position. However, training does not fully reflect the competency analysis due to the conflict between training and work.

Consider to the Indonesian Status Quo and the Korean Experience, there are some recommendations, as follow: (1) As a pilot study, LAN conducts competency analysis in major positions in LAN, and formulates a list of necessary training from which one can choose his needed training areas. (Action Plan II of the LAN). (2) After the analysis of the pilot study, LAN can require the same process for each Ministry. LAN may include the compliance of this CB training in the accreditation criteria. (3) LAN needs to train the personnel in each ministry who handle CB training.

Table 3. Elements of Job Analysis in Korea

Evaluation Factors			Contents
Inputs	Knowledge	Depth and Breath of Knowledge	Specialized knowledge, skills and techniques

			required to do a given job
		Planning and Organizing	Requirements of jobs for planning and organizing
		Communicating and Influencing	Requirements within jobs for working with, and through, others to achieve end results
Process	Problem Solving	Extent of considerations	The scope of the rules, instructions or policies to considers to define issues
		Challenge	The complexity and variety of the tasks that one is required to tackle and the extent to which innovation and originality are necessary
Outcomes	Accountability	Level of empowerment	The extent to which one can make decisions within limits defined by rules, policies, precedent, or senior direction
		Job Scope	The scopes and magnitudes of the job
		Impact	The impact of the job and the area of the organization upon which the job has an impact

5.4. Long-term Training and the Advancement

The years spent in long term training are currently fully counted for the advancement, but it should be regulated in its scope and limits. Long-term training should be facilitated but not be abused. In many cases, in term of long term training which can be divided into degree and non degree programs. Then, in term of founded can be divided into self founded by the employee in this respect we called it as study permit (ijin belajar). And the other one is institution funded for study on duty (tugas belajar) usually this long term training conducted in domestic education institutions. And the last one is founded by other institution, in this respect, institution only gives permit and administrative supported for those who have scholarship by other parties. This type categorized as study on duty.

Long term training founded by other parties usually for study in overseas, mostly employee can finish their study right on time based on sponsorship regulation in term of scholarship. In other hand, for study permit, it will be different case, since they founded their own study, so length of study freely based on their own decisions and will. Meanwhile, for long-term training founded by institution, even though there are regulation of limitation of length of study, but still there are many case which employees can not finish their study right on time. The punishment only related founded. The institution will stop their finance support after 2 years for master degree programs and for PhD programs they will stop financial support after 5 years of study.

However, there is no other punishment of delayed of length of study periods. It still fully counted for advancements. The other thing related with this long-term training is about these people post after finished their study. There is no clarity regulation mentioned about do these people will come back on their origin post or will be placed on other department based on vacant positions. This situation will make a new problem, since it related with job rotation and job placement of employee. In future, The HRD Department needs to arrange about planning of job placement for those who finished their long-term training based on their field of study, performance records, expertise and considering whether these people come from staffs position or functional position or structural position, because it related with their career path and plan.

For the meantime, based on the Korean Experience, Official dispatch period is fully counted towards the advancement, but only up to 2 years. And there is also a limit in the number of those who are officially dispatched every year. For that reason, in order to be 'officially dispatch', one needs to get Ministry's recommendation, and then go through Test Administered by the MOPAS.

Regard to the Indonesian status quo and the Korean Experiences, there are some recommendations, as follow: (1) Each ministry reviews the appropriateness of the official dispatch (applicant's performance, areas of study etc), and grants only up to 2 years for MA, and 4 years for Ph.D., after which one's long-term training does not contribute to his advancement. This limitation will make employee more responsibility on their study, since after which one's long-term training does not contribute to their advancement. Employee is more careful because there is regulation that forces them physiologically to finish their study promptly with certain performance requirement. So far, there is no standard need to be fulfilled by the employees who have long-term training associated with their academic performance. People who have scholarship from other party much likely be careful than people who have scholarship from their own organization. Since the scholarship regulation from other party stricter than internal organization. (2) This policy should be applied to new applicants for the long-term training, not for those who are already on absence of leave. Because, those are who already on absence of leave reference on previous regulation. In other hand, new applicants will reference on new regulation which including this new regulation. (3) The other thing is about job placement for those who just finished their long-term training. It is really need to consider about their field of study, performance records, expertise, their previous position or post, since it related with their career path and career plan.

