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Working Paper

Glocalization, Brain Circulation, and Networks:
Towards A Fresh Conceptual Framework for
Open Human Resource Development System in South Korea¹

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1. Introduction

Today's knowledge-based society is often called an age of "global war for talents." Particularly with the onset of glocalization—a combination of globalization and localization—and the rise of network society, success of national innovation eco-systems critically depends upon their respective ability to attract or tap onto such global talents with creativity and expertise. However, the old "brain drain" or "brain gain" model based on the conventional understanding of labor migration as a unidirectional movement often results in the underestimation of multi-directional networks that could transmit social capital between bridged countries for achieving mutual benefits (Putnam, 2000). The recent research on labor migration has increasingly shifted its focus to a new model that addresses "brain circulation" or "flow of human talents" (Velema, 2012). For instance, Saxenian (2007) offers a new paradigm by arguing that "New Argonauts" or high-skilled workers who left their home countries to build knowledge and skills have been reversing "brain drain" through creating transnational professional networks between host and home countries. In this framework of understanding, the outflow of domestic talents does not constitute a risk or hindrance to economic development. The key lies in some organic presence of human talents, open community, and their networks, as demonstrated by the continuous successes of such regional innovation hubs as Silicon Valley. For a society like Korea, where the networks tend to be those of exclusionary blood, regional or school ties, the developmental task may require transformation of its informal as well as formal institutional human resource development (HRD) or human resource management (HRM) infrastructure which goes beyond brain gain or drain framework of mind. From an alternative brain circulation framework, therefore, this paper takes a critical look at Korea's extant HRM system, institutional structure and practices, with an eye on some comparative perspective from the cases of China, India, and Israel. The paper argues that such a transformative or adaptive outlook springs from cosmopolitan values. In so doing, it offers some tentative suggestions about how Korea could practically and strategically bring about such an adaptive change in the way its HRM system operates.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. *Brain Drain, Brain Gain, and Brain Circulation*

Skilled labor migration, albeit germane to freedom of movement and choice of employment, has emerged as a socio-economic crisis in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. In particular, developing countries, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa, have increasingly witnessed the massive outflow of local scientists and technicians to Western Europe and North America for an extended period of time, creating diminishing returns on domestic education and training (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997). This rising trend of brain drain accelerated "success to the successful" and exacerbated the widening North-South gap (Joyce and Hunt, 1982). At the onset of globalization, brain drain became further intensified. Between 1990 and 2000 alone, the number of highly educated immigrants to developed countries increased by 63.7 percent, as compared to the increase of low-skilled immigrants by mere 14.4 percent (Docquier and Marfouk 2006). Recognizing that the vast majority of home or sending countries are developing countries, their immigration policies have been primarily geared towards reversing the trend of brain drain by settling the high-skilled expatriates back in their home countries. South Korea, despite highly ranked in terms of business activity and research and development, has continued to experience negative impacts from a serious outflow of local talents. The IMD World Talent Report (2015) ranked South Korea at 55th among 61 economies across the world in terms of employees' work motivation, and gave

Korea a score of 3.98 out of 10 as an indication of the high level of brain drain that hinders competitiveness of domestic economy²

Nonetheless, with the recognition of positive net gains from financial remittances and business value chains generated through immigration, the widespread myth of brain drain has gradually waned. In fact, a data analysis on 127 developing countries indicates that the prospect of migration often encourages individuals in home countries to invest in education, and that some of them either stay or ultimately return after years of international experience to their home countries to contribute to industrial development. The research also shows that immigration of less than one-fifth of the highly educated people could immediately generate net positive gains for sending countries (Segerfeldt, 2015). In the case of South Korea, brain gain and brain drain have occurred almost simultaneously. Choi (2003) pinpoints that “ethnic Koreans have contributed to the development of the South Korean economy by transferring their knowledge and skills—which were obtained and strengthened in the more advanced countries of their residence—to their homeland.” Recognizing these net gains, the Korean government has actively sponsored programs and financial benefits for skilled professionals to establish businesses in highly industrialized countries (Shain, 1999). This type of state policy, however, remains pertaining to the old model of labor migration in that this brain gain strategy only concerns the reversed unidirectional flow of human capital from a country of destination to a country of origin.

Brain circulation that hinges on “the ability to locate foreign partners quickly and to manage complex relationships and teamwork across cultural and linguistic barriers” emphasizes multi-directional, mutually cooperative networks that directly and indirectly affect both home and host countries (Saxenian, 2007). Hence, the framework of brain circulation is distinctly different from the state-centered model of brain drain or brain gain. In this sense, the very notion of brain circulation strongly resonates with the concept of boundaryless global career which can be “characterized by a career identity that is independent of the employer; the accumulation of employment-flexible know-how; and the development of networks that are independent of the firm, non-hierarchical, and worker enacted” (DeFillippi and Arthur, 1996). As an example of boundaryless global career, Hong Kong and Indian immigrants to Canada were initially regarded as the outflow of human capital for their countries of origin, but diminishing constraints on the mobility of labors encouraged them to acquire dual citizenships and establish interlinked business chains by shuttling back and forth between two distant hubs (DeVortez and Ma, 2002). Likewise, Indian and Taiwanese immigrants in Silicon Valley, as recognized by Saxenian (2006), greatly contributed to the development of IT technology in their countries of origin by establishing IT hubs in India and Taiwan that hold mutually beneficial business operations with Silicon Valley. As such, brain circulation, akin to the notion of boundaryless global career, is founded upon an environment conducive to free movement across the boundaries of distant nations, sustainment of long-term international networks, departure from state-centered career development, and a nexus of mutually beneficial and cooperative relations between host and home countries (Carr, Inkson, and Thorn, 2005).

Nonetheless, one must not equate brain circulation to boundaryless global career as an interchangeable concept. It must be recognized that the precedent studies on brain circulation have thus far put a lopsided focus on the frequent mobility of labor and the consequent creation of transnational business value chains like the Silicon Valley. As a result, the conceptual peculiarities of brain circulation that manifest itself as a new paradigm often remained somewhat obscure. The notion of brain circulation that this paper explores in terms

² IMD computes a talent ranking for 61 economies across the world; among the collected data, IMD files Brain Drain Index (BDI) on a scale of 0 to 10 where the lower the reading the stronger the tendency for highly educated and skilled individuals to leave a country and hinder its economic competitiveness.

of Korea's human resource development refers broadly to the establishment of long-term and sustainable transnational networks that have the capacity of sharing financial, human, and social capital between distant diaspora communities and homeland to generate explicit and implicit knowledge for mutual development. Such "distant cooperative work" that links home and host countries for co-development not necessarily through the physical mobility of human capital is what brain circulation should capture in its foundational framework (Meyer and Brown 1999). In this sense, brain circulation is beyond the state-centered strategies to attract foreign talents or assist stable settlement in host countries, but rather concerns the trust-driven foundation of global network chains that are sustained for the people, through the people, and by the people. Hence, the paradigm of brain circulation is inherently rooted in transnationalism that rejects state nationalism, top-downism, and military-style authoritarianism. As such, from the perspective of brain circulation, the increasing outflow of skilled labors is less of a socio-economic concern than the absence of open and inclusive environment.

2.2. *Diaspora and Transnationalism*

Brain circulation, albeit not confined merely to diaspora-homeland networks, primarily performs a bridging role between home and host countries for expatriates or overseas ethnic communities. Diaspora, used interchangeably with the term "overseas ethnic community", is referred to as a community of "people dispersed from their original homeland, people possessing a collective memory and myth about and sentimental and/or material links to that homeland, which fosters a sense of sympathy and solidarity with co-ethnic diasporans and with putative brethren in the ancestral homeland" (Safran, 1991). This ethnic-based sense of belonging and connectivity explains the embodiment of a home country or a country of origin as a hub and of ethnic communities spread across the world as spokes. In the framework of brain circulation, these spokes interact with their hub and other spokes to create a flow of human capital, share knowledge or information, and create new business opportunities (Rauch and Trindade, 2002). In general, these ethnic communities of well-educated and high-skilled individuals have been often referred to as "knowledge diaspora" (Welch and Zhen, 2007). Most prominently, Indian and Taiwanese technician communities in the Silicon Valley are epitomized as such knowledge diaspora or spokes that closely connect with their hubs, Bangalore and Hyderabad in India and Hsinchu Science Industrial Park in Taiwan, respectively.

As briefly introduced above, a close linkage between diaspora and homeland based on the brain circulation model is not merely confined to businesses or industries. Levitt (1998) proposes that diaspora communities, in addition to financial remittances, also enable the transfer of social remittances which are rendered as ideas, behaviors, and social capitals circulating between hubs and spokes, or simply home and host countries. A social remittance generally comprises distinctive merits of facilitating immigrant entrepreneurship, community and family formation, and political integration, without the physical mobility of human capital. Furthermore, repeatedly learned interactions between diaspora and home countries can foster a potential for politicization. The government of the home country can mobilize diaspora communities as interest groups and political actors to shore up political or economic support for promoting its interests, and the host country may do the same, as epitomized by Jewish diaspora serving the interests of the United States and Israel (Esman, 2002). In recognition of this win-win strategy driven by diaspora networks, Mohann (2000) classifies such diaspora-homeland linkage as the following: development *in* the diaspora, development *through* the diaspora, and development *by* the diaspora.

