Enhancing BATNA Analysis in Korean Public Disputes
- Enhancing BATNA Analysis in Korean Public Disputes
- Kim, Dong-Young
- BANTA; Public Dispute Resolution; Negotiation; Institutions; South Korea
- Issue Date
- Series/Report no.
- KDI Working Paper Series;07-15
- The challenge of getting disputants committed to the public dispute resolution process is
the major obstacle to the use of consensus building methods. Without the commitments
of parties to come to the table, there is no possibility of consensus building.
There has been a tendency to criticize parties of not being rational enough to come to
negotiating tables in public disputes in South Korea. Compared with disputants in
Western democracies who seem to be better at negotiating among them, Koreans have
been not that sophisticated in their dealing with public disputes.
While the reality of involving parties in the process is very frequently more complex
than a few simple hypothesis about the incentive to come to the negotiating table, their
incentive is highly associated with their calculation of BATNA (Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement). I hypothesize that the calculation of BATNA is also influenced
by institutions, such as legal frameworks, surrounding parties in specific public disputes.
This hypothesis-generating research can be the first step to better understand disputants,
and distinct contexts in Korean public disputes so that it may suggest institutional
reforms for more effective use of consensus building procedures in Korea.
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