5.5. Competition among Training Centers

Each ministry runs training centers, which has a monopolistic power. There is no competition among training centers or with private providers such as universities, and this lowers motivation of each center to perform better. In each ministry or other government agency there must be a training centers. LAN as fostering institution in term of training for public servants, so far didn't published their evaluation on each government training centers or private providers which conducting training for public servants.

The other thing is each government institution runs training centers as monopoly powers, in this respect there is no competition among training centers, thus there is no innovation created, there is no knowledge spillover among them, by the end these training centers will be lack innovations, lack of creativity, lack of productivity, less motivation since there is no challenges. There is no positive externality among them.

For the time being, based on the Korean Experiences, an individual can take a training credit either from COTI (Central Official's Training Institute) or from Training centers in each ministry or from private providers. MOPAS approves the eligibility of training courses offered by private providers.

As recommendation for the Indonesian Government in section are: (1) an individual should freely take a course from the training centers in the other ministries. Chosen of courses are depending on needs and which institution can provide that service. It is not depending on merely favoritism institutions just because they have monopoly power, but expertise on certain related subject (competency of institution) being the main prioritize. (2) LAN should evaluate the curriculum of each training centers and their operation, and make a press release the result of the evaluation. It will encourage them to perform well by introducing competition among training centers.

There have been no detail regulations on evaluation of government training centers, except financially which performed under The Audit Board of Republic of Indonesia (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan-BPK). Hence, in order to

evaluate the curriculum of each training centers and their operation, which fall under LAN's authority, it should be legislated in the form of Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden) to give apparent authority for LAN and to ensure the introduction of the competition system among training centers.

5.6. Minimum Requirement for Training Hours

Since there is no minimum requirement for annual training hours, a director tends to deter the training needs of staffs. Therefore, in order to make employee have changes to improve their skills and other cognitive knowledge it is necessary to set up minimum requirement for training hours a years. By doing this, it will bring beneficiary for both sides superiors and subordinates. For superior by this setting they will not miss their 'crews' during the rapid times, since training needs set up within certain training hours, for instance in the range of 50 to 100 hours in a years. And there is flexibility in schedule based working loading unit. So both sides will gain on this system. There are cases happening to most of Indonesia's civil servants whereby their superior did not allow going to training because of the lack of personnel in the office. By putting certain minimum training hours for employees, it is expected that it would be one of consideration to be taken by both employees and their supervisors.

In Korea, an individual below the position of directors should take 100 hours a year and for a promotion to a director level, fulfill the minimum requirement is a must

As recommendations, there are some points need to be considering by the Indonesian Government: (1) Depending on the training need of each organization, each ministry sets the minimum training hours a year. The range of the minimum can be from 50 to 100. This setting needs to consider about type of training related with duration of training. This setting is not only about time, but also about sustainability of this training in the future. For instance, training for researcher in beginner level starts in 100 hours a year. After this step, then continue into the intermediate level with duration around 50 to 70 hours, and then advance level in duration of 50 to 70 hours a year or depend on need of the job specifications. (2) The LAN needs to evaluate the training performance of each ministry considering the minimum requirement and its implementation. Before evaluate this step, first able, LAN need to determine standard minimum requirement for each position such as structural positions, functional position by coordination with related fostering institutions, and also for staff position in general.

5.7. LAN's Internal Reform

The three pillars of the LAN, research divisions, training divisions, universities can create more positive synergy effect. Somewhat there is collaboration among three pillars, however it didn't fully utilized since there is self-image of each pillar. Beside, cooperation there is also competition among these pillars. However, this situation can be bridging by relation among people who involve in these pillars. Since most of activities of these pillars involved the same people, so this synergy facilitated by exchange of information and knowledge and 'job opportunities' or side jobs among them in term of providing services in this three pillars.

But the problem is most research products didn't maximize utilized as reference study both in universities and training activities, and this situation either changeable among them. Since research output is rarely published by press release or other promoting media. So, most people didn't know what research unit done so far. Only a few, which is always regularly publish their output and share with both internal and external organizations. In this respect, it is very limit of institution support in term of publicity.

There is no formal bridging which facilitated the exchange of information and knowledge spillover among these three pillars within organization either one of reason why this collaboration didn't maximize as a synergy.

Meanwhile, if we look to the Korean Experiences, since Korea's KOTI (training) and KIPA (research) are two separate entities, there are not so much exchanges, which is problem. In the other hand, KDI (research) and KDI School (training and graduate school) is similar to LAN, but there is not enough cooperation between the two. However, there are good synergy effects between short-term training program and the graduate program within KDIS. (KDIS has three associate deans: degree programs, non-degree programs, and planning and management.)