In this context, the vast majority of the current research proposes that the success of brain circulation hinges heavily on one's affinity or embeddedness to a certain ethnicity or

nationality, thus obscuring the distinctiveness of brain circulation from the old model of brain gain and brain drain. For instance, Tung (2008), in explaining brain circulation, frames the commonalities of Chinese and Indian diasporas as the following: (i) their heavy representation in US graduate degree programs in science and engineering; (ii) their affinity to their motherland; (iii) the growing economic might of their country of origin; and (iv) various attempts by governments of their country of origin to attract members of their ethnic diaspora to return to contribute to economic development at home. Such parsimonious proposition that international knowledge networks can be built most effectively by strengthening diaspora communities' affinity to their nationality or ethnicity is also premised in the research conducted by Wang (2015) on conditions conducive to knowledge transfer success. Based on the analysis of the dataset of 4,183 former J1 Visa holders in the United States from 81 different countries, the author demonstrates that a returnee's host and home country embeddedness greatly increases knowledge transfer success, and further verifies that positive gains from a returnee's host and home country embeddedness in terms of knowledge transfer are mutually contingent. Although these observations partially correspond to the brain circulation model, an undue amplification of ethnic nationalism could engender the risk of inflating state power and discriminating against foreigners, both pernicious to the sound HRD. In this sense, brain circulation should be inclusive of both the rooted ethnic diaspora communities and transnational communities bridged by mobile human capitals, including ethnically associated yet socially distanced diaspora communities and ethnically untied foreigners.

To this end, global talents as dispersed nodes interconnecting diverse communities across the world should be rendered as transnational citizens inculcated with a sense of responsibilities and a set of conditions of peace and justice and sustainability (Falk, 1993). Nonetheless, in the understanding of transnationalism, one must not conflate transnational identity with a worldview to establish a systemized form of cross-national governance devoid of nation-state and ethnic identities. Transnational citizens, as framed by Portes (1996), "lead dual lives, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political, and cultural interests that require a simultaneous presence in both." In other words, transnational citizens' networks, activities, patterns of living, and ideologies are needless to be confined in the parameter of particular nation-states, but their respective national cultures, traditions, and customs inculcated through their living experiences can also be retained and respected (Nielsen, 1999). In this sense, transnationalism resonates closely with liberal nationalism which also renounces exclusionary and patriotic national identities, and recognizes transnational values, norms, and ideologies (Bosniak, 2000).

Putnam (1995) conceptualizes this very notion of transnationalism by means of social capital—*bonding social capital* and *bridging social capital*. In his framework, socially homogenous individuals often organically build an interlinked network that can facilitate trust and emotional bonding. This bonded social capital could generate spillovers to bridge disconnected groups across the region, through which groups of individuals can further facilitate trust, spread information, and circulate innovations. With the intensification of globalization and the increased mobility of labors, many countries have been increasingly witnessing that locally or regionally bridged social capital is being connected to another locally bridged social capital situated in different geographical areas, thus generating non-local networks that embody transnationalism (Schiller, Basch, and Blanc, 1995). The premise of transnational bridges or networks, however, is that these mobilized individuals should be embedded or anchored into certain communities—not necessarily certain ethnicities or nationalities—so that knowledge, information and skills transferred can be accepted as legitimate. Given that, even foreigners (bridging Country A and B), alien to the home country

(Country C) of the immigrant communities they bonded and bridged with locally, can be included in the transnational networks of the immigrant communities' country of origin (Country C). This is because these foreigners can share knowledge and expertise transferable to locally bonded immigrants, and in turn, to transnationally bridged communities. Hence, the model of brain circulation based on the framework of transnationalism is most germane to global knowledge networks that involve both diasporas and foreigners alike, as shown in the *Diagram 1*.




Diagram 1: The Model of Brain Circulation

2.3. Historical Institutionalism and Diseased Dirigisme

The formation of transnational brain circulation networks, although generated organically, requires certain institutional conditions to be satisfied. When an individual or a group of individuals residing abroad attempts to build a transnational network with either the country of origin or a third country, one must acquire a certain level of power resources that comprise economic resources, social resources, political resources, information resources, moral resources, and physical resources (Uphoff, 2005). In this regard, Brinkerhoff (2009) holds that a conducive environment for diaspora communities to hold necessary power resources for building networks often stems from the arrangement of democratic, participatory and stable institutions in both home and host countries. In other words, if home or host countries retain rigid, horizontal, and elitist institutional arrangements that inhibit the free flow of various forms of capital, transnational linkages among knowledge communities could remain vulnerable and ineffective. In a similar context, the research conducted by Wang (2015) verifies that xenophobic tendencies of home countries, systematically hostile against the influx of foreign human and social capitals, hinder transnational knowledge transfers, because knowledge recipients negatively perceive the overseas embeddedness of returnees. This analysis closely resonates with the social fabric of South Korea in that its institutions have long been exclusionary against foreign identities, ethnocentric, and consequently far-reaching to ethnic Korean communities, and yet centered on dominant state authority and ruling elite. This paradoxical pairing of ethnic nationalism and state nationalism in Korea, which undermines transnational values, has been molded through various historical experiences, such as infiltration of Confucian culture, Japanese colonial rule, Rhee Syng-man's autocratic rule during South Korea's First Republic, and Park Chung-hee's developmental dictatorship. This socio-cultural and historical trajectory has systematically

hampered the effective circulation of global talents across the world, creating so-called a path of institutional disease.

Path dependence, founded on the paradigm of historical institutionalism, explains how a self-destroying institution such as South Korea's ethnic nationalism and state nationalism can be self-enforced and self-reinforcing. From the perspective of path dependence, the given institutions often "generate feedback mechanisms that create inertia, or possibly even increasing returns to 'lock out' competing political ideas and vested interests," which ultimately leads to morphostasis or "locked-in development path" (Greener, 2005). In the case of South Korea, the decades of nation-wide struggles against Japanese colonialism and foreign interventions ultimately shaped South Korea's cultural unity and solidarity founded on race, blood and ethnicity (Shin, 2012). As such, the Korean government emotionally appealed to ethnic Korean communities abroad and reinforced ethnic homogeneity through media, sports games, and various government-sponsored programs in order to gain international recognition of its state legitimacy and induce investment for fast economic development. Meanwhile, in the course of state building and development, the authority of the state, or more precisely the ruling elite, has become exceptionally muscular and attained commanding and controlling power. Particularly during the 1960s and the 1970s, Park Chung-hee, coming to power in an undemocratic and illegitimate manner, has chosen a course of actions that harmed equity, democracy, social cohesion, and thus the people's ability to take the initiative and innovate or form viable civil society. He instituted a vertical political structure with centralized and monopolized policy-making, utilized a small number of big conglomerates or *chaebols* as the main proxy of economic growth for garnering political legitimacy, turned industrial workers into "industrial warriors" by fueling the ideal of growth at all costs, and expedited growth by marginalizing minorities and oppositions (Park, 2004).

This pathological course of actions, which this paper terms as diseased *dirigisme*, ultimately has become "locked in" the fundamental institutional structure and policy legacies in the following regimes of Korea and continued to limit and constrain policy options, injure the social fabric and delimit the inclusion of the ordinary citizens in society. This diseased *dirigisme* has been the core institutional fabric that directly challenged any state-led attempts of Korea to introduce brain circulation which fundamentally requires open, participatory, and inclusive environment. Nonetheless, the diseased *dirigisme* must not be considered as institutional or state determinism. In line with the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, an institutional arrangement that shapes ways in which political actors define their interests, goals, and preferences is, in fact, a path of actions chosen by the ruling elite vying for legitimacy, authority, and public support. It is this path causes the resistance of formal and informal institutions to change, as this line of choices becomes embedded in decades of history and normalized in people's day-to-day socio-political behaviors. Nonetheless, institutions do change in critical juncture by means of "punctuated equilibrium" (Krasner, 1984). As have Chinese and Indian Argonauts changed the business outlook through major shifts in their economic institutions, South Korea in this critical juncture can revisit its current brain circulation strategies and address the challenges by shedding new light on open human resource development system.

3. Revisiting Human Resource Development in Korea

3.1. Current Status of Global Korean Talents

In 2016, the IMD World Competitive Center in its *World Talent Report* ranked South Korea 31st out of 61 economies across the world, in terms of talent competitiveness that responds to a country's balanced commitment to the development of domestic talents and the

attraction of overseas talents. The figure was all-time low in a span of one decade, along with the continuous increase of brain drain and the decrease of brain gain. In this regard, the Institute for International Trade conducted an online survey on 320 local candidates and graduates for master’s and doctorate degrees (Han, 2014). The result shows that 73.1 percent of the respondents indicated their willingness to seek employment abroad, and 91.9 percent confirmed their willingness to take a job abroad if given an opportunity. Furthermore, those who wish to seek employment abroad specified major pull factors in host countries which include the acquirement of advanced knowledge and technology (35%), higher wage (20.7%), reputation or image of foreign firms (10.2%), and outstanding welfare (9.9%). On the other hand, they indicated push factors in Korea to be employment instability (21.6%), long working hours (21.3%), and closed, stiff corporate culture (16.3%). Likewise, a survey, conducted by Science and Technology Policy Institute (SEPTI) on Korean scientists working actively in the U.S. biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, shows a similar result where three major push factors in Korea turn out to be low funding levels, rigid organizational culture, and relatively low wage levels (Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2011). In terms of brain circulation, this rising trend of brain drain in Korea needs not to be a critical issue. However, its inability to attract foreign talents and the outflow of both domestic and foreign talents as a result of disappointment or even hostility greatly hinder the embeddedness of these talents in the local bridged networks in Korea. As Wang (2015) proposes, these conditions are adverse to knowledge transfers and network formation.

Circulating global talents has been a topic of contentious debate in Korea, due to legal obscurity in defining overseas Koreans and foreigners and dissimilar characteristics of Korean diaspora communities across the world. In contrast to other settler countries that accept, assimilate, and naturalize new citizens based on the legal principle of *jus soli*, South Korea awards citizenship largely based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. In addition, the Korean government repeatedly projects a firm belief that all ethnic Koreans share the same ancestry and bloodline, which ultimately becomes an obstacle to fully accepting foreigners into the Korean community. Nonetheless, this repeatedly reinforced ideal of ethnic homogeneity did not quite translate into the legal inclusion of overseas Koreans either. In this regard, this paper proposes that such exclusion of overseas Korean communities is often rooted in the *dirigiste* government that formulates policies on overseas Koreans solely for the political and economic interests of the leadership and that retains the old paradigm of zero-sum competitiveness in human capital. Since the administration of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012), the usage of terms, “Global Korea” and “global Korean talents” have become popularized and frequently referenced in the discussion of brain circulation (Park & Jung, 2009). In this context, although global Korean talents are generally referred to as highly skilled and educated overseas Koreans inclusive of both Korean nationals residing abroad and ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality (statistically indicated in *Table 1*), their highly disproportionate legal status and rights adds complexity to brain circulation strategies. The following sections would discuss the social, legal, and organizational challenges associated with overseas Koreans, and provide an empirical evidence as to how diseased *dirigisme* impairs the circulation of global talents, particularly ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality and non-Korean ethnic foreigners, in the milieu of the paradoxical pairing of ethnic nationalism and state nationalism

Region \ Year		Year				Percentage (%)	Percentage Change
		2009	2011	2013	2015		
Total		6,822,606	7,175,654	7,012,917	7,184,872	100	2.45
Northeast Asia	Japan	912,655	913,097	893,129	855,725	11.91	-4.19
	China	2,336,771	2,704,994	2,573,928	2,585,993	35.99	0.47

	Sub-total	3,249,426	3,618,091	3,467,057	3,441,718	47.90	-0.73
South Asia Pacific		461,127	453,420	485,836	510,633	7.11	5.10
North America	United States	2,102,283	2,075,590	2,091,432	2,238,989	31.16	7.06
	Canada	223,322	231,492	205,993	224,054	3.12	8.77
	Sub-total	2,325,605	2,307,082	2,297,425	2,463,043	34.28	7.21
Latin America and the Caribbean		107,029	112,980	111,156	105,243	1.46	-5.32
Europe		655,843	656,707	615,847	627,089	8.73	1.83
Africa		9,577	11,072	10,548	11,583	0.16	9.81
Middle East		13,999	16,302	25,048	25,563	0.36	2.06

(unit of measure: person)

(Korean nationals residing abroad and ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality)

Table 1: Statistical Data on Overseas Koreans

3.2 Current HRD System in Korea

3.2.1. Korean corporate organizational structure

South Korea is often cited as a prominent example of diaspora-homeland development which arguably resembles the model of brain circulation. During the early development of Korea, diaspora communities were indeed mobilized as one of the strong engines for the fast industrial development. As early as the 1960s, South Korea introduced human resource development as the cornerstone of its economic development strategies. The “command and control” government steered the economy away from import-substitution industries towards export-oriented and labor-intensive light manufacturing industries, heavily utilizing the abundant human capital. Given this trend, South Korea aggressively invested in primary education and vocational high schools, which paved a gradual path for generating higher value-added economic activities and high-end employment opportunities. In the 1970s, the Korean leadership switched gears to heavy and chemical industries requiring not just abundant low-wage labors but also the tremendous amount of medium-quality labors and technological capabilities. To meet the demands of industries, vocational junior colleges were established along with a range of legal institutions mandated for vocational training (Pillay, 2010). During these particular periods between the 1960s and the 1970s, the Korean government also actively contributed to the economic development of ethnic kin abroad through diaspora-homeland business linkages, particularly in the United States. For instance, the Korean Export Bank (KEB) supported wig manufacturers in South Korea and immigrant wig retailers and wholesalers in the U.S. by means of subsidized loans, hiking up the South Korean market share of wigs in the U.S. from mere 8 percent in 1965 to 89 percent in 1972 (Patterson, 2006). Coincided with the massive outflow of technicians and skilled workers to Vietnam, Germany, and the Middle East, the government aimed to reverse the brain drain by establishing major research institutes, such as Korea Institute of Science and Technology in 1966, Agency for Defense Development in 1970, and Korea Development Institute in 1971. These institutes, with the generous provision of incentive packages, attracted some 2,000 Korean scientists and engineers living abroad, and have arguably brought knowledge, experience, connections, and leadership to Korea (Lazonik, 2007).

In the 1980s, South Korea made major transitions from labor-intensive to technology-intensive, and entered rapid industrialization fueled by the world’s trend of globalization, trade liberalization, and deregulation. In this connection, industries urgently demanded the increasing number of high-skilled workers, and required the government’s substantial efforts to enhance the knowledge and technical skills of the workforce. In tandem with such changes in economic development strategies, the government accelerated educational reforms, such as abolishing college entrance examinations, diversifying

institutions of higher education, and introducing a trial program that requires one year of training at an industrial site along with two years of academic studies (Kim, 2005). However, industrialization started outpacing the development of human capital, and engendered discrepancy in the job market, particularly since the 1990s. Hasty expansion of student enrollment capacity and vocational training created “imbalance between quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement of education and skill mismatch between public training and industrial needs” (Pillay, 2010). In specific, the contribution of physical capital to economic growth has substantially decreased from 57.1% in the 1970s to 45.6% during the period 1996-2001. Similarly, the contribution of labor for the same period has declined from 30.1% to 13.8% (Kwon, 2003). Since then, the Korean labor market has continuously suffered from the shortage of skilled labor, as predicted by the Ministry of Science and Technology as early as 2005. Despite having the reputation of being the science and technology stronghold, Korea has continued to experience the alarming shortfall of engineers and scientists with PhDs, particularly in the field of software engineering (Han, 2014). On this note, Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) anticipated that Korea would encounter the shortage of 10,000 top-level science and technology personnel by 2020, and would continue to lag behind in technology and human resource competitiveness in comparison to advanced countries (Bae, 2012). This rising shortage of skilled labor, coupled with the decreasing birthrate, became a significant driving force behind South Korea’s engagement in the global war for talents.

For the last few decades, the Korean government has greatly amplified its endeavors to address the escalating industrial challenges. Given the centralized and hierarchical economic arrangement, the government has strongly pushed forward with its initiatives to sponsor overseas training programs, offer free language education, and provide public loans for immigrants starting businesses abroad, with the expectation of direct financial benefits to Korea (Shain, 1999; Weiner, 1995). In this connection, OECD (2008) introduced South Korea as a prime example of brain circulation and categorized the Korean diaspora as relatively large, mature, and well-organized networks that played a significant role in directing Korea’s transition to a knowledge-based economy. In recognition of the Korean government’s drive in encouraging repatriation of high skilled ethnic Koreans by creating employment opportunities with sufficiently high wages and challenging tasks, OECD made a positive appraisal of Korea’s development of information and communications technology (ICT) industry through the diaspora. Likewise, Choi (2003) evaluated that “ethnic Koreans have contributed to the development of the South Korean economy by transferring their knowledge and skills—which they obtained and strengthened in the more advanced countries of their residence—to their homeland.”

Along with the government, a surging number of Korean multinational corporations have also ramped up their efforts in tapping into the global pool of talents, in order to offset the shortfall of high-skilled domestic labors and meet the fast-changing industrial needs. In particular, Samsung, one of the most influential *chaebol* groups once heavily influenced by Japan’s hierarchical structure of labor, has undertaken a major overhaul of its management and operation system, transitioning from seniority-based pay and promotion to competition and merit-based one. As early as the 1990s, Samsung has dispatched international recruiting officers (IROs) abroad to facilitate recruitment of foreign talents, and sent around 3,000 talented young employees abroad through *regional special program* over the period 1990-2015 to equip them with language skills and international experience necessary for understanding the international market demands. In this connection, Harvard Business Review (2011) assessed these programs as a critical success factor of the so-called “Samsung Empire”. Furthermore, following the transition of leadership, Samsung further intensified its international outlooks by operating borderless teams and innovative talent management

programs, and newly implementing *global mobility program* through which Samsung recruited and assigned around 1,000 foreign talents to its affiliates abroad after 1-2 years of training in Korea (Samsung, 2015). Similarly, LG, another business giant in Korea, has been also keen on attracting foreign talents while internationalizing the current workforce. In doing so, LG maintained close connections with the diaspora community abroad. The Association of Koreans in Kazakhstan has, in particular, acted as a core diaspora spoke for LG to sign a number of mutually beneficial contracts with Kazakhstan, contributing to development of home and host countries (Kim, 2015). Finally, it is also noted that some of the most influential leaders in semiconductor industries, such as Samsung, Goldstar Co., and Hyundai Electronics Industries, are all defectors from foreign multinationals, such as Intel Corp., Honeywell Inc., and Digital Equipment Corp. This positive depiction of South Korea resonates with the dominant narratives on Korea's miracle of economic development.

Nonetheless, contrary to the positive assessment of Korea's human resource management system by the renowned institutions including OECD and Harvard Business Review, the aforementioned efforts of the public and private sectors can hardly be interpreted as a good model of brain circulation. From the command and control economy to marketization, privatization, and deregulation, the Korean government has indeed invested heavily in human resource development for meeting the industrial demands, but a dearth of attention is actually given to *how* the government produced such seemingly remarkable outcomes. During the early stages of development, many people lived in extreme poverty and lacked skills and sophistication to move forward with modernization by themselves. Thus, the Korean government easily instituted a vertical political structure that gave monopolistic and dictatorial decision-making power to the leadership, while turning workers into industrial warriors to serve the national goal. While imbuing the people with ethnic solidarity and patriotism, the government has also established a collusive relationship with a small number of big entrepreneurs who could carry out developmental orders as agents of the state and in return receive privileged access to investment credits and licenses. This *dirigiste* institutional arrangement characterized by top-downism, cronyism, and elitism, which survives to this date, has been the core element behind human resource development collectively managed by the government and *chaebols*. Thus, the current HRD system is neither people-centered nor has it been shaped by the needs of overseas Korean communities. In fact, the current attempts at attracting foreign talents have not marked much departure from the past efforts that were made at the whim of the leader or the ruling party at the time solely to contribute to the economic development of Korea.