As recommendations, there some points need to be considered by the LAN, as follow: (1) more research products need to be taught to the trainees and more research topic should come from training activities. It should be

encourages for LAN members to work on both research and teaching (training and lecture). (2) More publicity of research output it is really necessary, so then people will know about research progress done by LAN. Therefore, if this research products relevant, significant and create new ideas, innovative, creative and applicable for those concern with this products, it will be automatically utilized in very wide range not only internal LAN but also external parties. (3) In the long run, LAN needs to consider two possible models as in the following page.

Table 4. A COMPARISON OF TWO MODELS

	(Research + Training) + Universities	Research + (Training + University)
Case	LAN	KDI + KDI School
+	(1) Synergy between research and training; (2) Academic independence of the university	(1) Synergy between training and academic programs including facilities (2) Clear division of roles
_	(1) Mix of research and training may blur the mandate (2) University can be somewhat isolated from the government	(1) Not enough interaction between KDI and KDIS (2) University has to respect the training need of the government
Task	(1) Justification of the universities under LAN (2) Synergy b/w research-training	(1) Justification of marriage b/w research + teaching

6. Bureaucracy Reform System

Currently, MENPAN has already prepared 8 (eight) law drafts consist of Public Services Law Draft, State Ministries Law Draft, Government Administration Law Draft, State Administrator Ethics Law Draft, State Employees Draft Law, Authority Arrangement between Central and Regional Law Draft, Company and Non-Government Organizations Law Draft, and National Monitoring System Law Draft. Those drafts nowadays are in the process of formulation by experts and expected to be able to harmonize and synergize internal, functional and community monitoring system. Specifically for Government Administration Draft Law, it has been the initiative of the government since 2004. The draft is one of the law instruments for bureaucracy reform in Indonesia as well as closing the access for corruption, collusion and nepotism. The draft itself contains government administration authority, discretion, and procedures. For instance, in procedures, it is going to be regulated that public officials should be neutral and hearing people's opinions in decision making.

6.1. The Institutional Arrangement for Reform

Though a bureaucracy reform will entail a lot of resistance from the line Ministries, MENPAN has no allies in the government. Many of the plans are not respected either by line ministries or the Parliament. Since political reform movement in 1998 emerged as a new spirit of Indonesian democracy life, one of the reform agenda is government reform. However, euphoria of democracy movement has abused the primary agenda of reform. Prejudice and less social capital among Indonesian has been widely spread into relation among political actors and bureaucracy. As result, political instability is being common scenery in Indonesian political life. As result, built trust foundation among Indonesian is being a huge job, even now.

Reformation movement only stays in a place if people didn't cooperation to make it happen or there is no single focus about reform direction. The primary problem within Indonesian bureaucracy now is every government organization busy with their own agenda in reformation, there is no synergy among ministries and other government organization, each ministry or even local government running their own reformation in their version based on their concern. Even if there is some kind of meeting cross ministries level and other government organization which discussed about bureaucracy reform but still it didn't implement yet about what is the real Indonesian bureaucracy reform agenda made by government.

Therefore, when now days MENPAN or Ministry of Administrative Reform as Institution which has mandate from the President to formulate and to coordinate any kind of efforts for bureaucracy reform faced a lot of resistance from line ministries even for the parliament members. Even worst, many of the plans are not respected either by line ministries or the Parliament. Thus, MENPAN has no allies in the government.

Resistances from many line ministries and the parliament members because there is some anxiousness on their organizations authority will be reduced or even their organization will be merged with other ministries or other government organization if these bureaucracy reforms will be implemented.

Since there is no massive coordination among government organizations about bureaucracy reform agenda, monitoring the progress of the meeting continuously, and commitment of the meeting participants about continuously and visibility of the meeting in the future implementation has been made the previous meeting or discussed about the bureaucracy reform less support from any government institution including line ministries and parliament members.

In other hand, there are so many technical assistance from international organizations such as GTZ and ADB and other which tried to assist the Indonesian government in term of bureaucracy reform still didn't come out with the specific time frame, strategy even action plan which is applicable and visible for Indonesian bureaucracy reform. Even though most of the these assistances coordinated by Ministry of Administrative Reform with other ministries, but still the result of these assistances look as if they are running in their own track without synergy with results from other which come up as a single agenda of Indonesian bureaucracy reform.