Aside from the pathological means of development, ends of the brain circulation policies in Korea have not proven to be successful either, due to *dirigiste* governance instilled in *chaebols*. The rigid top-down management style prevalent in Korean firms across all sectors is a chronic disease that continues to stifle innovation, creativity, development, and global competitiveness. Lagging behind other OECD countries, Korea after 30 years of democracy still exhibits management style that consists of "top down decision-making, paternalistic leadership, clan management, personal loyalty, compensation based on seniority and merit ranking, high mobility of workers, [and] the organization structure of companies [that] are highly centralized and formalized with authority concentrated in senior levels" (Lee, 2012). Foreign professionals often find this management style poisonous to their capacity building and career development. In this regard, the survey conducted by Kraeh, Froese, and Park (2015) on 211 foreign professionals working at the headquarters of Korean-based global organizations including Samsung, LG, and Hyundai, showed some of the following results: (i) 70.3 percent of the respondents pinpointed strict hierarchies in Korean organizations as a major reason for their strong desire to leave the country; (ii) 66.9 percent claimed that companies make decisions without consulting subordinates; (iii) 79.1 percent complained that

managers expect obedience from their subordinates; (iv) 74.2 percent agreed that people do not question any decision made by top-level executives. Hence, the failure of Korean corporations in a global war for talents lies not on their tactics to attract talents but rather on management. To address these challenges, Samsung's new *de facto* chairman Lee Jae-yong announced its initiative in March 2016 to execute a dramatic transition from top-down to down-top management by institutionalizing so-called "Start-up Samsung" (Seo, 2016). In specific, this complete overhaul based on the Silicon Valley model aims to eliminate ranks of employees, discard unnecessary internal executive meetings, maximize online communications, and hire foreign talents in overseas affiliates based exclusively on merit and experience (Kim, 2015). However, its realistic implementation remains questionable, due to the decades-old corporate culture deeply ingrained in minds of rank-and-file employees. Years of the past experience in structural overhauls attempted by many multinational corporations testify that change requires increment yet revolutionary reforms in both formal and informal institutions in all fronts.

Over the past decade, the businesses, albeit their attempts to attract or retain global talents, have continued to experience an outflow of talents because of the rigid, vertical, and exclusionary corporate culture of Korea that cannot be conducive to capacity building of foreign and overseas Korean professionals (Froese and Kishi, 2013). Such departure out of hostility hampers these foreign professionals in building close knowledge networks with the Korean community and in having any willingness to contribute to mutual development of Korea and their residing countries. Empirical evidence suggests that a significant number of newly recruited foreign talents, both ethnic Koreans and non-Korean foreigners, often end up leaving the country prior to the maturation of their contract terms, due to the diseased corporate culture (Froese, 2012). As an example, out of the 208 foreign MBAs employed in Samsung's Global Strategy Group, mere 135 remained in the organization as of 2010 (Khanna, Song and Lee, 2011). Particularly, the story of Eric Kim, a Korean-American who was recruited as a chief marketing officer in Samsung Electronics Co. in 1999, most prominently represents the common experience shared by many overseas Koreans. Although his recruitment was once acknowledged as a headline for Samsung's new slogan, "For Samsung DigitAll: Everyone's Invited", he constantly experienced ostracism and discrimination by senior executives, and encountered severe limitation in decision-making and project management. This hostile and rigid corporate environment eventually led him to leave the company in 2004 and move to Intel as a chief marketing officer.

As such, strong affinity of Korean nationals to ethno-cultural oneness reinforced by ethnocentric and nationalistic education dating back to the colonial periods has also been a crucial factor that perpetuates cultural intolerance and hostility against social *others* in Korea. When Samsung Electronics held a discussion with 200 employees who were recently promoted to a managerial position on the question of "is Samsung a global venture?" in 2009, only around 50% agreed, with the rest stating that "Samsung only manufactures global products but without global business operation" or "Samsung still lags behind the global standards" (Kim, 2012). This particular survey result epitomizes the overall blueprint of Korean corporations' approach to the global war for talents. If analyzed in detail, international training programs and foreign recruitment initiatives directed by *chaebols* are heavily concentrated on brain gain based on cultural assimilation and ethnic nationalism. As a prime example, even newly hired, foreign-born chief executives, including those who are assigned to affiliates abroad, are obligated to take Korean language and culture courses and receive training that emphasizes loyalty and integration. This deep-seated ethnic nationalism is constantly reinforced and perpetuated through decades of mandatory history education, media playing, and government sponsored programs. In this connection, an alarming result from the recent survey conducted by Korea University has shown that an average score of

3.77 on a five-point scale was given to a statement, “I am proud of having long maintained a racially homogenous nation” (Shin, 2012). The notion of ethnic and cultural assimilation as such is the root cause of Koreans’ unfounded hostility and discrimination against foreigners, taking a toll on recruiting global talents for further economic development. As pointed out by Shin and Choi (2015), only a small fraction of countries with strong ethnic identities—Korea not being one of them—can ever be able to successfully institute programs designed to build transnational networks with overseas knowledge communities.

However, it is worth noticing that such ethnic homogeneity, cultural solidarity, and ethnic nationalism have not produced favorable conditions for ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities to reside and seek employment in Korea either. The overseas Koreans often find themselves facing numerous legal restrictions in terms of employment, which is due to the *dirigiste* state-centered approach to HRD. As the following section discusses, past and present programs for inviting, attracting, and absorbing overseas Korean communities have been devised, not by the stakeholders, but rather by the state authority in order to fuel fast development of particular industrial areas designated in accordance with the President’s national action plans. For looking further into the full impact of state nationalism and *dirigisme*, a historical account of legal grounds and policies of overseas Koreans is discussed as below.

3.2.2. Institutional Challenges Embedded in Immigration History

Institutionalization of policies addressing overseas Koreans is a palpable manifestation of the principle of *dirigisme* deeply rooted in Korean society. Throughout the modern history of Korea, basic frameworks of legal institutions concerning overseas Koreans have consistently embodied the following characteristics: i) sound settlement of diaspora communities in their host countries; ii) expansion of educational and cultural exchange with diaspora communities for promoting national identity and pride; and iii) reinforcement of diaspora-homeland bonds for economic development. In other words, the concerned legal institutions primarily revolved around national affinity and domestic economic development—two essential elements for overseas Korean communities to become the agents of the state of Korea. Since the early stage of development in the 1960s, rhetoric and narrative of policies on overseas Koreans may have been altered significantly in accordance with the change of administration. However, the underlying objective across all previous administrations has always been absorption and utilization of untapped human resources for meeting the needs of the state authority within the boundary of its agenda. For Korea imbued with ethnocentrism and nationalism, tapping into ethnic Koreans has been the most cost-efficient method for relieving the shortage of labor and fueling economic development. Hence, as a part of the strategies to draw in foreign talents, the government has legally institutionalized some favorable provisions, albeit remained nominal, for ethnic Koreans. The following historical accounts on the development of such policies illuminate the path dependency of legal institutions in Korea and some challenges ahead.

Full-fledged institutionalization of legal protection and assistance for overseas Koreans did not come to fruition until the legislation of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (hereinafter referred to as Overseas Korean Act) in 1997. Nonetheless, public discourse on overseas Koreans’ rights could be traced back to the Cold War Era (1948-1992). When the government of South Korea was established independent of the influence of Japan in 1948, Korea was already riddled with internal conflicts driven by ideological differences and geopolitical allegiances. Therefore, President Rhee Seung-man, propagating “anti-Japan” and “anti-Communism” as a core national policy framework, made recourse to state nationalism and ethnic integration as political tools for gaining legitimacy and treated ethnic Koreans as objects of oversight and scrutiny. Hence, policies concerning

overseas Koreans were limited to Rhee's politically charged efforts to enlist support for his right-wing government by reinstating their Korean nationality. In this connection, Rhee's administration granted formal recognition to the Federation of Korean Residents in Japan in 1948, established Korean schools abroad, and enacted Registration of Korean Nationals Residing Abroad Act in 1949. However, in 1950, the Korean War ensued and resulted in both physical and ideological division between South and North, pushing the South Korean government to take a hostile stance against the influx of ethnic Koreans, let alone foreigners. Amid deteriorating relations between South Korea and Japan, the North started actively engaging with Korean residents in Japan. Coincided with Japan's rising desire to deport ethnic Koreans, North Korea repatriated and absorbed Korean residents in Japan through the pro-North Association of Korean Residents in Japan.

In 1960, after the resignation of Rhee as a result of 4/19 Revolution, the interim government stated its commitments to the resumption of Korea-Japan Summit, financial and education support for Korean residents in Japan, and permission to inward remittance. However, all efforts went futile. In 1961, through a military coup, Park Chung-hee acceded to presidency and succeeded a similar line of policies that capitalized on overseas Koreans as a source of inflow investment and cash transfers for domestic economic development. Park's administration instituted the department of overseas Koreans in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1961, enacted the Emigration Law in 1962 for facilitating inbound capital remittance, and established a Korean cultural center in 1963 for educating overseas Koreans of anti-Communist and pro-South ideology. A series of nationwide efforts as such, which coincided with the promulgation of Hart-Celler Act in the United States in 1965 increasing the permitted number of incoming Korean immigrants from 100 to 20,000 per year, triggered Korean citizens' massive immigration to the United States. Nevertheless, the targeted population of these policies was mostly confined to overseas Koreans in Japan, because of prevailing animosity against Communism and North Korean regime. Only in the 1970s characterized by the accession of China to the United Nations, the formation of detente between the United States and Soviet Union, and the conclusion of Shanghai Communique, tensions between the South and the North became eased momentarily, leading to a shift in policies concerning overseas Koreans. The term "overseas Koreans" became more inclusive of ethnic communities residing in China and Central Asia, with which a minimum level of legal foundation was arranged for encouraging immigration abroad and supporting immigrants' *ex post* conditions. The policies, however, remained investment-oriented rather than rights-based approach.

Following 20 years of Park's command, Chun Doo-hwan instituted a military regime by force in 1980, causing the downfall of democracy along with a rapid dissemination of the so-called Red Scare. Chun's administration indeed inserted a clause that ensures "protection of overseas Koreans' rights and interests" in the constitution, and introduced the National Plan for Expansion of Immigration Abroad in 1981. These legal provisions entailed the following significance: i) abolition of restrictions based on property, income, and social status in accordance with the principle of equality in opportunities for immigration abroad; ii) streamlining of administrative and bureaucratic procedures for immigration abroad; iii) increase in a cap on foreign exchange payments for smooth settlement of Korean immigrants; and iv) relaxation of regulations on resettlement agencies. Moreover, Chun's government consolidated all policies pertaining to overseas Koreans under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these legal foundations, however, embodied a primary focus neither on freer entry and exit of Korean immigrants nor extension of overseas Korean networks, rather on severing ties between Korean citizens and overseas Koreans, and strengthening Chun's dominance over the general public. Further reduction in regulations on immigration abroad continued throughout Roh Tae-woo's regime. Most characteristically, with the onset

of Seoul Olympic in 1988, Roh's administration actively pushed forward principles of "one ethnic community" and "Northern diaspora consolidation" reaching out to a wider scope of overseas Korean communities across the world. Roh's new approach resonated with increasingly evident signs of the fall of the Soviet Union and possibility of unification through South-led absorption. It was against this fast changing current of political tectonics that South Korea put greater emphasis on the consolidation of state, nation, and ethnicity necessitated for its legitimacy, sustainability, and growth.

In the 1990s, namely the post-Cold War and globalization era, the administration of Kim Young-sam was particularly keen on making South Korea on a par with international standards. Prioritizing globalization as a core national agenda, Kim established the Globalization Promotion Committee in 1995 and mandated the committee to achieve 53 objectives which included the vision of "support for vitalization of overseas Korean society". Kim's administration also promulgated "New Policy on Overseas Koreans" which entailed the following principles and objectives: i) supporting overseas Koreans to establish their socio-economic foundation in their country of residence; ii) providing support for ethnic education in an effort to sustain overseas Koreans' ethnic-national identity and bonds with their home country; iii) consolidating overseas Korean communities under liberal democratic values; iv) supporting their self-sustainability; v) streamlining administrative procedures under a unified administrative agency; and vi) modifying legal institutions to promote economic activities of overseas Korean communities. Along with the new policy, Kim instituted the Overseas Korean Policy Committee in 1996 and the Overseas Korean Foundation in 1997. As a result, there have been major developments pertaining to implementation and enforcement of policies, but contentious debates over the definition or scope of overseas Koreans, particularly the residents of Communist-influenced countries, remained unaddressed.

At the turn of the century, general policy directions regarding overseas Koreans have transitioned from perceiving them as potential threats against state legitimacy and objects of scrutiny to recognizing their values for mutually beneficial economic growth. During Kim Dae-jung's administration dated from 1998, economic recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis has been of primary importance in his top national agenda. Acknowledging that the inflow of overseas Koreans can close the gap between demands and supplies of labor in domestic industries, Kim actively sought to grant equal legal status to nationals and ethnic Koreans alike. In particular, Kim's administration legislated the Overseas Korean Act in 1999 which entailed the followings: i) classifying both "Korean nationals residing abroad" and "ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality" as overseas Koreans; ii) granting ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality a permit to stay in Korea for 2 years as well as authorization for repeated renewals of the length of stay, exemption from alien registration, and employment given a limitation to non-menial labor; and iii) easing regulations on real estate acquisition, investment, and foreign exchange. However, the extension of its legal boundary has been called into question by China and Russia as a diplomatic issue, due to the inclusion of ethnic Koreans with Chinese, Russian, and Sakhalin nationalities in the definition of overseas Koreans. Therefore, Kim's administration, despite its initial success in institutionalization of policies on overseas Koreans, acquiesced to the demand of China and Russia by outlawing foreign national Koreans' employment in the public sector and narrowly defining overseas Koreans as those who have migrated to other countries only after the establishment of South Korean government.

The overarching direction of Kim Dae-jung's policy on overseas Koreans was extended to President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003, with few modifications mainly geared towards maximizing the utilization of foreign human capital for economic recovery. The Roh administration, the so-called Participatory Government, amended the Overseas Korean Act in

2004 through which ethnic Koreans residing in China and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) earned the same legal rights as other ethnic Koreans living primarily in Japan under the same legal grounds. In addition to declaring the 5th of October as the Global Korean Day, Roh was also keen to address a continuous decrease in supply of domestic labor especially in 3D industries, which in part triggered his decision to initiate the Working Visit (H-2 Visa) system in 2007. This Working Visit program allowed all overseas Koreans to freely enter and exit the country multiple times, sojourn at a maximum of 3 years per visit within 5 years of effective period, and seek employment in 32 designated fields. Furthermore, during his administration, conditions for obtaining overseas Korean status (F-4) became further relaxed, permitting ethnic Koreans who have entered the country with other visa status to maintain their permanent residency as overseas Koreans. Nonetheless, rising issues of Korean nationals fleeing the country for the purpose of avoiding military services and granting their children foreign nationality by giving birth in *jus soli* based countries has simultaneously brought forth rigid restrictions on opening the windows for overseas Koreans. Thus, in quite contrast to Roh's past effort in amending the Overseas Korean Act, the Nationality Act was further tightened, which reduced ethnic Koreans' opportunities to obtain dual nationality and enjoy full rights in the territory of South Korea. National policies germane to overseas Koreans have continued to remain largely inconsistent and contradictory as such precisely because overseas Koreans embodied representation of deep-rooted ideological struggles, and a clash between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism in the state building process of Korea. Furthermore, legal challenges have remained intact in terms of incorporating all ethnic Koreans into a single legislation, given their decisively divergent identities and experiences molded throughout history.

President Lee Myung-bak, since his inauguration in 2008, has demonstrated an even stronger drive and determination in attracting global talents to curb the global financial distress escalated from the United States' subprime mortgage crisis. In this connection, the Lee administration has proclaimed achievement of "a lively market economy", "a country rich in talent", "a global Korea", "active welfare", and "a government serving the people" as five core national policy objectives. As compared with the previous administrations, Lee has marked a departure from perceiving overseas Koreans merely as labor substitutes for industries avoided or neglected by domestic workers, and focused on pulling them in rather as crucial talent pools for resuscitating the depressed state of economy. Emphasizing the notion of citizen diplomacy, Lee granted overseas Koreans a limited permission to obtain dual nationality in 2011 and limited rights to vote in 2012. Similarly, Park Geun-hye's administration, inaugurated in 2013, has set economic recovery and job creation as top priorities in national action plans. Thus, Park adopted a line of policy directions akin to Lee's. For instance, the primary focus of Park's policies entailed attracting high-skilled ethnic Koreans, reinforcing their role in homeland development, and ensuring legal protection for their community in Korea. In particular, Park, upon her inauguration, nominated Jeong-hun Kim, a Korean American scientist and entrepreneur who was then the president of Bell Labs, to lead Park's vision of "creative economy" as a cabinet member representing the newly established Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning. However, soon after the nomination was publicly informed, heavy criticisms followed, questioning his allegiance to Korean nationality based on his backgrounds including his U.S. citizenship, service in the U.S. Navy and former position on an external advisory board to the CIA. Although he offered to renounce his U.S. citizenship upon the start of his service as a minister, critics and oppositions eventually pressured him to forfeit his nomination. This turn of event is a vestige of historical struggles of Korea's independence and state building process—galvanizing the support of ethnic Korean communities abroad for gaining state legitimacy and economic

development internationally while fending off enemies of state, be it colonizers or Communists, to ensure homogenous nationhood.

Hence, despite the change of policy directions led by all previous administrations, the gap between ethnic nationalism and state nationalism remained intact as well as the existing legal and institutional arrangements hindering the advancement of overseas Koreans' economic and social conditions in Korea. As evidenced in the history, the nominal advancement of overseas Koreans' rights and conditions occurred generally when the country was in an economic turmoil that the state authority tried to curb at all costs through fast mobilization of capital. Therefore, as mentioned repeatedly, the institutionalization of policies has been generally geared towards the political and economic interests of the state leadership of Korea, not the general interests of the overseas Korean communities. The ways in which the *dirigiste* governance, meaning top-downism and cronyism, intervenes in the human resource development of Korea is most prominently acknowledged in the following section that discusses how the legal structure and networks concerning overseas Koreans are managed.

3.2.2.1 *Challenges in Legal and Informal Institutions*

Lack of coherent policies on overseas Koreans stems from the legal definition of overseas Koreans. The current Overseas Korean Act broadly and loosely defines the term "overseas Korean" as a person who is either i) "a national of the Republic of Korea who obtains the right of permanent residence in a foreign country or is residing in a foreign country with a view of living permanently there (hereinafter referred to as a Korean national residing abroad)" or ii) "a person prescribed by the President Decree of those who have held the nationality of the Republic of Korea or of their lineal descendants, who obtains the nationality of a foreign country (hereinafter referred to as a Korean with a foreign nationality)." Nonetheless, the integration of two distinctively divergent communities into a single identity group does not translate well into the actual implementation of legislation, regulations, statutes, or ordinances that grant legal rights and status for ethnic Koreans. Most prominently, the extension of voting rights to overseas Koreans is applied disproportionately to people categorized under the definition of overseas Koreans amounting to 7,184,872 in total as of 2015. First and foremost, ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities who account for 4,712,126 out of the total number of overseas Koreans are excluded from enfranchisement, in accordance with the Public Official Election Act. Among all enfranchised Korean nationals residing abroad, or generally known as Korean diaspora communities, Korean nationals with permanent residence in foreign countries account for 1,080,559 and hold voting rights limited to proportional representation elections which add up to 15 percent of the total seats in the National Assembly. Only Korean nationals with registered permanent residence in Korea, amounting to 1,392,187, are granted equal rights as Korean citizens to vote for both simple majority and proportional representation elections. Such disproportionate electoral law manifests the persistent discord between ethnic nationalist ethos which binds all Korean diaspora communities as brothers and sisters on an equal footing and state nationalism which emphasizes physical belonging and allegiance within a state boundary.