In addition, it is very necessary to maintain the support of allies by intensively approach to any ministries or other government institution to secure their support on Ministry of Administrative Reform. And also it is really needed to have more authority to exercise that approach through reward and punishment to the related ministries. Without clarity in exercise the reward and punishment it is really difficult to have cooperation and compliance from other ministries, particularly for those who have more power than Ministry of Administrative Reform.

The other things are since Ministry Administrative Reform founded there are no continuously of their previous, current and future programs on bureaucracy reforms. The bureaucracy reforms formulation always changes depends on political will. Because this ministry led by minister which is come from political party, so then their content of formulation of bureaucracy reforms made by what the political power views at the moment. In other words, we can say that: "Different President, different programs". There is one of the weaknesses of bureaucracy reforms process in Indonesia. Since most of minister or other government organization leaders come from political party is very difficult to meet what bureaucracy concern with the political leaders concerns within government about their agenda in bureaucracy reforms.

Bureaucracy leader position in terms of authority is less strong compare with authority of political leaders within government. Meanwhile bureaucracy is the main engine of government activities. It is will be better in the future, if most ministers also come from bureaucrats (career civil servants) which have experiences in government, so they are not merely come from political party. Ultimately, continuously of critical government program has chance to be continued for the next elected government.

Meanwhile if we look to the Korean experience, in order to strengthen the reform drive, Presidential Committee for Government Reform was established both under President Kim (1998-2003) and Roh (2003-2008). To implement this reform agenda, the Chairpersons were appointed among notable scholars versed in the government reform. The members are major Ministers related with the bureaucracy reform, and notable specialists in the academia and private sector. Institutionally, the major reform driving Ministries come from MPB under KIM and MOGAHA

under Roh played a role of the secretariat of the committee. Through this Presidential Committee for bureaucracy, President Can fully monitoring the bureaucracy reform program progress. In other hand, for the driving force ministry has full access to the President to help them just in case they need President Support to make approach to the powerful ministries.

Lesson learned from the Korean experience, as recommendation MENPAN needs a Presidential Committee for Bureaucracy Reform, benchmarking Korean case, and should play a secretariat for the committee. The other recommendation is there is should be strong political will and commitment to make reformation movements, continuously and integrated plans with specific time frame and strategic action plan which involve all ministries and all government organization at the same time and publish every progress to the public, so then there is physiological forces by the media by the process to the involvement ministries to their commitment.

6.2. Internal Organization of MENPAN

Current organizational chart of MENPAN shows more emphasis on the management of the bureaucracy than on the reform of it. All the deputies and directors have their own specified duties on bureaucracy management, and as a result, there is no one in MENPAN whose job is to think about 'what to reform?''. Since there is no particular unit in MENPAN which has main duty is to think about 'what to reform' as a result there is no clarity direction in determine which is unit has responsibility in coordinate all kind of reform plan actions. Therefore these action plans has no permanent umbrella to cover all duties related with the reform plans made by the MENPAN Institutions. Even if there is a unit who has responsible to coordinate of reform plans in MENPAN, but still so far they do it as a side job not a main job, because current organizational chart of MENPAN shows more emphasis on the management of the bureaucracy than on the reform of it. All the deputies and directors have their own specified duties on bureaucracy management. So the next question is; *"how come they will focus on reform plan, or to think about reform plan, meanwhile they are too busy with their daily routine jobs in management of the bureaucracy than on to reform it?"*

Regard to Korean experience, the government reform office under President Kim, Dae-Jung had 8 divisions with very wide jurisdiction of responsibility. Since there was no pre-assigned specific duties, division directors were searching for their reform agenda, like hunter. This kind of actions is actually needs to do by the Indonesian Government: being active, aggressive, analytical and critical to the status quo, and then innovative, progressive, have courage to implement the plans.

As recommendations, MENPAN needs a Deputy or Director who has no pre-assigned responsibility. A more fundamental recommendation would be a matrix organization. Then, MENPAN may have to focus on the 'steering role' of reform empowering BKN with more 'rowing role'.

Below is the proposal made by the author for a new organizational chart for MENPAN as driving force in bureaucracy reform process.

Table 5. Proposal for a New Organizational Chart for MENPAN

Deputy for Institution		Deputy for Apparatus HRD		Deputy for Management		Deputy for Accountability		Deputy for Public Service		Deputy for Monitoring	

Among the 12 divisions, 2 (two) are directly under each Deputy focus on 'what to reform'. The Deputies are jointly in charge of 20 lower Divisions regarding his area.