On a similar note, the issue of attainment of dual nationality has also been of grave concern as to attracting overseas Koreans. The Nationality Act, which stipulates the conditions under which attainment, loss, adjudication and revocation of nationality could be administered, contains discriminatory and disproportional elements directly posing counterproductive impact against long-drawn national efforts to attract overseas Koreans. In principle, "a person whose father or mother is a Korean national at the time of the person's birth, whose father was a Korean national at the time of the father's death, or who was born in Korea if both of the person's parents are unknown or have no nationality" can obtain the

nationality of Korea by birth along with a given foreign nationality. This type of person who has attained multiple nationalities before fully turning 20 years of age are required to choose one nationality before fully turning 22 years of age, and a person who has attained the nationality of Korea but retains a nationality of a foreign country must renounce the nationality of the foreign country within one year after the attainment of the nationality of Korea (Nationality Act, 10:1 & 12:1). With the revision of the Nationality Act in 2010, however, a person with both Korean and foreign nationalities as a result of birth or naturalization can now retain his or her nationalities by vowing his or her intention not to exercise his or her foreign nationality in Korea to the Ministry of Justice within one year from the date of attainment of Korean nationality. Although these newly added provisions opened windows for some selective groups of ethnic Koreans and naturalized foreigners to retain multiple nationalities, a requirement not to exercise a foreign nationality in the Korean territory is an unnecessarily restrictive measure that is heavily based on state nationalistic ideals and ill-fitted for transnational movement of labor in this day and age. Moreover, the Nationality Act substantiated by the Military Service Act further confines the rights of dual citizens by limitedly granting male dual citizens an opportunity to renounce the Korean nationality within three months from the time of enlistment; if they fail to do so, renouncement of their Korean nationality can only be permitted after they serve the military in full terms. As a result, numerous overseas Koreans, who are often not well aware of the concerning laws and have not renounced the Korean nationality accordingly, have been increasingly disadvantaged from study abroad and employment benefits.

Foreigners who have no blood, regional, or school ties with Korea face equally unfair treatment particularly in terms of employment and investment. Contrary to the national strategies to attract foreign talents to meet the fast-changing demands of transnational industries, legislative reforms concerning the rights of inflowing foreigners have only been made at a bare minimum in Korea. For instance, the current regulatory provisions impose foreign invested enterprises a limitation on the employment of foreign workers up to 20 percent of the total number of contracted employees. After a number of petitions have been filed in this regard, few amendments are made to grant small-sized foreign invested ventures in the fields ranging from manufacturing to trade, consulting, and R&D a temporary regulatory relief for a duration of two years from the date of launching their business. Nonetheless, such regulatory ease only serves an administrative function without necessarily addressing the discriminatory and unreceptive culture of business in Korea. In the same vein, foreign enterprises and business persons often encounter a considerable amount of regulations in Korea, such as exclusion from investing in 29 designated business fields, restrictive land use in metropolitan areas, and various administrative burdens. These disproportionate regulatory burdens on foreign enterprises directly translate into the net outflow of FDI and mere 1 percent in terms of FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio, as of 2014, which continue to block the channels of circulating financial and human capitals in and out of Korea. As evidenced, stark incongruity between the explicit national strategies to attract foreign talents by capitalizing on ethnic homogeneity or solidarity and the legal institutions restricting the freedom and rights of overseas Koreans and foreigners epitomizes the ingrained culture of exclusion and discrimination against “others” that is pernicious to transnationalism and brain circulation.

Currently, three core institutions, namely Overseas Korean Policy Committee, Overseas Koreans and Consular Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Overseas Koreans Foundation, preside over overall policies, programs and administrative services concerning overseas Koreans. The Overseas Korean Policy Committee, launched in 1996 on the basis of the presidential decree, is mandated to conduct a review and pass a vote on bills or policies pertaining to overseas Koreans to be enforced or implemented by

government departments and relevant agencies. The Committee, however, has been convened only 15 times thus far, which is a severely insignificant number for fulfilling any of its prescribed functions, such as establishing directions of policies on overseas Koreans, elevating legal and social status of overseas Koreans, increasing interstate networks or solidarity among overseas Korean communities, and supporting domestic and international economic activities of overseas Koreans. The Overseas Koreans and Consular Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is composed of 4 divisions, Overseas Koreans Division, Overseas Korean Nationals Protection and Crisis Management Division, Consular Services Division, and Passport Division. As evidently pronounced, the Ministry presides over primary legal and administrative duties pertaining to overseas Koreans. The performance of the Ministry is carried out in coordination and cooperation with other pertinent government departments and central agencies, but redundancy of work and conflicts of interests remain as significant challenges. Lastly, the Overseas Koreans Foundation (OKF), established in 1997 under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a central agency to enforce and implement projects geared towards building ethnic solidarity and supporting overseas Koreans' residence in host countries. The OKF's projects are generally aimed at providing aid to Korean language education, establishing regional and professional networks of young overseas Koreans, vitalizing economic cooperation via the World Korean Business Convention, increasing exchange programs to improve mutual cooperation, and strengthening online networks of overseas Korean communities. Despite such all-rounded efforts, the ongoing projects, programs and action plans on overseas Koreans generally fall under the discretion of multiple departments and agencies rather in an inconsistent and uncoordinated manner. In this regard, overseas Korean communities in various fields of profession ever since 1997 have relentlessly voiced their demands for the establishment of an overseas Korean agency within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs substituting OKF, so that the said agency could have substantial authority to consolidate all policies, regulations and projects concerning overseas Koreans under its oversight as a control tower (Lee, 2000). Nonetheless, due to potential diplomatic disputes that could arise from such high level of approach, proposed bills for establishing an overseas Korean agency have continuously failed to pass the National Assembly over the past decades until today. As such, the institutional structure for managing overseas Korean policies is arranged rather discordantly, although all institutions must report to the President for coordination with the overall national agenda. This structural flaw creates burdens for overseas Korean communities as to figuring out the windows for voicing their opinions and demands.

In this context, incessant emergence of overseas Korean networks, amounting to 3,171 across the world as of 2015, begs the question as to their actual impact on developing diaspora-diaspora and/or diaspora-homeland connections in various fields of profession. Overseas Korean networks are constituted of a wide spectrum of qualities that are shaped by lived experiences, geography, and interstate relations, and thus, these networks can hardly be defined under simple categories or remedied with a single prescription. Broadly speaking, the overseas Korean networks encompass all of the following features: i) online and offline, ii) country, regional, continental, and global scales, iii) diverse fields of profession, iv) community-specific, bridging, and homeland-specific mandates, and v) differing levels of blood ties to Korean nationality. However, among them, the organically established overseas Korean networks, which account for the majority number, tend to hold weak influential power, and their activities are generally not closely linked to the formal institutions of Korea. The most active and influential transnational network organizations of overseas Koreans, listed in *Table 2*, are the ones established by the Korea's state authority in a top-down manner via proxy organizations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and OKF whose decision making bodies have the insignificant number of overseas Koreans' representation. The most

influential network that has been frequently acknowledged by the former and current Presidents is the World Korean Business Convention (Hansang). Hansang, launched by the OKF in 2002, has annually convened worldwide conferences aimed at building solidarity among ethnic Korean businessmen, expanding investment opportunities in host and home countries, and increasing economic exchanges for mutual development. The Convention has continued to receive full endorsement of the leadership of the Korean government helping to mobilize top Korean business leaders in the world. Likewise, the World Federation of Overseas Korean Traders Association (World-OKTA) since its launch in 1994 has achieved an enormous success by bringing together over 4,000 business leaders as members in 77 branches located in 21 countries in the world. Through hosting major events, including World-OKTA Convention, Overseas Korean Next Generation Trade School, Overseas Export Market Development Business, and World-OKTA 13 International Committee, the World-OKTA has exerted great efforts into organizing overseas Korean economic networks for easier flow of information, trade and investment among long-distance markets across the world. Aside from these major organizations, sector-specific organizations including Future Leaders' Conference, Korean Federation of Science and Technology Societies, Korean Women's International Network, Overseas Korean Media Association, and Global Overseas Adoptees' Link have contributed to mobilizing ethnic Korean leaders across various fields of profession. In addition to the offline conventions, the Overseas Korean Foundation also established an online portal, Korean.net, to consolidate all available information on overseas Korean persons and communities into a single database so as to implement free flow of information.

However, the current overseas Korean networks, albeit having achieved great success in establishing longstanding channels of diaspora-homeland exchange and mobilizing a significant number of overseas Korean leaders across the world, failed to be on a par with brain circulation. In principle, these networks are mandated to bridge the “nodes”—overseas ethnic Korean communities or sub-communities—into a web of connections that can disseminate or share both explicit and tacit knowledge at local, regional, state, and international levels. In practice, however, these networks contain institutional failures that hinder the achievement of the initially designed objectives. First, most of these networks have been established by or under the supervision of the Korean government in a top-down manner for the pursuit of the political needs of each administration. Hence, contrary to the officially proclaimed mandates, activities and programs of these networks are generally centered on the advancement of the interests of homeland and its government (Lee, 2014). Second, the current institutions often lack coordinated and integrated efforts, leading to conflicts of interests between enforcement bodies and network groups. As indicated in *Table 2*, the Overseas Korean Foundation presides over the operation of the major overseas Korean associations and networks. However, the Foundation is obligated to receive an approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for any of its decision, business plan, or budget to be effective. Under such diminished independence and authority of the Foundation, in addition to the lack of coordination among government departments in formulating policies on overseas Koreans, coherent implementation of policies with clear blueprints can hardly be expected (Jeon, 2008). Against this backdrop, many grassroots associations have been formed locally and regionally to advance the rights of their community members, causing more difficulties in coordination and harmonization. Third, conferences or conventions held by the overseas Korean networks often remain as one-time events without continuity or consistency. Compared to overseas Chinese associations, conventions held by overseas Korean associations put greater emphasis on the quantifiable trade or investment outcomes following the event, rather than development of long-term relations (Choi, 2011). Thus, the networks do not develop further into brain circulation. On a similar note, global Korean networks are supposedly mandated to

hold conferences as a platform to not only build ethnic solidarity and contribute to homeland economy but also to receive grievances from overseas Koreans residing in distanced countries and reflect them on bills or legislations. In contrary, however, interests of the government departments have usually taken precedence over the interests of the public or overseas Korean communities, and thus, overseas Koreans' proposals raised during the past conferences have found to make insignificant impacts on rule-making of the National Assembly. In particular, despite the substantial differences in demands of overseas communities shaped by divergent immigration backgrounds and political economic regimes of the residing country, the government policies are insensitive to such details. For instance, Korean Americans generally demand the advancement of their legal status and expansion of their influence in American societies, while ethnic Korean Chinese demand easier access to Korean job markets with less pronounced reference to their legal rights or status. In the meantime, ethnic Koreans in Russia and CIS focus much rather on recuperating their Korean identity, culture, and traditions through education (Jeon, 2008). Lastly, synchronization between online and offline networks has yet to be achieved. Despite the present efforts to post all documents on conferences, programs, and activities online, a lack of cooperation among these networks leads to difficulties in finding necessary information at one spot (Park et. al., 2009). For instance, Korean.net is an online database supposedly storing all information on overseas Koreans and their communities, but the list of registered associations posted online is found to be far from exhaustive or comprehensive.

Name	Type	Major Responsibility
The World Korean Business Convention (“Hansang”)	On & Offline/ Business	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched in 2002 by the Overseas Korean Foundation with a mission of promoting global business networks among Korean entrepreneurs and giving them ongoing opportunities for their business interaction online as well and outline • Convened annually in Korea, with approximately 1,000 overseas Koreans visiting Korea just to attend the event • Offered customized programs aimed at stimulating information exchanges, creating new businesses, and increasing exports
World Federation of Overseas Korean Traders Association	On & Offline/ Trade and Industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched in 1997, with around 4,000 members in 77 branches in 21 countries • Aiming at developing the trade of homeland, increasing overseas markets entry of homeland's products, supporting information interaction, and organizing overseas Korean economic network • Periodically holding major events, such as World-OKTA Convention, Overseas Korean Next Generation Trade School, Overseas Export Market Development Business, and World-OKTA 13 International Committee
World Korean Community Leaders Convention	Offline/ General Networking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched in 2000 by the Overseas Korean Foundation, with 400 leaders and staff members of Korean communities in 73 countries • Having convened annually to enhance ethnic solidarity between homeland and overseas Korean communities, and to create networks among Korean communities across the world
The Korean Federation of Science and Technology Societies	On & Offline; Science and Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched in 1966 with mandates of fostering science and technology communities and supporting national growth by undertaking study, planning, research and advice on science and technology • Supporting 17 overseas Korean scientist and engineer associations that hold 18,584 members across the world • Supporting major programs, such as Program of Inviting Best Foreign Scientists and Engineers (Brain Pool) and Young

		Generation Forum
World Federation of Korean Association of Commerce	Offline/ Trade and Industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Launched in 1993 with a mission to organically consolidate communities of overseas Korean economists and entrepreneurs Helped to organize 246 economic and commercial associations Paying particular attention to overseas Koreans' densely populated regions in Central Asia, East Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean
Korean Women's International Network	Offline/ Gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Launched in 2007 as a means to build solidarity and promote information exchange among overseas Korean women, as well as to contribute to strengthening the national power of their homeland Holding various activities and programs, such as KOWINNER International Convention and KOWIN US Eastern Regional Leadership Conference
Overseas Korean Media Association	On & Offline Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Launched in 2002 as a global media network covering about 130 newspapers and broadcasting stations for ethnic Korean residents in 63 cities in 32 countries in the world Hosting Overseas Korean Media Convention twice a year to strengthen networks, create global contents, and circulate news and information
International Association of Korean Lawyers	On & Offline/ Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Launched in 1987 as a platform for all lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and law professors of Korean heritage Holding annual conferences to build networks and share information for capacity building Operating a website to share information on conferences, seminars, and its programs provided for immigrants, multicultural families, adoptees, and law school students
Future Leaders' Conference	Offline/ Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Launched by the Overseas Korean Foundation to promote growth and strengthen overseas Korean society by inviting future leaders in the various fields
Global Overseas Adoptees' Link	On & Offline/ Social Welfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Founded in 1997 as a non-profit organization in Korea to serve the Korean adoptee community both in and out of Korea Providing various services that include assistance in searching for birth families, translation and interpretation services, consultations on F-4 visa and dual citizenship applications, network opportunities, and Korean language scholarships
Korean.net	Online/ Database	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Launched by the Overseas Korean Foundation to consolidate all information and database on overseas Korean communities Operating as a one-stop shop for browsing through various activities and programs provided by overseas Korean organizations
The Global Network of Korean Scientists and Engineers (KOSEN)	Online/ Database	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiated in 1999 under the umbrella of Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information in order to strengthen knowledge sharing and information exchange Connecting around 100,000 overseas Koreans in 70 different countries online

Table 2: List of Overseas Korean Networks

3.2.3. Some Lessons from Comparative Case Studies

Korea, since its inception, has experienced a massive outflow of human capital, as a result of frequent ideological wars. Hence, each administration of Korea has, albeit in different meanings, objectives, and levels of commitment, assigned great significance to tapping into overseas Koreans as one of the most important contributing factors to gaining state legitimacy and economic development. Against this backdrop, a series of action plans and policies have been formulated or further strengthened by each administration to pull in foreign talents including both ethnic Koreans and non-ethnic aliens. In particular, the current government has implemented three major action plans, namely “the 3rd Action Plan for Supporting and Fostering Talents in Science and Technology” (2016-2020), “Action Plan for

Establishing the International Science and Business Belt” (2012-2017), and “Action Plan for Immigration Policies” (2013-2017). All of these action plans, in the milieu of global war for talents, aimed at dismantling barriers to entry and exit, providing job opportunities for highly skilled foreign scientists and engineers, and building infrastructure to accommodate foreign talents. Under these broad national action plans, the government has recently initiated Brain Return 500, among others, to reach the goal of hiring 500 overseas scientists by 2017 at the Institute of Basic Science (IBS) established inside the International Science and Business Belt. Currently, the number of overseas researchers at IBS has reached 30 percent of the total number of the employed researchers. Aside from that, the government has also adopted the systems of Gold Card and Science Card to provide streamlined and fast-track procedures for highly skilled and educated scientists and engineers to obtain visa and residence permits. Other policies include a job matching service to connect foreign talents with domestic industries, a temporary tax break on the income of newly settled foreign skilled workers, and improved welfare services such as health care and child education (Han, 2014).

Year	1970s	1980s	1990-2000	Mid-2000s	Late-2000s	2010s
Perspective	Brain Gain			Brain Circulation		
Target group	Ethnic Koreans	Ethnic Koreans & Foreigners (high-tech industry)	Ethnic Koreans & Foreigners (middle-skilled workers)		Ethnic Koreans & Foreigners (Master’s & Ph.D.)	
Reason for Mobility	Economic Benefits; Patriotism		Better Standards of Living; Occupational Benefits			
Major Policy	Invitation of Overseas Korean Scientists and Engineers (‘68)		Brain Pool (‘94); Brain Korea 21 (‘99); Study Korea Project (‘04)		World Class University (‘08); World Class Institute (‘09); Study Korea 2020 (‘12)	Brain Return 500; Science Card, Gold Card; Contact Korea
Policy Rationale	Economic Development; State Legitimacy	Economic Development	Internal Stability; Economic Growth	Economic Recovery from Asian Financial Crisis	Economic Recovery from Global Financial Crisis	Economic Recovery; Job Creation

Table 3: Historical Overview of Policies on Overseas Koreans

However, actual implementation or enforcement of these action plans and policies often takes a direction divergent from their explicitly declared mandates. For instance, although the current policy framework is nominally framed as a model of brain circulation, actual contents of the policies indicate a skewed inclination towards ensuring the acquirement of foreign talents in specific industries designated by the state authority. In this sense, as frequently witnessed in the current channels of overseas Korean networks, the formation and implementation of policies on overseas Koreans are shaped heavily by the needs of each administration’s political interests, not the needs of stakeholder communities. This common feature across all institutional arrangements pertaining to overseas Koreans verifies the existence of discrepancy between ethnic nationalism and state nationalism, where ethnic nationalism governs the informal institution of the general public in their day-to-day interactions with one another, and state nationalism governs the formal institution that corresponds to the assignment of legal status and rights to overseas Koreans. Therefore, the culture of exclusion and discrimination is not just simply rooted from ethnic nationalism or ethnic homogeneity, but is also deeply influenced by state nationalism that simultaneously

disadvantages ethnic Koreans by instituting legal mechanisms that require their allegiance and patriotism to the nation. Above all, diseased *dirigisme* characterized by top-downism, use of vested interests as proxies, growth-at-all-costs, and battle speed has been continuously manifested in the HRD policies of Korea, harming equity, democracy, social cohesion and people’s ability to innovate or take initiatives.

On top of these challenges, the current policies also manifest similar problems as the programs or projects run by the global overseas Korean networks, such as the lack of coordination among executive bodies, devoid of coherence or continuity, and absence of channels to harmonize government policies and grassroots community programs. For example, among various policies on overseas Koreans concerning entry (information acquisition, visa, nationality, etc.), settlement (socio-cultural adjustment, settlement conditions, welfare services, etc.), activities (entrepreneurship, research, education, etc.), and infrastructure (human capital exchange, database, statistics, etc.), any policy on human capital exchange alone requires coordination four different ministries, Overseas Korean Foundation, and Korean Federation of Science and Technology Societies, among others. Hence, a true sense of brain circulation has yet to be realized in Korean institutions. In this regard, the followings are some lessons that can be learned from brief case studies of other countries, namely China, India, and Israel that have long been attempting to implement the mutually beneficial model of brain circulation. The comparisons among ethnic communities representing four different countries are represented in *Table 4*.