The lower 20 divisions manage the ministry in all 6 bureaucracy areas (institution + HRD + management + accountability + public service + monitoring), and check the reform implementation of the ministry. They get an order from 6 different Deputies depending on the agenda.

Division for ministry 1	Division for ministry 5,6	Division for ministry 12, 13	Division for ministry 20,21	Division for 28, 29
Division for ministry 2	Division for ministry 7,8	Division for ministry 14, 15	Division for ministry 22, 23	Division for ministry 30, 31
Division for ministry 3	Division for ministry 9,10	Division for ministry 16, 17	Division for ministry 24, 25	Division for ministry 32, 33
Division for ministry 4	Division for ministry 11,12	Division for ministry 18, 19	Division for ministry 26, 27	Division for other agencies

6.3. Members of MENPAN

All the members in MENPAN are career civil servants, which makes it hard to push reform agenda that generate strong resistance from the civil service. Even though, in MENPAN there are specialists who hired for their expertise advises, but still the final decision is in the minister hands. So, their existences didn't give much driving forces since their jobs only to give expertise opinions without any authority. In other hand, based on Korean experience, the Government Reform Office (1998-2003) under Ministry of Planning and Budget recruited many specialists from the private sector and quasi-public sector: the head of the Office (Echelon 1), 4 out of 8 Directors as contract-based civil servants. And those newly-recruited members had much higher motivation for reform and created a good synergy effects with the career civil servants. But, the next question is how Korean government utilizes these newly recruited members to motivate the reform process and what kind of synergy effect that they produced with the career civil servants. Also what kind of strategies and authorities those newly recruited have to make driving forces for the reform process? Thus, this lesson learned could be applicable for Indonesian case.

Actually, MENPAN already did it, not only specialist hired by MENPAN but also specialist founded by International Organization cooperation such as GTZ and ADB However, the problems with that are no strongly commitments to follow up what the specialist do, and the other ones are there are no specific time frame for action plans and also there are no strong political will from the MENPAN institution to push this program up to the final line.

And the other one is MENPAN Institution to busy for doing something which is not really related with their main job as bureaucracy reform locomotive. Such as doing research that not really related with their main duties, for the time being they do not have resources to do that, so most of research they do by contracting out or using outsourcing behalf of MENPAN Institution. On the other hand, forget to focus what being their main doing to reform the Indonesia bureaucracy.

The next recommendation is in MENPAN structural's organization there should be one or two deputy could be from private or quasi-public sector. And then, Staffs under the directors should be mixed with career civil servants and outside specialists. By doing this, MENPAN organization will work more motivated then before since there are new fresh and various ideas come out from outsider which have different point of views than insiders.

6.4. Reform Plan

Reform plans should be made in a way to make it easy to check whether a line Ministry has followed the recommendation by MENPAN. Currently many line Ministries think that the reform plan is too vague. If bureaucracy reform didn't involve all key parties since the beginning of process and maintain it up to the finish line, it will face difficulties in monitoring their supported or compliance or even rejection during the process running. The other things is without involvement the key parties intensively since the process begin up to the finish line, it will make the results vague for other parties since MENPAN didn't know precisely what they concerns based on each parties expertise. What usually really happen in any ministry level meeting about some topics are coordinator ministries usually already prepare about the draft of meeting material, and during the meeting they only asked about

agree or disagree related with the content of the material. But they never make such kind of brainstorming about the issues or problem inventories before they made the draft of meeting materials which include all parties concerns.

It is very often that coordinator ministry only provides draft made by themselves with emphasizing on their own concerns, and if during the process there are a lot of rejections of the content of the drafts from other parties who involved in the meeting, it is very rare that for the next meeting these rejection parties will be involved in further discussions. Therefore the coordinator ministry keeps move on with their own agenda, meanwhile line ministries keep on their own agenda. There is no meeting point that meets them in the same point, as result the bureaucracy program produced by MENPAN Institution seems to be vague for the line ministries by the end there are a lot of resistances from the line ministries. By then end, when this coordinator ministry comes to the parliament to introduce this reform agenda, there content cannot persuade the parliament to get their supports on their reform programs since there are no clarity in time frame, strategy and action plan of related ministries which being involved in this program. This reform agenda will be easily recognized made only based on the coordinator ministry will not government will as a whole.

Meanwhile, if we look to the Korean experience, The Government Reform Office under President Kim sets a very specific target for each reform agenda. There was also a clear deadline. And some of the vague reform directions which were result of compromise with the relevant ministries turned out to be a failure after all. Based on this, lesson learned that Indonesia government can be adopt related with Korean experience is made specific target that include all related ministries with clear deadline and clarity in rewards and punishment set up based on authority that coordinator ministry has from the President. Comprise among the parties involve should be do since the beginning up to finish line, in that case it is the coordinator ministry's job to secure that process. Thus they have full supports when they come to the parliament.

As recommendations, MENPAN needs to review the current reform plan, and make it more specific with clear indexes attached to each plan. A deadline for each reform plan should be set as well. The other one is MENPAN needs to consider about political condition in term of timing set up to implement their agenda. Since the election in next year, a reform plan that will not be easily implemented by the early next year may be renegotiated in the next administration when the reform drive is stronger. This is not a good timing for reform negotiation with the line ministries.

6.5. Penalty for No Compliance

Many of the reform plans are not implemented. A delay of the reform requiring Parliament's approval is quite understandable. However, the other reforms that just need compliance of the Ministries are not implemented as well. There is neither a progress check nor a penalty for non-compliance. Since there is no specific target of actions, there is no specific time frame, there is no specific reward and punishment made by the MENPAN institution, the reform plan has no visibility to implement. The other one is there is no continuously strong commitment made by the coordinator ministry, make this reforms plans didn't implement yet as well by the line ministries. There are no rewards and punishment exercise by the MENPAN Institution effects on the future commitments of the line ministries of this reform plan. To tight the line ministries with the strong commitment the MENPAN institution needs to set up the penalty for non-compliance and the rewards for the cooperative ministries.

Since the final products of this reform plan is law which is needs the parliaments approvals, so any kind of progress within the process even delayed should be reported to the Parliaments, because it related with budget absorption by the government.

In the other hand, if we reference to the Korean experience in exercise the penalties for non-compliance, The Government Reform Office under President Kim, Dae-Jung codified all the reform agenda to make it clear for all ministries about their homework, and checked the monthly progress of line ministries. To make the line ministries compliance with the reform plan, The Ministry of Planning and Budget stopped budget allocation to a line Ministry that does not meet the deadline. By doing this, The Government Reform Office is surely controlling the compliance of each line ministries by using budget instruments.

Based on the Korean experience, as recommendation MNPAN first needs to clarify the homework of the ministries, and regularly check the progress of the reform. And then for the next step, MENPAN needs to evaluate and publicize the reform level of each ministry including the progress of the homework as a major indicator.

6.6. Political Support for the Reform

With upcoming elections, the political environment for the reform is not favorable. Implementing a new reform plan now may turn out to be a failure as some cases already show. It is, therefore, a time for MENPAN to prepare a reform plan that should be implemented after the next president inaugurate. Reform plans will not be enough only based on the specification in the time frame, specification in the target and strategy, but more than all those things are the time set to make all those reform plans to be implemented. Social and political moments should be considered as well. To make sure the perfect plans implemented successfully the implementers should critically noticed the political movement around them. Since public policy will be produced by this reform plans are political decisions, thus any kind of activities should be adjusted with political situation such as presidential election on the next year (2009).

In this respect, The MENPAN institution current job is to make preparation of reform plan and to make sure that plans should be implemented after the next president inaugurate. And it is become MENPAN main duty to deliver these reform plans as soon as possible to the next elected president. So then, they can be working on their plans as soon as possible as well without any delayed which make these plans out of date. Regard to this we can say political support truly important to implement any kind of bureaucracy plans. Without political support, any perfect plans made by bureaucracy will be only left in the inside drawer which is not change anything. *Remember*: "The precise momentum will make different results of any kind of plans".

Political support for the reform of Korean experiences are Presidential candidates are busy in their political campaign, and have little time for making a reform plan, not so attractive agenda for voters. As a result, a president drives a reform without a plan or spends several months in preparing a plan. We lose either strategically planned reform or important momentum for a reform.

Regard to the lesson learned from the Korean Experience, recommendation can be made for Indonesian bureaucracy reform plans are MENPAN needs to make a comprehensive reform plan that will be reported to the president elect next year. Consensus among Ministries will have to be made after the new administration comes in, not now. And also, MENPAN needs to set up a taskforce for this draft plan with specialist in the other organization such as LAN and other Universities with fully supported from Ministry of Budget Planning and Ministry of Finance to make sure the compliance of line ministries.

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