Level of Global Network \ Level of Brain Circulation	Low	High
	Low	Overseas Korean Community
High	Overseas Chinese Community	Overseas Israeli Community

Table 4: Simple Comparative Analysis of Overseas Networks of China, India, Israel, and Korea

First, overseas Chinese populations, amounting to approximately 46 million residing outside China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau, constitute the biggest cooperative networks in the world interlinked across various fields of profession. In particular, conglomerates owned by overseas Chinese often have their own networks which are found to be interlinked with a myriad of other business networks, and together they ceaselessly develop into a sizable web-like system of transnational networks. These networks are capable of maintaining their long-term, intimate relations through a well-established stream of information and major conventions like the World Overseas Chinese Convention. With such influential economic connectivity, they are known to operate about 50 percent of the domestic businesses and 40 percent of the international businesses. The incredible success of overseas Chinese business networks largely attributes to the government’s long-standing efforts throughout the history. Most notably, China has established an overseas Chinese department within the government at a ministerial level and similarly instituted a standing committee inside the National People’s Congress to provide necessary legal protection and assistance to overseas Chinese communities across the world. In terms of policies on overseas Chinese, the central government of China recently launched “1000 Action Plan” in 2008 to invite 1,000 world-class researchers and professors to fuel the development of less competitive fields of industry in China, such as technology, finance, and patent, by providing financial subsidies and permanent residence or long-term residence permits. Similarly, the municipal or local government has adopted “100 Action Plan” to build the capacity of 100 selected overseas Chinese professionals. In addition, the government has also initiated “111 Action Plan” to

establish 100 world-class universities in China and invite 1,000 foreign talents to be trained for the development of brain pools. Aside from the government-led policies, however, the fundamental attributes to the success of the overseas Chinese networks are their distinct features, compared to other ethnic networks. First, the networks high social capital, or more specifically trust. As these networks are created organically through a long history of social and cultural interactions, the level of their commitment and cooperation in terms of doing business can be far superior to other ethnic or diaspora communities. Second, *guanxi*, or personal relationship, constitutes the fundamental fabric of these networks (Vanhonacker, 2004). Therefore, unlike Korea, international conventions or conferences are not held just to create immediate trade and investment opportunities, but also to envisage the long-term and mutually beneficial diaspora-homeland relations. Given these characteristics, however, the government-led policies on overseas Chinese networks share with Korea the similar symptoms of having skewed interests towards pulling in foreign talents for the development of domestic economy, instead of circulating talents for increasing the global flow of human, social, and financial capital. Meanwhile, a strong intimacy and solidarity among ethnic Chinese networks also leads to a disproportionate and discriminatory treatment against non-ethnic aliens. Hence, the level of brain circulation is relatively low, despite the active global overseas networks.

Second, overseas Indians, amounting to 28.4 million residing in various parts of the world, have increasingly contributed to the development of India over the past few decades through transnational networks. Most prominently, annual remittances transferred to India by Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) have reached \$70 billion which is now one of the largest sources of foreign exchange for India even exceeding IT exports. Moreover, these financial remittances have become the essential part of migrant families for accessing necessities, housing, school and medical services, as well as the core source of money for recoveries from financial difficulties. To this end, the Indian government has made strenuous efforts to connect with overseas Indian communities, and encouraged them to deposit their savings in Indian banks, invest in Indian companies, and start entrepreneurship in India. Furthermore, the Ministry of External Affairs of the Indian government instituted a Special High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora to consolidate policies pertaining to overseas Indians, conduct investigations into challenges or demands addressed by the communities, and study their role in economic, social, and technological development of India (Patterson, 2006). With the permission of obtaining a dual citizenship for NRIs and the launching of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indian Business Day) in 2003, transnational networks between homeland and diaspora communities became further strengthened. In particular, India has increasingly experienced the trend of NRIs who have built their skills, knowledge, and expertise in IT and science over the past decades returning to homeland to share knowledge and information with the local communities. Most prominently, high-skilled human capitals of Indian heritage in the Silicon Valley have increased their homeland investment and expanded their cooperative channels with homeland, through which Bangalore and Hyderabad in India have quickly developed into core IT hubs in the world. In turn, Indian locals educated through such investment are poured into the Silicon Valley to lead the economy in the United States. Such positive circulation of human capital is the crux of brain circulation. Nonetheless, the successful brain circulation of India is not translated well into the success in achieving global overseas Indian networks. This type of positive circulation is mostly limited to the United States; whereas, overseas Indian communities are dispersed throughout numerous countries in the world that manifest different histories of immigration, living standards, and characteristics of associational behaviors. Given that the government efforts in building transnational networks only started in 2003, more considerations and

consultations should be granted for overseas Indian associations and communities in various parts of the world to reflect their needs on legislations, as much needed in Korea as well.

Lastly, overseas Israelites or overseas Jewish communities, amounting to 7.8 million across the world with 73 percent of them concentrated in the United States, have maintained intimate and systematic channels of communication and mobility with Israel, since its inception. Due to a long history of territorial disputes with neighboring countries, gaining state legitimacy has been of primary importance and concern for Israel at the onset of state-building process. Therefore, attracting global talents of Jewish heritage to contribute to the development, reinforcement, and securitization of the Israelite territory has been essential part of national action plans in each administration of Israel. In this sense, the state-building ethos of Israel resonates with that of Korea in that ethnic nationalism is utilized as a political tool to gain sympathy and international recognition for the newly established state. Nevertheless, unlike Korea, for Israel, a state boundary has been a fluid concept, as its territorial boundaries have been changed constantly on the occasion of regional warfare or settlement expansion. Thus, ethnic nationalism, which is more of an effective tool to appeal its vulnerability in the Middle Eastern region, has superseded state nationalism. In this connection, Israel has enforced some major actions, namely Law of Return, Birthright Israel, I-Core (Israeli Centers of Research Excellence) Program, and Brain Gain Program. First and foremost, the Law of Return which was legislated in 1950 granted an Israeli nationality to all returning Jewish populations, along with 6 months of settlement subsidies and Hebrew language education. Non-comparably easy obtainment of nationality allowed Jewish populations to freely enter and exit the country to create stronger networks between diaspora and Israel. Second, the Birthright Israel, initiated in 1999, has given any Jewish young adult who has never been to Israel an opportunity to visit their homeland for 10 days with full sponsorship including airfare. This visiting program not only allowed overseas Jewish communities to build strong solidarity and global networks with their homeland but also promoted Israeli nationals' interests in overseas Jewish communities by encouraging their participation in fundraising and volunteering programs associated with Birthright Israel. Third, I-Core Program established 4 research institutes as of 2011, and invited foreign researchers in the fields of science and technology through building networks with universities, research centers, and hospitals in Israel. Notably, these programs are not necessarily concentrated on pulling in foreign talents of Jewish heritage; instead, the programs are aimed at equipping overseas Jewish populations with national pride, ethnic solidarity, and political unity so as to encourage them to represent the interests of Israel in their residence abroad and contribute to the development of homeland as well as their own communities by gaining political and economic power. Hence, compared to China, Korea, and India, Israel has the most fluid and intimate channels of communication, interaction, and cooperation with overseas ethnic communities, and manifests the closest depiction of brain circulation.

4. Conclusion by Way of Some Policy Suggestions

A resounding phenomenon of brain circulation across the world resonates strongly with Millennials, born between 1980 and 2000 now becoming the most active members of the job market. Millennials, projected to form half of the global workforce by 2020, represent stark differences from other generations, in terms of loyalty, longevity, and leadership in their workplace (Keene & Handrich, 2015). Harboring transnationalism, Millennials generally demonstrate a strong preference for international assignments during their career and a willingness to leave their jobs within two years if better opportunities for personal development and work-life balance arise. For example, a survey conducted by Deloitte (2016)

on 7,700 Millennials representing 29 countries across the world illustrates that 66 percent of the respondents expect to leave their current occupation by 2020, and 70 percent believe their personal values to be shared by the organizations they work for. Another survey conducted by PWC (2011) on 4,364 graduates across 75 countries demonstrates that 71 percent of the respondents believe international experience is vital for a successful career, and 65 percent feel that rigid hierarchies and outdated management styles explain the failure of recruiting young talents. South Korea, in contrast to a remarkable development path over the past 50 years, lagged behind in attracting or tapping into high-skilled Millennials precisely due to rigid hierarchies, non-participatory decision making, paternalistic leadership, xenophobia driven by ethnic nationalism, and exclusionary networks based on blood, regional or school ties (Shin, 2006; Lee, 2012).

In order to tap onto global talents, therefore, South Korea needs to establish a more open, brain circulation-based human resource development system. Brain circulation promotes the establishment of a long-term, sustainable transnational network that has the capacity of sharing financial, human, and social capital between closely bridged—even if geographically distant—communities to generate explicit and implicit knowledge for mutual development. As this paper has examined, the South Korean government has begun to switch its policy direction to brain circulation since the mid-2000s, and heightened its efforts to accommodate international talents by liberalizing some legal restrictions and launching such programs as BK21, Brain Return 500, Science Card, Gold Card, and Contact Korea. Despite the rather long list of policy attempts by the Korean government, however, the country still falls short of transforming its formal and informal institutions towards a more full-fledged brain circulation model. Hence, the first and foremost policy suggestion for institutionalizing brain circulation in the HRD system of South Korea concerns the need for some cognitive change towards a more open and inclusive national identity and citizenship.

Second, in accord with the cognitive change, the definition of overseas Koreans and their legal rights and status need to be revised. The current policies are deeply rooted in ethnic Koreans' blood and physical ties to their homeland, and non-Korean ethnic foreigners who are connected with overseas Koreans through marriage or other ways often find themselves excluded from the overseas Korean networks. It would be in South Korea's interest to embrace such "friends of Korea."

Third, to attract global talents to freely go back and forth to South Korea requires its legal institutions be flexible for the sake of ensuring and enhancing their quality of life as they stay or reside in the country. Examples of such legal arrangements for reconsideration and adjustment include rigid visa obtainment requirements, restrictive dual citizenship, compulsory military obligations, and unequal voting rights.

Fourth, an open HRD system requires knowledge and human networks be formed rather organically and horizontally than top-down state-manuevered. The world's renowned innovative industrial ecosystems like the Silicon Valley, Hsinchu Science Industrial Park, and Hyderabad and Bangalore IT hubs have the commonalities of grassroots organic formation. In such a vision for new state-society interaction or public-private partnership, the role of the South Korean state does not have to get diminished; it just needs to be transformed into a more empowering one from a *dirigiste* kind.

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